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Management review
In 2016, all Finnish nuclear power plants operated safely and caused no danger to their 
surrounding environment or employees. The collective radiation doses of employees were 
yet again historically low in almost all of the plant units and radioactive releases into the 
environment very small. The low employee radiation doses were the result of short annual 
outages and improvements implemented at the nuclear power plants. In spring 2016, three 
leaking fuel assemblies were replaced at Olkiluoto 1 during an extra refuelling outage, and 
then three more assemblies were replaced in connection with the annual outage due to 
subsequent leaks. The fuel leaks were one reason why the employee radiation doses at the 
plant unit were somewhat higher than in the previous years.
Over the course of 2016, Fortum Power and Heat Oy (Fortum) submitted to STUK a total of 
20 operational event reports. The operational events did not compromise nuclear or radiation 
safety. STUK performed an annual outage inspection in compliance with the periodic 
inspection programme during the annual outage. During the annual outages, Fortum 
inspected – according to a programme agreed with STUK – that there was no hydrogen 
flaking in the reactor pressure vessel of the power plant unit 1. Hydrogen flaking could have 
occurred during manufacture of the pressure vessel. A similar inspection on the pressure 
vessel of Loviisa 2 was performed in 2014. No hydrogen flaking was detected in either 
of the pressure vessels. In 2016, STUK focused its regulatory oversight on the Fortum’s 
organisation, inspecting Fortum’s management, competence, resource and procurement 
processes. Also in 2016, Fortum completed a major organisational renewal, and STUK 
oversaw its implementation and initial impact as part of its regulatory oversight.
In 2016, Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) submitted to STUK 11 operational event reports. 
Some radioactive materials were released into the environment in the case of two of the 
events. One of the events involved fuel leaks and the other an error during maintenance. 
The set limits were not exceeded and neither of the events compromised radiation safety of 
the population. Both events increased the radiation level inside the plant, which was taken 
into account when planning the work to be done by the employees. STUK performed an 
annual outage inspection in compliance with the periodic inspection programme during the 
annual outage. TVO implemented a new organisation and operations model in 2015. Based 
on inspections by STUK, the new operations model has been largely established, but there 
are still some challenges pertaining to the atmosphere at the company and the adequacy of 
resources. STUK will continue to monitor as part of its regulatory oversight the situation 
and the actions taken by TVO to maintain the organisation’s safety culture during the 
challenging change.
At both Olkiluoto and Loviisa, modifications required for improving safety continued. 
New main steam line safety valves were installed at Loviisa 1 during the 2016 annual 
outage. They will also operate in a case where water flows through them in addition to 
steam. A similar installation was carried out at Loviisa 2 in 2014. New main steam line 
radiation measuring instruments were also installed and commissioned at Loviisa 1. Of 
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the improvement measures started after the Fukushima accident, further improvements 
of the flood protection and securing the cooling of the fuel pools are still remaining. Their 
planning proceeded in 2016. An improvement project of the diesel fuel storage and transfer 
system was completed in 2016. STUK continued its review of the Loviisa I&C renewal 
documents and supervised installation work of the renewal’s first phase during the 2016 
annual outage. The first phase included a preventive safety function control and indication 
system as well as modernisation of the I&C status monitoring system. The rest of the I&C 
renewal installations will be completed during the 2017 and 2018 annual outages.
As a result of the Fukushima accident, Olkiluoto will improve, for example, systems used 
to cool the reactor and add whole new systems for pumping water into the reactor in 
case of a complete loss of AC power. Another ongoing project at Olkiluoto is an upgrade 
of the reactor coolant pumps and the emergency diesel generators. In 2016, first of the 
six reactor coolant pumps in Olkiluoto 1 was replaced. TVO plans to commission the new 
reactor coolant pumps between 2016 and 2018. STUK continued its review of documents 
pertaining to the modifications and the supervision of manufacture.
The installation and construction work of Olkiluoto 3 are nearing the end, and full-scale 
testing of the systems and components was started in 2016. Testing of the I&C systems 
started at the beginning of the year and the first process system tests were performed 
in April 2016. TVO submitted an operating licence application for the plant unit to the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE) in April 2016. At the same time, 
TVO submitted the documents on the plant and its operation required by virtue of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree to STUK for approval. In 2016, STUK focused its regulatory 
oversight on review of the operating licence application and on oversight of the remaining 
installations and the commissioning activities. While reviewing the operating licence 
application, STUK also prepared implementation decisions for Olkiluoto 3 of the updated 
YVL Guides that were published in 2013. The new YVL Guides will enter into force for 
Olkiluoto 3 as soon as the operating licence is granted.
Due to suspected product forgeries involving manufacturers in France, STUK required 
reports from the power companies on whether the suspicions involve manufacture of the 
components used at Olkiluoto 3 or whether any components from the said manufacturers 
have been used at the operating nuclear power plants. The report on Olkiluoto 3 must 
be submitted to STUK by the end of April 2017. No forgeries have been detected at the 
operating plant units, but the reports on Loviisa will be supplemented in early 2017.
In June 2015, Fennovoima submitted to the MEAE a construction licence application for 
a new nuclear power plant. At the same time, Fennovoima submitted to STUK for review 
documents required by the Nuclear Energy Decree. Fennovoima has supplemented and 
will supplement the construction licence application in stages between 2015 and 2018. 
Delivery of documents has been delayed from the schedule of the first licensing plan due 
to slower organisation than expected of the project and its supply chain and due to a lack 
of resources in the design organisation. STUK monitored the development of Fennovoima’s 
management system and quality management, and assessed the company’s organisational 
resources to begin construction of a nuclear power plant. In September 2015, STUK 
launched the inspections included in the regulatory inspection programme, and a total 
of 15 inspections of Fennovoima and key organisations of the plant supplier were carried 
out in 2016. Furthermore, STUK’s experts participated as observers in audits of the plant 
supplier and its subcontractors, arranged by Fennovoima.
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The handling and storage of spent nuclear fuel and operational waste and the disposal 
of operational waste were implemented safely, and no events compromising safety were 
detected at the Loviisa or Olkiluoto nuclear power plants. Due to the successful planning 
of operations, the plants accumulated clearly less operational waste than nuclear power 
plants on average. An important positive development in the waste management of the 
plants was the fact that operation of a solidification facility for liquid radioactive waste at 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant started on 15 February 2016 after STUK had approved the 
related application. Fortum continued the planning of repairs of the damage observed in 
the outer surface of the concrete vault in the solidified waste disposal facility, which is why 
the disposal of solidified waste could not be started yet.
The operating licence for the research reactor FiR 1 of VTT Technical Research Centre of 
Finland is valid until the end of 2023. VTT shut down the research reactor for financial 
reasons in June 2015 and has been preparing decommissioning of the research reactor ever 
since. STUK has conducted all the measures necessary for the oversight of the reactor that 
was shut down and prepared for the review of the application on the decommissioning of 
the reactor. VTT submitted a nuclear waste management plan for the research reactor to 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment in September 2016. The report described 
all measures since the 2015 report and all planned measures up until 2022. STUK stated 
in its statement to the MEAE that VTT had clearly progressed with the planning of the 
research reactor’s decommissioning over the course of the past year. The most important 
open issues regarding the decommissioning of the research reactor involve the return of 
spent fuel to the United States and the storage and disposal of dismantling waste.
After Posiva Oy received a construction licence from the Government on 12 November 
2015, STUK’s oversight has focused on the construction of the encapsulation and 
disposal facility. The regulatory oversight during the construction stage covers design, 
manufacture, construction and installation of the nuclear waste facility and its safety-
classified systems, structures and components. This stage also includes the nuclear waste 
facility’s commissioning stage, at which time STUK will oversee Posiva’s operations, review 
testing programmes and results, and perform commissioning inspections. In 2016, STUK’s 
oversight focused particularly on the assessment of Posiva’s readiness for construction 
after the submission of the construction licence. STUK continued to oversee construction of 
the underground research facility by Posiva, Posiva’s system design, activities of the Posiva 
organisation and development of Posiva’s safety analyses. An important stage in 2016 was 
the start of the construction of the disposal facility according to the construction licence. 
STUK comprehensively assessed Posiva’s readiness for construction before the construction 
work was started.
In June 2016, Fennovoima submitted to the MEAE its environmental impact assessment 
programme on the disposal of spent nuclear fuel as required in the 2010 decision-in-
principle. The submission of the EIA programme started Fennovoima’s spent fuel disposal 
project and the selection process of the disposal facility site. Fennovoima has proposed 
Sydänneva in Pyhäjoki and Eurajoki as the potential sites. The more exact research area in 
Eurajoki has not been determined as of yet. In its statement on the EIA programme, STUK 
emphasised the fact that the proposed process would last a long time, the need to regularly 
assess the programme to ensure that it is up to date and the fact that the exact research 
area in Eurajoki must be determined as soon as possible.
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In addition to the operation and construction of a nuclear facility, the use of nuclear energy 
as laid down in section 2 of the Nuclear Energy Act includes the possession, manufacture, 
production, transfer, handling, use, storage, transport, export and import of nuclear 
material. Furthermore, components, systems and information required by nuclear facilities 
are subject to licensing and oversight by virtue of the Nuclear Energy Act. In 2016, STUK 
became aware of two cases of import without the proper licence.
Nuclear safeguards in Finland were implemented in compliance with the international 
treaties. Nuclear safeguards ensure that nuclear materials and other nuclear items remain 
in peaceful use in compliance with the relevant licences and declarations and that nuclear 
facilities and related technologies are only utilised for peaceful purposes. STUK maintains 
a national control system which aim is to take care of the necessary oversight of use of 
nuclear energy for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. STUK processed reports and 
declarations on nuclear materials and performed safeguards inspections together with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission. STUK actively 
promoted with the IAEA and the European Commission the development of nuclear 
safeguards for the disposal of spent fuel. Key issues in this development work were the 
development of a new oversight model and a new fuel measuring technology.
STUK-B 214
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1 Development and implementation 
of legislation and regulations
Amendments and preparation of 
nuclear energy legislation
An amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act that 
provides STUK with the authority needed to issue 
binding orders on nuclear safety issues entered into 
force at the beginning of 2016. It emphasises the 
independence of STUK and its regulatory oversight.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment (MEAE) has regularly studied the 
need to reform nuclear energy legislation. STUK 
has also been active in this work. In the summer of 
2016, the MEAE decided to establish a project that 
aims at clarifying the Nuclear Energy Act by the 
beginning of 2018.
The decision to clarify the Act was made because 
of three Directives published by the European 
Commission in 2013 and 2014: an amendment of 
the Nuclear Safety Directive (2014/87/EURATOM), 
a Directive that establishes basic safety standards 
for the protection against the dangers arising from 
ionising radiation  (2013/59/EURATOM) and an 
amendment of the Directive on environmental 
impact assessments (2014/52/EU), which must be 
enforced in national legislation by the end of 2017. 
In the summer of 2016, the Commission also posed 
additional questions about the enforcement of the 
Directive on safe management of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste (2011/70/EURATOM) in 2013, 
which should be studied in the same connection.
The MEAE established a steering committee 
that makes decisions on the project policies and 
two working groups: one to assess the amend-
ments caused by the Directives and make proposals 
on them and another to address licensing issues. 
Representatives of STUK were named to both work-
ing groups and the sub working groups of the work-
ing groups.
Most of the policies on the amendment of the 
Nuclear Energy Act and the proposals required by 
them were completed by the end of 2016. The most 
important amendment proposals involve issues 
based on the Directives, such as nuclear facility de-
commissioning licence, transparency and licensee’s 
obligation to provide information, participation of 
the general public in the decision-making process on 
nuclear facility licensing, international peer reviews 
and the licensee’s obligations.
The proposals for amending the Act and their 
justification will be further processed in early 
2017. Preparation of an amendment of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree will also be started. The goal is for 
the amended Nuclear Energy Act and Decree to 
enter into force on 1 January 2018.
Update of STUK regulations and YVL Guides
STUK’s regulations adopted by virtue of the 
Nuclear Energy Act and the YVL Guides will be 
updated between 2016 and 2018. To proceed with 
this work, STUK initiated a project of its own 
(RYSÄ) in early 2016. For a start RYSÄ focused on 
assessing the needs to amend the regulations.
When updating the STUK regulations, the 
primary important issue is taking into account 
the amendments of the Act and Decree, but the 
Reference Levels for operating nuclear facilities, 
for waste and nuclear waste disposal facilities and 
for decommissioning by the Western European 
Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) in 2014 
and 2015 also have impact on the regulations. The 
WENRA member states are committed to enforce-
ment of the Reference Levels in their national 
regulations by the end of 2017. The International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has also published 
updated safety standards that take into account 
lessons learned from the Tepco Fukushima Daiichi 
accident, among other things. According to STUK’s 
guidelines, the IAEA standards must be taken into 
account when preparing the national regulations.
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Implementation of the YVL Guides
The nuclear safety guidelines (YVL Guides) cover 
all issues influencing the safety of nuclear facili-
ties, such as design, operation, safety of the facility 
and its environment, nuclear materials, nuclear 
waste, structures and equipment. The renewed 
YVL Guides were competed in late 2013 and have 
been applied as such to the planning of new nucle-
ar facility projects, such as the Fennovoima nuclear 
power plant project, ever since.
In 2015, STUK made YVL Guide implementa-
tion decisions to the operating units at Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto and VTT’s FiR research reactor. In 2016, 
STUK prepared YVL Guide implementation deci-
sions to Olkiluoto 3. The decisions will be finalised 
in 2017 and the new YVL Guides will enter into 
force for Olkiluoto 3 as soon as the operating li-
cence is granted.
In the YVL Guide implementation project, 
STUK assessed guide-specific reports by the licen-
sees, focusing on the processing of non-conform-
ances and measures proposed by the licensees. The 
project covered 42 YVL Guides and the around 
8,000 requirements included in them. More than 
60 people participated in the STUK implementa-
tion project, using 2.2 man-years.
STUK-B 214
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2 Results of regulatory oversight of 
nuclear power plants in 2016
2.1 Loviisa 1 and 2
STUK oversaw the safety of the Loviisa power 
plant and assessed its organisation in different 
areas by means of reviewing materials provided 
by the licensee, carrying out inspections in line 
with the periodic inspection programme and the 
YVL guides, and by overseeing operations at the 
plant. On the basis of this regulatory oversight, 
STUK can state that operations did not cause a ra-
diation hazard to the employees, population or the 
environment. Summaries of inspections included 
in the periodic inspection programme for 2016 are 
included in Appendix 4. The periodic safety assess-
ment that was started in 2014 was also continued. 
It will be finalised in 2017.
Radiation safety of the plant, 
personnel and the environment
The collective occupational radiation dose of the 
employees in 2016 was 0.25 manSv at Loviisa 1 
and 0.32 manSv at Loviisa 2. The combined ra-
diation dose of both units (0.84 manSv) was one 
of the lowest doses ever when compared to all the 
years during which a longer annual outage was 
performed. The collective occupational dose during 
the annual outage of Loviisa 1 was clearly lower 
than originally anticipated and clearly lower than 
during the reference year (2008). The collective 
occupational dose at Loviisa 2 complied with the 
advance estimate. The positive development is the 
result of development of the working methods to 
lower the radiation doses and the replacing of re-
actor coolant pump seals that contained activated 
antimony with seals that do not contain antimony 
between 2011 and 2014. Activated antimony that 
attached itself to the primary circuit piping was 
a major source of radiation in the steam genera-
tor room. According to primary circuit dose rate 
measurements performed during the annual out-
age and nuclide-specific measurements, the radia-
tion levels are clearly lower than in the previous 
years. Fortum also performed some eye dose meas-
urements during the annual outages. As radiation 
legislation will be revised, which means that the 
equivalent dose limit for the lens of the eye will 
become stricter, the work on determining the eye 
doses must be continued.
The annual effective dose from radiation work 
for a worker may not exceed 100  mSv during a 
period of five years (on average 20 mSv per year) 
and a maximum of 50 mSv during any single year. 
The actual radiation doses remained clearly below 
these limits. The largest individual dose at the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant was 9.8 mSv; this dose 
was the result of work on insulation materials dur-
ing the annual outage.
 Loviisa
manSv
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
Figure 1. Collective occupational doses since the start of operation of the Loviisa nuclear power plant.
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Radioactive releases into the air and sea re-
mained clearly below the set limits. The calculated 
radiation dose of the most exposed individual in 
the vicinity of the plant was around 0.05 µSv per 
year or less than 0.1% of the set limit (Appendix 1, 
indicator A.I.5c).
A total of approximately 500 samples were col-
lected and analysed from the land and marine en-
vironment surrounding the Loviisa nuclear power 
plant in 2016. Small amounts of radioactive sub-
stances originating from the plant were observed 
in some of the analysed environmental samples. 
The amounts were so low that they are insignifi-
cant in terms of the radiation safety of the environ-
ment or people. The exposure to radioactivity of 
residents in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant 
was also measured. No radioactive substances 
originating from the Loviisa power plant were de-
tected in them.
Operation and operational events
In 2016, Fortum reported the results of twenty 
event investigations to STUK. Most of the events 
revealed development areas involving procedures 
and operating methods, such as compliance with 
the operational limits and conditions and guide-
lines, sufficiency of instructions, planning of work 
and communication. Around half of the events took 
place during the annual outages. The operational 
events in 2016 did not compromise nuclear or ra-
diation safety, and all of the events were rated 
as category 0 events on the international INES 
scale. The most important operational events are 
described in Appendix 3.
STUK verified by reviewing reports that 
Fortum has investigated the underlying causes of 
the events and initiated the necessary actions to 
correct technical faults and deficiencies in its op-
erations methods and prevent reoccurrence of the 
events. STUK considered most of Fortum’s event 
investigations sufficient. However, STUK required 
that Fortum further investigate the underlying 
causes of one of the events. In the case of some 
events, STUK required minor additional actions 
or pointed out issues that Fortum should take into 
account in its further development. Furthermore, 
STUK wished to verify in the case of some of the 
events that Fortum is able to achieve changes with 
the actions it has taken. To monitor this issue, 
STUK requested that Fortum submit reports on 
the impact of the corrective actions at a later date.
STUK uses the results of the event investiga-
tions also when choosing the focus areas of its 
plant inspections. In the 2016 inspections, STUK 
studied issues such as the underlying reasons for 
delays of pressure equipment inservice inspections 
and Fortum’s improvement actions, as well as nu-
clear fuel refuelling machine personnel resources 
and qualification of these employees. STUK is of 
the opinion that Fortum’s reporting indicates a 
willingness to develop the operations in order to 
learn from the events.
The annual outages of the plant units were 
implemented as planned in terms of nuclear and 
radiation safety. In addition to refuelling and modi-
fications, a large number of maintenance meas-
ures and inspections are carried out during each 
annual outage to ensure the safe and reliable 
operation of the nuclear power plant. The annual 
outage inspections were carried out on schedule 
and in the planned scope. During the annual out-
ages, Fortum inspected – in accordance with a 
programme agreed with STUK – that there was no 
hydrogen flaking in the reactor pressure vessel of 
the power plant unit 1. No observations indicating 
hydrogen flaking were made. A similar inspection 
on the pressure vessel of Loviisa 2 was performed 
during the 2014 annual outage. The most impor-
tant events during the annual outage involved 
the refuelling of Loviisa 1, and STUK required a 
report on these events from Fortum. An indication 
from an emergency water system nozzle was found 
at Loviisa 1 with a new inspection method, and 
STUK required that Fortum conduct similar in-
spections of both plant units also during the 2017 
annual outages. More information about the an-
nual outages is available in Appendix 3 and a sum-
mary of the annual outage inspection is included in 
Appendix 4.
Development of the plant and its safety
Several modification projects that will improve 
plant safety are currently ongoing at the nuclear 
power plant. The largest project is the Loviisa I&C 
renewal. Installations included in the first phase of 
the project were completed at both plant units dur-
ing the 2016 annual outage. This phase included a 
preventive safety function control and indication 
system as well as modernisation of the I&C status 
monitoring system. STUK continued its review of 
STUK-B 214
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2.1 Loviisa 1 and 2
the Loviisa I&C renewal documents for the subse-
quent phases. The rest of the I&C renewal instal-
lations will be completed during the 2017 and 2018 
annual outages.
A replacement project of Polar cranes in the re-
actor buildings of the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
has started well and STUK reviewed construction 
plans related to the modification in late 2016. The 
construction inspections started at the end of the 
year. According to Fortum’s plans, installation and 
commissioning of the cranes will take place before 
the 2018 annual outages.
During the 2016 annual outage, new main 
steam line safety valves were installed in Loviisa 
1. The valves have also been qualified with a 
steam-water mixture to prevent them from get-
ting stuck in the open position, which will prevent 
a primary-secondary circuit leak, for example. A 
similar installation was carried out at Loviisa 2 
during the 2014 annual outage. In 2016, STUK 
approved, based on analyses and reports, changes 
made by Fortum in its guidelines according to 
which the forced opening function of the valves will 
be utilised to reach a safe state also in more infre-
quent cases if the other means are not available. 
The reports involved opening of the valve slowing 
down during continuous operation.
New main steam line radiation measuring in-
struments were also installed and commissioned 
at Loviisa 1 to replace the old, aged instruments. 
The new measuring instruments are more sensi-
tive than the old ones and are better at detecting 
any leaks from the steam generators to the second-
ary circuit. Similar instruments were installed at 
Loviisa 2 in 2015.
A new weather mast and related sensors were 
commissioned at Loviisa in the summer of 2016. 
The weather mast had been tested parallel to the 
old system since 2015. When the weather mast sys-
tem was replaced, a marine weather observation 
point to support the power plant’s weather mast 
was constructed on Orrengrund island, which is 
located around 10 kilometres from the power plant.
During the annual outages, Fortum replaced 
one high pressure safety injection pump motor 
and the related heat exchanger at both units. The 
pumps themselves were replaced in 2006 (LO2) 
and 2008 (LO1). The pumps are important to safe-
ty, and this action ensures their operability and the 
availability of spare parts until the end of the plant 
units’ service lives. The work will be continued in 
2017, at which time the rest of the motors (three in 
total) at both units will be replaced.
The modifications started after the assessments 
done due to the Fukushima accident were contin-
ued in 2016. As part of the preparations for high 
seawater level, Fortum conducted additional stud-
ies and continued the planning of added flooding 
protection for the rest of the emergency systems 
that could be needed under extreme conditions. 
The raising of the stop-log gates is ongoing and, in 
addition to the flooding protection of the auxiliary 
emergency feedwater pumping plant, Fortum is 
planning a similar protection system for the ad-
ditional residual heat removal system. The plan is 
to realise it in 2017. In 2016, STUK also approved 
Fortum’s updated plans regarding securing the 
cooling of the fuel pools under highly exceptional 
conditions. According to Fortum’s plans, installa-
tion and commissioning of the modification will 
take place in 2018. Some improvements in the stor-
age and availability of diesel fuel were also made 
in 2016 to ensure that diesel fuel will be available 
to all of the systems required during an emergency 
for a minimum period of 72 hours.
The original plan was for modifications aiming 
at securing the safety functions of the secondary 
circuit in the turbine hall in case of a high energy 
pipe break to be implemented during the 2016 
annual outage, but Fortum postponed the modi-
fications to 2018 because further planning was 
necessary.
Periodic safety assessment
In 2016, STUK continued the finalisation of its 
periodic safety assessment that was started in 
2014, and the work will be completed in 2017. 
According to the terms of the operating licence that 
was granted to Fortum in 2007, the licensee must 
prepare comprehensive safety assessments for the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority by the 
end of the years 2015 and 2023. STUK will create 
its own safety assessments based on these assess-
ments and require actions from Fortum to correct 
deficiencies or improve safety, if necessary.
Emergency preparedness arrangements
STUK oversaw the ability of the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant emergency preparedness organisation 
to act under exceptional conditions with inspec-
14
STUK-B 214 2.1 Loviisa 1 and 2
tion visits and by reviewing reports and emer-
gency response plan updates submitted by Fortum. 
No events requiring emergency response actions 
took place at the Loviisa nuclear power plant in 
2016. An extensive cooperation drill was arranged 
at the plant in April. Several public administra-
tion organisations participated in the drill. In coop-
eration, the organisations were able to respond to 
all key challenges practiced in the drill. Potential 
development areas identified when assessing the 
drill included an assessment of the emergency pre-
paredness organisation’s alarm arrangements, the 
introduction of status logs for the holders of differ-
ent posts and replacement of the keys to the plant 
needed by repair teams. Emergency preparedness 
arrangements at the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
have been systematically developed and the plant’s 
emergency preparedness arrangements comply 
with all the key requirements.
Security arrangements
STUK assessed the security arrangements of the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant with an inspection 
included in the periodic inspection programme 
(Appendix 4) and by participating in oversight 
during the annual outage (Appendix 3). Fortum’s 
security arrangements drill plan was realised as 
planned in 2016. STUK participated in the drills 
mainly to test the connections, i.e. to practice the 
reception of announcements and the initiation of 
operations.
In late December 2016, Fortum submitted new 
versions of the Loviisa nuclear power plant’s secu-
rity plan and security standing order to STUK for 
approval.
A new head of the corporate security unit and a 
new head of information security were appointed 
in connection with Fortum’s organisational renew-
al. STUK approved these changes as part of the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant’s administrative rules.
Fire safety
Fire safety at the Loviisa nuclear power plant is at 
a good level. In 2016, STUK oversaw the plant’s fire 
safety with an inspection included in the periodic 
inspection programme (Appendix 4), with site visits 
and by reviewing reports submitted by Fortum.
Modifications that improved fire safety in 2016 
included a modification of the hydraulic turbine by-
pass stations into water-powered ones, for example.
Organisational operations and 
quality management
Based on STUK’s oversight, one can state that with 
a view to ensuring safety, the Loviisa nuclear power 
plant organisation has operated in a systematic and 
development-oriented way. STUK oversaw the oper-
ations of the Loviisa nuclear power plant organisa-
tion and competence management by, for example, 
performing two inspections included in the periodic 
inspection programme (Appendix 4). Furthermore, 
resource planning was the general theme of all of 
the inspections included in the periodic inspection 
programme in 2016. STUK focused its regulatory 
oversight particularly on Fortum’s management, 
competence management, resource management 
and procurement processes. In 2016, Fortum real-
ised a comprehensive organisational renewal that 
also involved the operations and personnel of the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant. The new organisation-
al structure entered into force on 1 July 2016. The 
change did not influence the annual outages which 
started in August, as the annual outage organisa-
tion had been determined based on the old areas of 
responsibility. STUK did not detect any special im-
pact on nuclear safety caused by the organisational 
renewal in 2016, but the issue will be reassessed 
and impacts will be monitored also in 2017.
Operational waste management
The processing, storage and disposal of low- and 
intermediate-level waste (operational waste) at 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant were carried out 
as planned. The volume and activity of opera-
tional waste in relation to reactor power remained 
low compared with most other countries. The nu-
clear power plant pays attention to keeping the 
amount of waste generated as low as possible 
by tightly packing the waste and releasing from 
control waste with so low a level of radioactivity 
that no special measures are needed. The most 
important development in waste management in 
2016 was the fact that operation of a solidification 
facility for liquid radioactive waste started on 15 
February 2016 after STUK had approved the re-
lated application.
Fortum detected corrosion damage on the outer 
surface of a concrete vault in the hall for solidified 
waste for low- and intermediate-level waste (KJT) 
in 2014. Fortum has launched a renovation project 
to repair the vault. The purpose of the project is to 
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STUK oversaw the safety of the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant and assessed its organisation in dif-
ferent areas by means of reviewing materials pro-
vided by the licensee, carrying out inspections in 
line with the periodic inspection programme and 
overseeing operations at the plant. Summaries of 
inspections included in the periodic inspection pro-
gramme for 2017 are included in Appendix 4. On 
the basis of this regulatory oversight, STUK can 
state that operations did not cause a radiation 
hazard to the employees, population or the envi-
ronment.
Radiation safety of the plant, 
personnel and the environment
The collective occupational radiation dose of the 
employees in 2016 was 0.64 manSv at Olkiluoto 1 
and 0.24 manSv at Olkiluoto 2. The slightly high-
er radiation dose than in the previous years at 
Olkiluoto 1 was partly due to the fuel leaks in the 
plant unit. The event is described in more detail in 
Appendix 3.
Due to the fuel leaks, releases into the air from 
Olkiluoto 1 were larger than in the previous years. 
Furthermore, a leak in a flange of the exhaust 
gas system’s radiation measuring system inside 
the turbine building of Olkiluoto 1 was detected 
after the annual outage in June. Due to the leak-
ing flange, some of the radioactive materials in the 
exhaust gas (most of them short-lived) moved from 
the interior of the plant unit to the vent stack with-
out entering the exhaust gas system delay tanks, 
which increased the noble gas and aerosol releases 
of the plant unit, in particular. Radioactive re-
leases into the air and sea remained clearly below 
the set limits despite the above-mentioned events. 
The calculated radiation dose of the most exposed 
individual in the vicinity of the plant was around 
0.28 µSv per year or less than 1% of the set limit 
(Appendix 1, indicator A.I.5c).
The annual effective dose from radiation work 
for a worker may not exceed 100 mSv during a pe-
riod of five years (on average 20 mSv per year) and 
a maximum of 50 mSv during any single year. The 
actual radiation doses remained clearly below these 
limits. The largest individual dose at the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant was 8.1 mSv; this dose was the 
result of mechanical maintenance work.
ensure that the engineered barrier will be in the 
planned condition at the time when the facility is 
closed. The project includes removal of aluminium 
nails that pose a corrosion risk from the vault 
structures and the maintenance of the surround-
ing rock surfaces, among other repair actions. The 
renovation will continue in 2017.
STUK performed a commissioning inspection 
of the maintenance/waste room 3 (HJT3) in June 
2016. The commissioning inspection was based on 
an operating licence granted by STUK that allows 
Fortum to use HJT3 for the sorting and storage of 
low-level waste. As the concrete vault in the hall 
for solidified waste (KJT) is currently being re-
paired, Fortum applied from STUK a licence to use 
HJT3 as the interim storage facility for concrete 
waste packages crated during the solidification 
process until the end of 2018. STUK granted the 
applied permit in August 2016.
Fortum initiated a spent fuel disposal devel-
opment programme for the years 2016–2030 be-
cause the transport of spent fuel to the Posiva fa-
cility in Olkiluoto and its disposal require actions 
to be taken at the Loviisa nuclear power plant. 
The development programme covers all of the 
work on the storage and disposal of spent fuel re-
quired by the Posiva disposal project. At the first 
phase at the end of 2016, Fortum has started the 
planning of the modernisation of gantry cranes to 
be used in the interim storage facility for spent 
nuclear fuel.
Nuclear safeguards
In 2016, a total of ten nuclear safeguards inspec-
tions were conducted at Loviisa nuclear power 
plant. STUK performed an inspection pertaining 
to the verification of the physical inventory of nu-
clear materials together with the IAEA and the 
European Commission both before and after the 
annual outages. Furthermore, STUK inspected the 
locations of the fuel assemblies in the reactor core 
prior to closing of the reactor cover in Loviisa 1 and 
Loviisa 2. Also in 2016, STUK performed a nuclear 
fuel reception inspection. No remarks were made 
in the inspections.
2016 was the first year when STUK included 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant nuclear safe-
guards inspections in its periodic inspection pro-
gramme (see Appendix 4).
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Fission product activity levels at Olkiluoto 1 
will be elevated in the next few years due to the 
fuel leaks. Radioactive iodine was detected in the 
systems of many of the employees in full-body 
measurements performed by STUK during the 
annual outage, but the internal dose recording 
threshold (0.1 mSv) was not exceeded in the case of 
any of the employees.
A total of approximately 450 samples were col-
lected and analysed from the land and marine 
environment surrounding the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant in 2016. Small amounts of radioac-
tive substances originating from the plant were 
observed in some of the analysed environmental 
samples. Unlike in the past years, small amounts 
of radioactive iodine were detected in the analysed 
air samples. This was to be expected, as more iodine 
than before was released from the plant into the 
environment in connection with the annual outages 
in the spring due to the leaking fuel rods. The level 
of radioactivity detected in the environmental sam-
ples was so low that it was insignificant in terms of 
the radiation safety of the environment or people. 
The exposure to radioactivity of residents in the 
vicinity of the nuclear power plant was also meas-
ured. No radioactive substances originating from 
the Olkiluoto power plant were detected in them.
Operation and operational events
In 2016, TVO reported the results of 11 event in-
vestigations to STUK. Nine of the investigations 
involved single events and two of the investiga-
tions involved several events occurred during the 
annual outages. Most of the events revealed devel-
opment areas involving procedures and operating 
methods, such as compliance with guidelines, suf-
ficiency of instructions and the planning of work. 
Development areas in employee orientation were 
identified in some of the investigations. Some ra-
dioactive materials were released into the envi-
ronment in the case of two of the events. One of 
the events involved fuel leaks and the other an 
error during maintenance. The set limits were not 
exceeded and neither of the events compromised 
radiation safety of the population. Both events in-
creased the radiation level inside the plant. The 
employees’ radiation exposure was limited by, for 
example, properly scheduling the work and en-
suring that the employees use protective equip-
ment. The most important operational events are 
described in Appendix 3.
STUK verified by reviewing event reports that 
TVO has investigated the underlying causes of 
the events and initiated the necessary actions to 
correct technical faults and deficiencies in its op-
erations methods and prevent reoccurrence of the 
events. STUK considered most of TVO’s investiga-
tions of the single events sufficient. In one case, 
STUK requested TVO to further investigate the 
underlying causes of an event and assess suffi-
ciency of the measures taken to improve the opera-
tions. In one case, STUK wished to verify that TVO 
is able to achieve changes with the actions it has 
taken. To monitor this issue, STUK requested that 
TVO submit reports on the impact of the corrective 
actions at a later date.
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Figure 2. Collective occupational doses since the start of operation of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2.
STUK-B 214
17
2.2 OlkiluOtO 1 and 2
The annual outages of the plant units were 
implemented as planned in terms of nuclear and 
radiation safety. A large number of maintenance 
measures and inspections are also carried out 
during each annual outage to ensure the safe 
and reliable operation of the nuclear power plant. 
Non-destructive inservice inspections of pressure 
equipment were implemented in compliance with 
an inservice inspection programme approved by 
STUK. STUK performed an annual outage inspec-
tion in compliance with the periodic inspection 
programme during the annual outage. A summary 
of the inspection is presented in Appendix 4. More 
information about annual outages of the plant 
units and STUK’s regulatory oversight is available 
in Appendix 3.
Development of the plant and its safety
Several modification projects that will improve 
plant safety that were designed based on assess-
ments of the Fukushima accident are currently 
ongoing at the nuclear power plant. These modi-
fications will improve the provisions for extreme 
external threats. TVO will install a steam turbine-
driven core-cooling system to manage a situation 
where a total loss of AC power has occurred. The 
plan is to commission the system in 2017 and 2018.
Dependence of the auxiliary feedwater system 
from the seawater cooling was clearly reduced 
by implementing a modification at Olkiluoto 1 in 
2014. Abnormal vibration and sounds were detect-
ed during testing in one of the new recirculation 
lines, however, and TVO continued to investigate 
the problems in 2016. A similar modification of 
the recirculation line will not be implemented at 
Olkiluoto 2 until the studies are completed. A reli-
able total view of how the modification will be com-
pleted could not be reached based on the reports 
submitted to STUK, which is why STUK required 
from TVO a report that describes the current sta-
tus of the auxiliary feedwater system and justifies 
operability of the system in Olkiluoto 1. The report 
must indicate how the problems detected by TVO 
are being resolved and the schedule of the repairs. 
The report must be submitted to STUK in early 
2017.
A project to replace the reactor coolant pumps 
and the frequency converters needed to control and 
supply power to the pumps, as well as a project 
to replace the nuclear power plant’s emergency 
diesel generators are also ongoing at the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant. TVO started with the replace-
ment of one of the six pumps in Olkiluoto 1 during 
the 2016 annual outage. TVO plans to commission 
the rest of the new reactor coolant pumps in 2017 
and 2018. STUK continued its review of documents 
pertaining to replacement of the reactor coolant 
pumps and the oversight of manufacture. In the 
emergency diesel generator project, eight of the 
power plant’s emergency diesel generators will be 
replaced and a ninth generator will be built. TVO 
has estimated that the first new emergency diesel 
generator will be commissioned in spring 2018. 
Then, the remaining eight emergency diesel gen-
erators will be installed and commissioned one by 
one in such a manner that the last one will be com-
missioned in spring 2022. The new diesel genera-
tors can be cooled with seawater and air. The cur-
rent ones can be cooled only with seawater. STUK 
is overseeing the upgrade. In 2016, STUK reviewed 
related design documents. 
Emergency preparedness arrangements
STUK oversaw the ability of the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant emergency preparedness organisation 
to act under exceptional conditions with inspection 
visits and by reviewing reports and emergency re-
sponse plan updates submitted by TVO. No events 
requiring emergency response actions took place 
at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant in 2016. In 
September, an emergency preparedness drill that 
covered both operating plant units and the spent 
fuel storage facility was arranged at the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant. An emergency preparedness 
drill that covers several plant units has not been 
arranged before at Olkiluoto. The key emergency 
preparedness actors participated in the drill: TVO, 
STUK, the rescue services and the police. In coop-
eration, the organisations were able to respond to 
all the key challenges practiced. Potential develop-
ment areas identified when assessing the drill in-
cluded the equipment available at the maintenance 
assembly point, the introduction of status logs for 
the holders of different posts and providing more 
training on the INES classification system. Even 
though more construction activities are ongoing 
at the Olkiluoto 3 construction site, the construc-
tion site’s influence on emergency preparedness ar-
rangements was low. The emergency preparedness 
arrangements have been continuously developed, 
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and future commissioning of Olkiluoto 3 has been 
taken into account in the development. Emergency 
preparedness at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
complies with the key requirements.
Nuclear security
STUK assessed the plant’s security arrangements 
in inspections included in the periodic inspection 
programme (Appendix 4). Drills are part of the 
development of security arrangements and the 
assessment of their effectiveness. In 2016, two 
emergency preparedness drills on threatening 
situations and training on threatening situations 
were arranged by TVO and the police together. 
Monitoring and reporting of the security organisa-
tion training programme have been developed in 
the past few years, and the plan is to use training 
more in the demonstration of the effectiveness of 
the security arrangements.
TVO submitted to STUK for approval a secu-
rity standing order and a security plan as well as 
updated versions of the transport security plan, for 
which STUK issued a request for clarification.
Fire safety
Fire safety at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant is 
at an acceptable level. In 2016, STUK oversaw fire 
safety of the nuclear power plant by means of regu-
latory inspections and site visits, and by reviewing 
reports submitted by TVO.
Organisational operations and 
quality management
Based on STUK’s oversight and the results of oper-
ating activities, it can be stated that with a view to 
ensuring safety, TVO’s organisation has operated 
in a systematic and development-oriented way. The 
operating model adopted by TVO in 2015 has been 
largely established, but there are clear challenges 
involving the atmosphere in the company. Their ef-
fects on the quality of the operations must be ana-
lysed and managed by the management of the com-
pany. Based on the regulatory oversight of STUK, 
there is reason to suspect that the organisation 
will also face challenges with the adequacy of re-
sources. STUK will continue to monitor the actions 
taken by TVO to maintain the organisation’s safety 
culture during the challenging change.
Operational waste management
The processing, storage and disposal of low- and 
intermediate-level waste (operational waste) at 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant were carried out as 
planned. The volume and activity of operational 
waste in relation to reactor power remained low 
compared with most other countries. The nuclear 
power plant pays attention to keeping the amount 
of waste generated as low as possible by tight-
ly packing the waste and releasing from control 
waste with so low a level of radioactivity that no 
special measures are needed. Disposal of radioac-
tive waste originating from the use of radiation at 
the operational waste disposal facility in Olkiluoto 
started at the end of 2016. These sources have been 
removed from use and classified radioactive waste. 
According to the Radiation Act and the Radiation 
Decree, such waste is under the responsibility of 
the state and the management of STUK.
An expansion of the spent fuel interim storage 
facility at Olkiluoto was completed in early 2015. 
Due to the expansion, TVO submitted to STUK for 
approval updated materials from the final safety 
analysis report (FSAR) of the facility, which STUK 
reviewed and approved.
Nuclear safeguards
A total of 19 nuclear safeguards inspections of 
TVO’s operating plants and the spent fuel storage 
facility were performed. STUK performed, together 
with the IAEA and the European Commission, in-
spections on the physical inventory of nuclear ma-
terials at both plant units and the spent nuclear 
fuel storage facility both before and after the an-
nual outages. Furthermore, STUK inspected the 
locations of the fuel assemblies in the reactor core 
prior to the closing of the reactor cover in Olkiluoto 
1 and Olkiluoto 2. A similar inspection was also 
performed after the extra outage of Olkiluoto 1. In 
addition, STUK completed a nuclear safeguards 
inspection on both plant units and the spent fuel 
storage facility, as well as a fuel reception inspec-
tion at Olkiluoto 1. STUK also participated in three 
inspections of IAEA and Euratom in Olkiluoto 
at short notice. Two of these inspections involved 
Olkiluoto 1 and one the spent fuel storage facility.
2016 was the first year when STUK included 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant nuclear safe-
guards inspections in its periodic inspection pro-
gramme. The inspection covered the procedures 
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TVO uses to meet the requirements posed by 
legislation, the YVL Guides and EU Regulations. 
Two requirements were imposed in the inspection. 
Compliance with them will be verified in 2017.
TVO imported measuring instrument shields 
(protective sleeves of SIRM detectors) without 
a licence which was not in compliance with the 
Nuclear Energy Act and submitted a special nucle-
ar safeguards report on the event to STUK. STUK 
required that TVO update its nuclear safeguards 
manual so that it includes clear instructions to 
avoid similar events in the future.
Renewal of the operating licence
The current operating licence for Olkiluoto 1 and 
Olkiluoto 2 is valid until the end of 2018. TVO will 
submit an application on renewal of the operating 
licence to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment in early 2017. The procedure to be 
followed when an application for the renewal of an 
operating licence for a nuclear facility currently 
in operation is filed is the same as that for filing 
an application for an operating licence for a new 
nuclear facility. A periodic safety assessment of 
the facility is always performed before renewing 
the operating licence. TVO submitted to STUK its 
periodic safety assessment and the related reports 
as laid down in YVL Guide A.1 at the end of 2016. 
STUK has started the review of the documents and 
the preparation of its safety assessment. Both of 
these tasks will be completed by the end of 2017.
2.3 Olkiluoto 3
STUK oversaw the construction and testing of the 
Olkiluoto 3 plant unit and TVO’s preparation for 
the future operational phase. In 2016, STUK fo-
cused its regulatory oversight on review of the 
operating licence application and on oversight of 
the remaining installations and the commissioning 
activities.
TVO submitted an operating licence application 
to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 
(MEAE) in April 2016. At the same time, TVO sub-
mitted the documents on the plant and its opera-
tion required by virtue of section 36 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree to STUK for approval.
Installation of almost all of the systems and 
components in Olkiluoto 3 was completed and 
large-scale testing started in 2016. Testing of the 
I&C systems started at the beginning of the year 
and the first process system tests were performed 
in April 2016. Many more tests have been started 
after that time.
STUK’s oversight consisted of assessing the 
acceptability of documents, monitoring the licen-
see’s operations and safety culture, inspecting the 
licensee’s operations in compliance with the con-
struction inspection programme (RTO), a variety 
of component and system inspections to verify the 
compliance of products and general oversight at on 
site.
Based on these oversight measures, STUK ob-
served that most of TVO’s procedures and opera-
tions are at a good level. In summary, based on the 
results of regulatory oversight, STUK is able to 
state that the original safety targets of the plant 
can be achieved.
Review of the operating licence application
TVO submitted an operating licence application to 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 
(MEAE) in April 2016. At the same time, TVO sub-
mitted the documents on the plant and its opera-
tion required by virtue of section 36 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree to STUK for approval. The operat-
ing licence documents were submitted to STUK as 
an entity from which only the fire risk analyses are 
missing. STUK had granted a permission to submit 
the fire risk analyses at a later date. The fire risk 
analyses were submitted to STUK in October 2016.
STUK will verify when reviewing the operat-
ing licence application that the prerequisites for 
safe operation of the plant are met. Detailed safe-
ty requirements are included in STUK’s regula-
tions and nuclear power plant guidelines (the YVL 
Guides). STUK assesses compliance with these 
requirements during the operating licence review 
process.
STUK’s safety assessment will not be based 
solely on a review of the operating licence docu-
mentation; instead, STUK will utilise in its as-
sessment all of the results from its oversight op-
erations, such as the general oversight of the plant 
site, its inspections and results obtained during the 
commissioning of the plant.
As STUK has already reviewed and approved 
the design of the systems and components during 
construction, i.e. before the submission of the oper-
ating licence application, the focus of the operating 
licence review does not lie in the assessment of 
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design. Instead, STUK assesses the readiness of 
the organisation to start operational activities, the 
analyses performed to demonstrate the safety level 
and the status of open issues from the previous 
stages.
STUK has proceeded with the operating licence 
review according to plan. The first decisions on the 
documents referred to in section 36 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act have been made. Review of the larger 
documents, such as the final safety analysis report, 
the operational limits and conditions and the prob-
abilistic risk assessment, will continue in 2017.
STUK will not issue a statement on the oper-
ating licence until it has been proven with com-
missioning tests that the plant and its systems 
operate as planned. Large-scale testing started at 
Olkiluoto in the spring of 2016. The plan is to com-
plete the tests of single systems and components 
by the summer of 2017, after which time the plant 
will be tested as a single entity before the loading 
of nuclear fuel. STUK oversees the testing on site 
at Olkiluoto. If the testing proceeds as planned, 
STUK will issue its statement on the operating 
licence application at the end of 2017. According 
to the present schedule, the loading of nuclear fuel 
will take place in April 2018.
Review of other licensing documents
I&C component suitability analyses and stress 
analyses of mechanical components and piping, 
among other documents, are still to be submitted 
to STUK.
STUK monitored progress of the I&C compo-
nent qualification and reviewed the component 
suitability analyses. The documentation of the 
qualification tests and the preparation of the suit-
ability analyses will continue until the beginning 
of 2018. The final suitability analyses must be 
Suspected product forgeries by 
component manufacturers
In May, the French nuclear safety authority ASN in-
formed STUK of suspected malpractice at the Creusot 
Forge factory that manufactured important compo-
nents for the Olkiluoto 3 reactor coolant circuit, such 
as forged parts of the pressurizer and the primary 
circuit pipes. Deficiencies, negligence and forgeries 
had been detected in the documentation delivered by 
the factory.
At the same time, TVO announced that it had 
received information about uncertainties detected 
in material certificates from SBS (Spécial Brides 
Service), a company that had delivered materials to 
several subcontractors. STUK required from TVO a 
report on whether these suspicions are connected to 
the manufacture of components for Olkiluoto 3 and 
if so, what is their significance. Furthermore, in con-
nection with this issue STUK required from TVO and 
Fortum reports on whether any components subject 
to similar quality uncertainties had been delivered 
by the said company to any of the currently operating 
Finnish nuclear power plants.
Areva’s report on Creusot Forge’s OL3 documen-
tation was still unfinished at the end of the year. In 
November, STUK participated in an international 
regulatory inspection of the Creusot Forge factory. 
TVO visited the factory in December. According to 
preliminary information, the investigation at the fac-
tory will be completed by the end of March 2017, after 
which time Areva will submit the results and conclu-
sions to TVO. STUK has required a report from TVO 
on the issue once the document review at the factory 
has been completed. The report must be submitted to 
STUK by the end of April. STUK is currently review-
ing the operating licence application of the OL3 plant 
unit. This matter must be cleared up before STUK can 
issue a statement on the operating licence application. 
STUK is scheduled to issue a statement on the operat-
ing licence at the end of 2017.
According to TVO, Areva has thoroughly rein-
vestigated all of SBS’ deliveries to Olkiluoto 3. TVO 
does not have the final documentation on the material 
deliveries at its disposal yet, which is why TVO has 
not been able to perform a new documentation review 
itself. STUK has required that TVO perform a new 
review of the documentation of SBS’ OL3 deliveries 
before loading of the fuel.
TVO submitted to STUK a report on the operating 
plants at the end of October. According to the report, 
there are no forgeries among the components delivered 
to the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units, and all the in-
spected components complied with the requirements. 
STUK received a report on the Loviisa nuclear power 
plant from Fortum at the end of December. According 
to the report, no defective or forged documents have 
been found as of yet, but the investigation needs to be 
continued because the investigation process is difficult 
and time-consuming. Additional information should 
be available by 31 March 2017.
STUK-B 214
21
submitted to STUK in due time before the loading 
of the fuel.
Over the course of the year, STUK processed 
several fatigue analyses of mechanical components.
Oversight of commissioning
The purpose of commissioning is to verify that the 
plant’s systems, structures and components oper-
ate as planned and were successfully installed. 
Large-scale testing of the OL3 plant unit started 
in 2016.
I&C testing started at the beginning of the year 
and testing of the nuclear island process systems 
started in April. STUK reviewed testing plans and 
oversaw the testing on site. Based on the review 
of the testing plans, STUK was not convinced of 
the coverage of the I&C function testing. STUK 
imposed a requirement on this issue to TVO in 
the I&C commissioning inspection. As a response 
to the requirement, TVO prepared a description 
of the testing strategy and the procedures used to 
verify coverage of the I&C function testing, and 
submitted the description to STUK. STUK did not 
have any remarks on the report.
The other commissioning plans have been of a 
good quality and STUK has been able to approve 
most of them without any remarks.
The procedures used at the testing stage were 
reviewed in several construction inspection pro-
gramme inspections. Some requirements on clari-
fying the roles and responsibilities of the organisa-
tion and the guidance provided to personnel were 
imposed in these inspections. In general, STUK 
considered TVO’s procedures to be sufficient for 
commissioning and testing.
Oversight of preparation for operation
In addition to the technical readiness of the plant, 
a prerequisite for safe operation of the plant is 
the organisation’s ability to use the plant in a safe 
manner. Procedures that cover the different func-
tions of the plant and a variety of exceptional situ-
ations must be in place and competent employees 
for the plant must be available. For example, only 
a person approved by STUK for the position may 
act as a nuclear plant operator in the control room 
of the plant.
STUK oversaw and inspected TVO’s prepara-
tions for the operation of the plant. An important 
part of the training provided to the operators 
is training in a plant simulator. STUK oversaw 
the acceptance testing of the simulator. The test-
ing demonstrated that the simulator sufficiently 
accurately depicts the plant, and training with 
the simulator could be started. Operator training 
was more comprehensively assessed in an inspec-
tion included in the construction inspection pro-
gramme. Two requirements about deputy practices 
were imposed in the inspection.
STUK reviewed preparation of procedures on 
the operation and maintenance of the plant as 
part of its construction inspection programme. The 
status of the procedures was a theme in the electri-
cal and I&C engineering inspections, for example. 
Maintenance procedures were reviewed in the age-
ing management inspection. STUK performed a 
separate inspection of verification and validation of 
emergency operating procedures. Even though the 
preparation of the procedures in some disciplines 
has just been started or being planned, it seemed 
based on the inspections that TVO is prepared to 
complete the work before starting operation.
STUK also inspected the emergency prepared-
ness arrangements and preparations related to 
the management of ageing. Both the emergency 
response plan and the ageing management pro-
gramme were submitted to STUK as part of the 
operating licence application.
According to the present schedule, transport 
of fresh nuclear fuel to the plant will start in the 
autumn of 2017. STUK approved an application 
on the fuel import licence. STUK inspected the nu-
clear safeguards preparations in two inspections, 
one of which was completed in cooperation with the 
European Commission. The inspections covered 
nuclear safeguards design infromation; i.e. the ba-
sic technical characteristics, and the installation of 
monitoring instruments.
Manufacture, installation and construction
STUK continued its oversight of manufacture, in-
stallation and construction.
Almost all piping installations were completed 
by the end of the year. STUK oversaw the in-
stallation activities and performed the installa-
tion inspections laid down in the YVL Guides. 
Modification of cabling in the nuclear island also 
continued in 2016. STUK oversaw the work on the 
cabling on site in connection with its site visits.
In the spring, TVO informed STUK of two prob-
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lems at the construction site: some valve compo-
nents had been accidentally installed at the wrong 
locations and it was observed during a ventilation 
duct leaktightness test that the leaktightness re-
quirements imposed during design were not met 
in all cases.
TVO submitted to STUK for approval a pro-
posal on how to correct the problems involving the 
ventilation ducts: if leaktightness without a special 
reason was demanded during design, the require-
ment can be made more lenient, but if there is an 
actual need for the duct to be leaktight (to prevent 
the spreading of radioactivity), the installations 
will be repaired. STUK approved the proposal 
but imposed some related requirements on, for 
instance, verifying the leaktightness of the ducts 
that must be leaktight due to radiation protection 
reasons.
In relation to the valve installations, TVO sub-
mitted to STUK a report on the underlying causes 
of the mix-up and the lessons learned. All of the 
errors made during the installation can be traced 
and corrected.
Pressurizer safety valves have not been in-
stalled yet. The valves will protect the plant’s 
primary circuit from overpressure. Some parts of 
the valves represent new design, and several modi-
fications of the design have been made during the 
project. Implementation and testing of the modifi-
cations continued in 2016, and STUK oversaw and 
inspected the work and the related documentation. 
In France, a similar valve station that will be in-
stalled in an EPR unit currently under construc-
tion In France, was tested. The purpose of the 
tests in France was to obtain operating experience 
feedback on the new type of valve. The valve was 
opened and closed several hundred times during 
the test. STUK monitored the testing and has re-
quired from TVO an assessment on the test results.
As part of the oversight of the construction site, 
STUK performed a combined security arrange-
ments and I&C system site visit at Olkiluoto 3 
in the summer of 2016. During this site visit, a 
site walk-down covering all rooms that include 
important I&C systems was made. STUK made 
some observations regarding the access control of 
the rooms, and corrective measures have been per-
formed due to these observations.
2.4 Hanhikivi 1
On 30 June 2015, Fennovoima submitted a con-
struction licence application for a new nuclear pow-
er plant (AES-2006) to the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Employment (MEAE). Fennovoima 
simultaneously submitted licensing documents 
by virtue of the Nuclear Energy Decree to the 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority for the 
initiation of a safety assessment. On 8 September 
2015, the MEAE submitted a request for a state-
ment to STUK. In the request, the MEAE asked 
STUK to provide a statement and a safety assess-
ment as well as a statement from the Advisory 
Committee on Nuclear Safety on the project by the 
end of 2017, if possible.
When processing reports linked to the construc-
tion licence application of the Hanhikivi 1 plant 
project, STUK assesses both technical compliance 
of the plant and ability of the organisations of the 
licensee, the plant supplier and the main service 
providers to construct and ultimately operate a 
nuclear power plant.
Review of the construction 
licence application
The documents submitted to STUK in connection 
with the construction licence application were not 
complete, and Fennovoima has supplemented and 
will supplement its construction licence applica-
tion in stages between 2015 and 2018. Delivery 
of the Fennovoima construction licence documents 
has been delayed from the construction licence ap-
plication and the first licensing plan submitted in 
2015. Furthermore, Fennovoima has updated its 
licensing plan since 2015. STUK is of the opinion 
that the delays in the delivery of the construction 
licence documents were mainly caused by the pro-
ject and its supply chain being organised slower 
than expected and a lack of resources in project 
management and the design organisation.
More meetings between Fennovoima, the plant 
supplier and STUK were held in 2016. Topical 
issues covered in the meetings included the core 
catcher, air plane crash, civil engineering, electri-
cal engineering and the turbine island. STUK 
also participated as an observer in audits of the 
Fennovoima supply chain.
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Regulatory inspection programme (RKT)
STUK assesses the management systems of Fenno-
voima and the other organisations participating in the 
project by, for example, participating in Fenno voima’s 
supply chain audits. Furthermore, STUK performs 
inspections of the organisations to ensure that their 
actual operations comply with the requirements.
STUK launched the inspections included in 
the regulatory inspection programme (RKT) in 
September 2015. The inspections are planned six 
months in advance. In 2016, STUK performed 
a total of 15 inspections of different functions of 
Fennovoima and key organisations of the plant 
supplier (RAOS Project Oy, JSC Atomproekt, 
OKB Gidropress and the Kurchatov Institute). 
Summaries of the RKT inspections performed in 
2016 are included in Appendix 6.
Based on the 2016 RKT inspections, STUK can 
state that Fennovoima has clearly developed its 
management system based on STUK’s previous 
requirements. Issues that still require further de-
velopment include securing the interfaces between 
the processes of Fennovoima and the plant sup-
plier, taking into account nuclear safety issues in 
project management and clarifying the responsi-
bilities of Fennovoima’s different departments in 
the processing of safety issues at the plant, archi-
tecture and system level.
In STUK’s opinion, organisation and develop-
ment of the required management systems of 
the plant supplier selected by Fennovoima, RAOS 
Project Oy, do not comply with the plans submitted 
in connection with the application. Many issues 
involving project quality management are still be-
ing developed and STUK is of the opinion that the 
organisation is not ready for nuclear construction 
yet. Determined development of the entire sup-
ply chain is necessary in order to comply with the 
Finnish requirements.
Agreements have not been signed with many 
of the key organisations yet and there is no clear, 
frozen plan of the plant I&C system suppliers, for 
example. In the summer, Fennovoima announced 
a turbine agreement with the plant supplier. The 
placement of the turbine island at the plant site 
and its connections to the nuclear island must be 
taken into account in basic design of the plant 
and in the safety assessment. As an agreement 
has been signed, the parties can now start further 
specifying the basic design of the plant site.
EIA program for disposal of spent fuel
In June 2016, Fennovoima submitted to the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 
(MEAE) its environmental impact assessment pro-
gramme (EIA programme) on the disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel. In its statement to the MEAE, STUK 
paid attention to the fact that it is a long-term pro-
cess and the EIA report will not be completed until 
2040. Therefore, the current status of the EIA pro-
gramme should be reassessed during the process, 
such as after commissioning of the nuclear power 
plant when Fennovoima will submit to the MEAE a 
waste management plan every three years. STUK 
also pointed out that the research area for the 
site investigation in Eurajoki should be selected as 
soon as possible, and that the EIA process should 
assess seismic properties of the research areas, the 
proximity of natural resources, radioactive releases 
from the operations under normal conditions and 
accident conditions and the radioactive waste gen-
erated in the process. The project’s EIA must take 
into account the entire project lifecycle, including 
the decommissioning of the encapsulation facility 
and the related processing and disposal of waste.
2.5 Research reactor
In 2012, VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland 
made, for financial reasons, a decision to shut down 
its research reactor and start the preparations for 
its decommissioning. The reactor was placed in 
permanent shutdown in June 2015, and VTT start-
ed to prepare an operating licence application for 
the decommissioning of the research reactor. VTT 
aims to submit the operating licence application to 
the Government in early 2017.
STUK monitored safety of the research reactor 
by reviewing materials provided by the licensee, 
as well as by carrying out inspections in line with 
the periodic inspection programme and the YVL 
Guides. Furthermore, STUK prepared for future 
assessment of the operating licence application by 
establishing a separate subproject.
VTT submitted a nuclear waste management 
plan for the research reactor to the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Employment in September 
2016. The report included all measures since the 
2015 report and all planned measures. The report 
included a proposed schedule for the decommission-
ing phase of the research reactor, which extends 
until 2022. According to a request for a statement 
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by the MEAE, STUK submitted to the MEAE a 
statement on the nuclear waste management report 
where STUK stated that VTT had made clear pro-
gress in the design of the research reactor’s decom-
missioning in the past year. Progress in the prepa-
ration of the dismantling plan has been systematic 
and material inventory surveys are being prepared. 
STUK pointed out that there are still uncertain-
ties regarding the storage and disposal of low- and 
intermediate-level waste, and that the related plans 
must be further specified in the operating licence 
application on the decommissioning. Furthermore, 
the effects of the uncertainties in the spent nuclear 
fuel return procedure and the alternative spent nu-
clear fuel maintenance programme on the research 
reactor decommissioning project must be assessed 
in the final decommissioning plan.
In terms of nuclear safeguards, VTT’s mate-
rial balance area and research reactor site cover 
the nuclear materials and related activities in 
the Otakaari 3 building. As the experimental re-
search activities in the VTT Centre for Nuclear 
Safety are started, the plan is to expand VTT’s 
nuclear safeguards site to cover both buildings. In 
2016, STUK approved VTT’s updated the nuclear 
safeguards manual of the research reactor’s ma-
terial balance area. STUK inspected the nuclear 
material accountancy together with the European 
Commission in June, and in November STUK per-
formed a nuclear safeguards system inspection of 
VTT to assess the procedures VTT uses to ensure 
compliance with legislation, the YVL Guides and 
EU Regulations.
2.6 Spent nuclear fuel encapsulation 
and disposal facility
At the end of 2015, Posiva received a decision from 
the Government that authorised it to construct 
the spent nuclear fuel encapsulation and disposal 
facility. In 2016, Posiva prepared for the start of 
construction operations. STUK assessed Posiva’s 
readiness to start construction with its construc-
tion inspection programme (RTO) inspections and 
readiness inspections at the end of 2016. In its 
decision issued in late November, STUK stated 
that Posiva had achieved the level of readiness 
needed to start construction. STUK also issued a 
statement to the MEAE on Posiva being ready to 
start construction. The statement also noted that 
Posiva had started the construction activities dur-
ing the validity period of the construction licence 
laid down in the Government decision.
The regulatory oversight during the construc-
tion stage covers design, manufacture, construc-
tion and installation of the nuclear waste facility 
and its safety-classified systems, structures and 
components. The oversight also includes the future 
nuclear waste facility’s commissioning stage, at 
which time STUK will oversee Posiva’s operations 
during commissioning, oversee testing, review test 
plans and test results, and perform commissioning 
inspections of components, structures and systems.
Construction of the disposal facility
In 2016, tunnel contract 6 (TU6) that includes ve-
hicle connections and an underground parking ga-
rage was completed at the underground research 
facility (Onkalo). Oversight of the rock construc-
tion in Posiva’s Onkalo has consisted of inspections 
of the different construction stages. STUK has per-
formed commissioning inspections of the facilities 
included in the scope of Onkalo.
Posiva has prepared a plan on delivery of the 
disposal facility construction design documents for 
regulatory review. STUK approved the plan, and it 
will be used as the framework for the oversight of 
the design documents.
Posiva started the first tunnel contract included 
in the disposal facility for which a construction li-
cence has been granted (LTU1) in December 2016 
after having received a decision from STUK which 
stated that Posiva was ready to start construction. 
The facilities to be excavated during LTU1 include 
vehicle connections, niches in the canister shaft, 
the central tunnel of a shared testing area and cen-
tral tunnels 1 and 2 of the first disposal area.
In addition to technical planning, an assess-
ment to verify that the areas to be excavated have 
been positioned in a suitable manner (based on the 
rock quality criteria) to ensure long-term safety 
must be made during construction of the disposal 
facility. Posiva will further develop its procedures 
for the assessment of the rock classification of the 
actual disposal facilities. The procedures must be 
completed before the excavation of the central tun-
nels is started. Posiva submitted implementation 
plans for the first stages of the LTU1 contract to 
STUK. STUK also assessed the rock suitability 
analysis on which the location of the facilities is 
based.
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Oversight of requirements imposed 
at the construction licence phase 
and Posiva’s development work
During the construction licence application review, 
STUK imposed requirements on Posiva that must 
be taken into account during construction or be-
fore submitting the operating licence application. 
STUK has systematically monitored compliance 
with the requirements imposed based on the con-
struction licence application review and Posiva’s 
plans to ensure compliance with the requirements.
Posiva took into account the requirements im-
posed by STUK during the construction licence 
review in the system design. Posiva has submitted 
to STUK a licensing plan that takes into account 
the delivery of updated system design documents. 
Posiva has submitted on schedule to STUK system 
design documents for review, and STUK has issued 
decisions regarding the documents after having 
reviewed them.
Posiva has launched long-term safety and rock 
classification criteria development projects, and 
a project on the design and development of engi-
neered barriers. STUK has reviewed project plans 
and programmes, and they have been discussed at 
meetings with Posiva. With this oversight, STUK 
verifies that the project plans and programmes 
sufficiently take into account the requirements 
imposed by STUK during the construction licence 
review.
Organisational operations and 
quality management
Due to Posiva’s organisational renewal, the sched-
ule of the disposal facility project and its changes, 
Posiva updated its management handbook and the 
programmes of its projects. STUK reviewed the 
updated documents. Special attention was paid to 
Posiva’s organisation and guidelines in the inspec-
tions involving the start of construction, as the 
organisation and the operating model had experi-
enced significant changes since the safety assess-
ment that was submitted in connection with the 
construction licence application.
In inspections included in the construction in-
spection programme (RTO), STUK assesses the 
performance of Posiva’s management system, the 
sufficiency of procedures and their ability to guide 
design, manufacture, construction and installa-
tion operations, as well as the taking into account 
of safety requirements at different stages of the 
project. The programme also aims at assessing 
Posiva’s procedures to ensure that a safe nu-
clear facility of a high quality will be constructed. 
Nine RTO inspections were performed in 2016. 
The inspections focused on the following areas: 
quality management, design operations, personnel 
resources and training, rock classification and de-
tailed model descriptions, nuclear safeguards, rock 
construction procedures, project management and 
quality management of the encapsulation and dis-
posal facility, safety culture and long-term safety. 
One of the goals of these inspections was to assess 
readiness of the Posiva organisation to carry out 
the construction project. The inspections and their 
results, as well as the requirements by STUK, are 
described in more detail in Appendix 7.
STUK continued oversight and assessment of 
Posiva’s auditing activities by participating in five 
supplier audits by Posiva in 2016.
Nuclear safeguards
STUK has implemented nuclear safeguards of final 
disposal in compliance with the national regula-
tory plan. Finland is the first country in the world 
to implement safeguards of nuclear materials on a 
final disposal facility, which is why STUK holds a 
key position in the development and implementa-
tion of international safeguards of nuclear materi-
als regarding geological repositories.
In 2016, Posiva updated the handbook on regu-
latory oversight of nuclear safeguards that was 
taken into use in 2005. It provides instructions on 
the nuclear safeguards of Onkalo. The new nuclear 
safeguards manual describes nuclear material ar-
rangements of the encapsulation and disposal fa-
cility during construction. STUK approved Posiva’s 
new nuclear safeguards manual. STUK inspected 
Posiva’s announced construction operations in 
three inspections and performed a nuclear safe-
guards inspection as part of the inspections on the 
readiness to start the construction of the disposal 
facility. The IAEA, the Commission and STUK per-
formed an onsite inspection on short notice at the 
Posiva site in April.
In 2013, Posiva drafted the first notices of the 
technical basic characteristics (BTC) of the en-
capsulation and disposal facility included in the 
construction licence application design documenta-
tion to the European Commission and the IAEA. 
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Based on the technical baseline, the Commission 
and the IAEA prepared in 2014 a plan on surveil-
lance and monitoring instruments to be installed 
in the encapsulation facility. STUK works in close 
cooperation with the IAEA and the European 
Commission to ensure that the plans on arranging 
international safeguards of the encapsulation and 
disposal facility will proceed in line with the design 
of the facility and meet the national requirements. 
Similar oversight has not been realised anywhere 
else in the world, and STUK has launched a sepa-
rate project to develop the spent fuel verification 
method and equipment.
2.7 Other uses of nuclear energy
In addition to the operation and construction of 
a nuclear facility, the use of nuclear energy as 
laid down in section 2 of the Nuclear Energy Act 
includes the possession, manufacture, production, 
transfer, handling, use, storage, transport, export 
and import of nuclear waste. Furthermore, compo-
nents, systems and information needed at nuclear 
facilities are subject to licensing and oversight by 
virtue of the Nuclear Energy Act. Thus, producers 
of uranium, parties in possession of small amounts 
of nuclear materials or nuclear information subject 
to a licence and research facilities participating in 
research of the nuclear fuel cycle are also included 
in the scope of the nuclear safeguards.
All users of nuclear energy must nominate re-
sponsible persons for their operations and describe 
in their nuclear safeguards manual the procedures 
the operator uses to ensure compliance with its 
obligations by virtue of the Nuclear Energy Act. 
Furthermore, parties in the possession of nuclear 
materials must report to Euratom in the man-
ner laid down in the Commission’s Safeguards 
Regulation. In 2016, STUK approved seven nuclear 
safeguards manuals on such operations. STUK ap-
proved the responsible managers or deputies for 
these operations as laid down in the applications 
for the Aalto University, the University of Helsinki, 
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy and the Geological 
Survey of Finland.
STUK reviewed uranium production inventory 
reports and, together with the Commission in 
June, inventories of Freeport Cobalt Oy’s Kokkola 
production facility and Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta 
Oy’s production facility. Nuclear material invento-
ries of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
and the University of Helsinki were also inspected. 
No remarks were made in the inspections.
Operators submitted their annual reports on 
research and development activities of the nu-
clear fuel cycle to STUK, and STUK prepared the 
Finnish summary report to the IAEA.
The plan is to transfer some laboratory func-
tions from VTT’s reactor building to the new 
Centre for Nuclear Safety. STUK approved the 
nuclear safeguards manual for the material bal-
ance area of the Centre for Nuclear Safety, and in 
November 2016 granted the Centre for Nuclear 
Safety an operating licence as laid down in the 
Nuclear Energy Act.
In December 2016 STUK received a special 
nuclear safeguards report from RAOS Project Oy 
on unauthorised import of nuclear information 
subject to the particular safeguards obligation and 
a special report from the University of Jyväskylä 
Department of Physics on a lost uranium sample. 
These special reports are still being reviewed, and 
the measures taken by the operators to prevent 
reoccurrence of the events will be assessed and 
inspected in 2017.
In a sulphide mine at Talvivaara in Sotkamo, 
metals are separated by means of bioheapleaching, 
where uranium is dissolved from the ore in addi-
tion to other metals. Talvivaara Mining Company 
Plc prepared for the extraction of uranium by 
building a separate unit, but the commissioning of 
the unit has been delayed. A Government decision 
on a permit for the extraction of uranium by virtue 
of the Nuclear Energy Act was appealed and the 
permit is not legally valid. In 2015, a new company, 
Terrafame Oy, started operations at the Talvivaara 
mine. Terrafame has not applied for a new licence, 
which means that the commissioning of the ura-
nium separation extraction unit not proceed at all 
in 2015.
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3 Safety research
sations that provide STUK with technical sup-
port services, such as the VTT Technical Research 
Centre of Finland, the University of Helsinki, the 
Aalto University, the Geological Survey of Finland 
and Lappeenranta University of Technology.
The SAFIR2018 safety research programme 
consists of 29 projects that were selected in the au-
tumn of 2015 based on a competitive bidding. The 
available VYR funding for the research was around 
EUR 3.8 million. Cancellation of the decision-in-
principle for the Olkiluoto 4 nuclear power plant 
unit of TVO meant that the research funding of the 
SAFIR2018 programme decreased from the previ-
ous year. The research projects are larger than in 
the previous programme, and the goal has been to 
create multidisciplinary projects to promote mul-
tidisciplinary cooperation and achievement of an 
overall idea of safety. Volume of the SAFIR2018 
research programme is EUR 6.5 million, which is 
divided into three areas as illustrated in image 3 a: 
1) overall safety and management of design, 2) re-
actor safety and 3) structural integrity and 
materials. VTT Technical Research Centre 
of Finland and Lappeenranta University of 
Technology (LUT) will use around 17% of 
the entire public funding for safety research 
when reforming the national infrastructure. 
The research programme covers all issues 
integral to nuclear safety, and it will create 
and maintain expertise, analysis methods 
and experimental readiness to resolve any sur-
prising safety issues.
In addition to the three research areas, the 
SAFIR2018 research projects are controlled by 
six steering committees. The steering groups take 
care of the academic control of research. Members 
of the supporting groups were named from or-
ganisations important to the research of the use 
of nuclear energy. The supporting groups are: 1) 
I&C, organisation and human factors, 2) severe ac-
Publicly funded safety research on the use of nu-
clear energy has a key role in the development 
and maintenance of nuclear technology exper-
tise in Finland. A new four-year nuclear safety 
programme, SAFIR2018, and a four-year nuclear 
waste management programme, KYT2018, contin-
ued in 2016, which was the second year of these 
programmes.
Without safety research programmes like 
SAFIR and KYT, developing the expertise needed 
to support the authorities would not be possible in 
Finland. According to the Nuclear Energy Act, re-
search funded by the Finnish State Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund (VYR) aims at ensuring that 
the authorities have access to comprehensive nu-
clear expertise. Both STUK and the licensees have 
hired several people who have obtained their train-
ing for expert positions in the field of nuclear en-
ergy use and oversight in publicly funded research 
programmes. The safety research programmes also 
have an important role in the training of organi-
Figure 3. Research areas of SAFIR2018 programme and 
their shares of the total funding in 2016.
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cidents and research of risks, 3) reactors and fuel, 
4) thermal hydraulics, 5) structural integrity and 
6) research infrastructure. The supporting groups 
were named based on the research areas. All of the 
projects included in one support group are usually 
part of a single research area. An exception to this 
is the second support group, which includes both 
projects pertaining to the determination of plant 
design bases and projects developing safety analy-
sis methods. The infrastructure support group op-
erates in the SAFIR2018 safety research organisa-
tion alongside the research areas (Fig. 4).
The projects included in the SAFIR2018 pro-
gramme for 2016 meet the requirements set for 
VYR-funded research. Special challenges of the 
research programme include reduced funding and 
a large share of infrastructure funding. High-class 
research on the use of nuclear energy requires a 
modern architecture.
The SAFIR2018 project entity consists of sev-
eral projects that develop the competencies needed 
to avoid accidents similar to the Tepco Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plant accident or to better 
understand such accidents. The projects’ subject 
matters range from design bases of nuclear facili-
ties and the analysis of accidents to the operation 
of organisations during accidents and as systems 
comprising several organisations. An international 
research project that started in 2015 has offered as 
reliable information as possible about the course 
of the Tepco Fukushima Daiichi accident in order 
to create Finnish accident analyses and compare 
results globally.
The four-year KYT2018 research programme 
was launched in 2015. The programme’s key re-
search areas are more or less the same as the 
KYT2014 programme. The programme consists of 
research issues important to national expertise. 
It aims at extensive coordinated research projects. 
Such have been formed particularly regarding the 
Figure 4. The administrative structure of SAFIR2018 research programme.
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research areas of performance of buffer and back-
filling materials as well as the long-term durability 
of final disposal canisters. A new research area 
added to the KYT2018 programme in 2016 due to 
an amendment of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act 
is funding of research infrastructure.
The KYT management team provided funding 
recommendations to the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Employment based on assessments by 
the support groups, applicability of the subject mat-
ter and content of the research project. In 2016, the 
total funding of the KYT2018 programme from the 
National Nuclear Waste Management Fund (VYR) 
was about EUR 1.6 million. In 2016, the research 
programme provided funding for 30 research pro-
jects representing new and alternative technolo-
gies for nuclear waste management (2 projects), 
safety research on nuclear waste management 
(26 projects), social nuclear waste management 
research (1 project) and research infrastructure (1 
project). The most important coordinated research 
subjects were buffer and backfilling materials, 
long-term durability of canisters and microbiology.
Table 1. Distribution of VYR funding of KYT2014 research areas in 2015–2016.
Research area/1000 € 2015 2016
Safety assessment 73 61
Buffer and backfill materials 478 341
Long-term durability of the canister 350 253
Microbiology 227 220
Other safety relevant research 593 414
Social science studies related to nuclear waste 
management
45 40
Administration 112 112
New and alternative technological solutions 80 88
Research infrastructure – 143
Total 1958 1672
Figure 5. Research areas of KYT2018 programme and 
their shares of the total funding in 2016.
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4 Oversight of nuclear 
facilities in figures
4.1 Processing of documents
A total of 3,559 documents were submitted to 
STUK for processing in 2016. Of these, 1,190 con-
cerned the nuclear power plant unit under con-
struction and 178 the disposal facility for spent 
nuclear fuel. The review process of a total of 3,322 
documents was completed, including documents 
submitted in 2016, those submitted earlier and 
licences granted by STUK by virtue of the Nuclear 
Energy Act, which are listed in Appendix 8. The 
average document review time was 83 days. The 
number of documents and their average review 
times in 2012–2016 are illustrated in Figure 6. 
Figure 7. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on the Loviisa plant.
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Figure 8. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on the operating plant units of Olkiluoto.
Figure 9. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on Olkiluoto plant unit 3.
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Figure 6. Number of documents received and reviewed 
as well as average document review time.
Figure 10. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on Posiva.
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Figures 7–10 illustrate the review time distribu-
tion among documents from the various plant units 
and documents about Posiva.
4.2 Inspections at nuclear power plant 
sites and suppliers’ premises
Inspection programmes
A total of 13 inspections at the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant and 13 inspections at the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant were carried out under the 
2016 periodic inspection programme (Appendix 
4). STUK carried out 15 inspections within the 
Olkiluoto 3 construction inspection programme 
(Appendix 5) and 11 inspections pertaining to the 
processing of Fennovoima’s construction licence ap-
plication (Appendix 6). Nine inspections of the en-
capsulation plant and disposal facility construction 
inspection programme were carried out in 2016 
(Appendix 7). The key findings of the inspections 
are presented in the appendices and the chapters 
on regulatory oversight.
Other inspections at plant sites
A total of 2,141 inspections onsite or at suppli-
ers’ premises were carried out in 2016 (other than 
the above-mentioned construction inspection pro-
gramme inspections and nuclear safeguards in-
spections, which are separately described). An in-
spection comprises one or more sub-inspections, 
such as a review of results, an inspection of com-
ponent or structure, a pressure or leak test, a func-
tional test or a commissioning inspection. Of the 
inspections, 982 were related to the regulatory 
oversight of the plant under construction and 1,159 
to that of the units in operation. 
The number of inspection days on site and at 
component manufacturers’ premises totalled 3,304. 
This number includes not only inspections pertain-
ing to the safety of nuclear power plants but also 
those associated with nuclear waste management 
and nuclear safeguards as well as audits and 
inspections of the underground research facility 
at Olkiluoto. Four resident inspectors worked at 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant and three resident 
inspectors at Loviisa nuclear power plant. The 
numbers of onsite inspection days in 2012−2016 
are illustrated in Figure 11.
4.3 Finances and resources
The duty area of nuclear safety regulation included 
basic operations subject to a charge, as well as op-
erations not subject to a charge. Basic operations 
subject to a charge mostly consisted of the regula-
tory oversight of nuclear power plants, with their 
costs charged to those subject to the oversight. 
Basic operations not subject to a charge included 
international and domestic cooperation, as well as 
emergency response operations and communica-
tions. Basic operations not subject to a charge are 
publicly funded. Overheads from the preparation 
of regulations and support functions (administra-
tion, development projects in support of regulatory 
activities, training, maintenance and development 
of expertise, and reporting, as well as participation 
in nuclear safety research) were carried forward 
into the costs of both types of basic operation and 
of contracted services in relation to the number of 
working hours spent on each function.
In 2016, the costs of the regulatory control of 
nuclear safety subject to a charge were EUR 19.6 
million. The total costs of nuclear safety regulation 
were EUR 22.1 million. Thus, the share of activi-
ties subject to a charge was 88.9%.
The income from nuclear safety regulation in 
2016 was EUR 19.6 million. Of this, EUR 3.4 mil-
lion and EUR 10.3 million came from the in-
spection and review of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plants, respectively. In addition to 
the operating units, the income from Olkiluoto 
NPP includes income derived from the regulatory 
oversight of the Olkiluoto 3 construction project. 
Costs arising from the oversight of the Fennovoima 
nuclear power plant project amounted to EUR 2.6 
Figure 11. Number of inspection days onsite and at 
component manufacturers’ premises. Overtime work 
is included.
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Figure 12. Income and costs of nuclear safety 
regulation.
million. The regulation of Posiva  Oy’s operations 
yielded EUR 2.3 million.  Figure 12 shows the an-
nual income and costs from nuclear safety regula-
tion in 2012−2016.
The time spent on the inspection and review of 
Loviisa nuclear power plant was 14.5  man-years 
or 9.5% of the total working time of the regulatory 
personnel. The time spent on the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant’s operating units was 13.8 man-years 
or 9.1% of the total working time. In addition to the 
monitoring of the operation of the nuclear power 
plants, these figures include the safeguards of nu-
clear materials. The time spent on the inspection 
and review of Olkiluoto 3 was 28.8 man-years or 
19.0% of the total working time. Work related to 
new nuclear power plant projects amounted to 9.1 
man-years or 6.01% of the total working time. A 
total of 8.1 man-years or 5.3% of the total working 
time was spent on inspection and review of Posiva’s 
operations, and that spent on the FiR 1 research 
reactor was 0.5 man-years. Figure 13 shows the 
division of working hours of the personnel engaged 
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Figure 13. Distribution of working hours (person-years) of the regulatory personnel by subject of oversight 
in 2009–2016. Until 2011 the nuclear waste management includes both the oversight of the operating 
nuclear power plants’ nuclear waste management as well as the oversight of Posiva, since 2012 only the 
oversight of Posiva. The oversight of the operating nuclear power plants’ nuclear waste management is 
combined with the oversight of the power plants.
Figure 14. The costs of research and commissioned 
work.
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in nuclear safety oversight (in man-years) by sub-
ject of oversight during 2009–2016.
Where necessary, STUK commissions independ-
ent safety analyses and research in support of 
regulatory decision-making. Figure 14 illustrates 
the costs of such assignments in 2012–2016. Most 
expenses in 2016 involved preparation of plant 
models for Hanhikivi 1, comparison analyses of 
Olkiluoto 3, independent assessments and reports, 
and assessment of the safety of the spent fuel dis-
posal project.
Distribution of the annual working time of the 
nuclear safety regulation personnel to the various 
duty areas is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Distribution of working hours (person-years) of the regulatory personnel in each duty area.
Duty area 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Basic operations subject to a charge 68.9 69.7 72.0 76.6 74.9
Basic operations not subject to a charge 5.6 5.0 3.5 2.6 4.0
Contracted services 2.2 1.6 2.9 2.8 2.1
Rule-making and support functions 46.3 45.3 41.8 42.2 44.5
Holidays and absences 24.7 25.1 25.3 26.4 26.6
Total 147.7 146.7 145.5 150.5 152.1
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International conventions
The International Convention on Nuclear Safety 
requires the submission of a report on how its ob-
ligations have been met every three years. STUK 
was responsible for the preparation of Finland’s 
report, and it was submitted to the IAEA, the sec-
retariat of the Convention, according to the agreed 
schedule in autumn 2016. Corresponding reports 
have previously been submitted in 1999, 2002, 
2004, 2007, 2010 and 2013. Compliance with the 
obligations of the Convention and related reporting 
will be assessed at an international meeting of the 
parties in Vienna in spring 2017. The Convention 
also includes an opportunity to pose questions 
about the actions of the other countries. STUK re-
viewed the reports of Finland’s neighbouring coun-
tries and countries with which STUK has been 
involved in the scope of its international coopera-
tion. STUK posed around 114 questions about the 
contents of the reports of other countries, while 160 
questions were posed to Finland.
In 2016, two meetings included in the scope of 
the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management which a representative of 
STUK attended were arranged. The meetings cov-
ered responsibilities and obligations for a disposal 
facility shared by two or more countries and light-
ening of the Convention’s reporting and review 
obligations in the case of non-nuclear countries in 
particular. 
Amendment to the Convention on Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear 
Facilities (CPPNM-A) entered into force in 2016. 
Finland submitted to the IAEA a report on na-
tional enforcement of the Convention as stipulated 
by Article 14.
5 International cooperation 
MDEP
The Multinational Design Evaluation Programme 
(MDEP) was established upon the initiative of the 
United States nuclear safety authority (Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, NRC). It involves fifteen 
countries with the objective of improving coopera-
tion in the field of the assessment of new nuclear 
power plants and developing convergent regula-
tory practices. In addition to the United States of 
America, the following countries participate in the 
programme: South Africa, India, United Kingdom, 
Japan, Canada, China, Korea, France, Sweden, 
Finland, Turkey, Russia, Hungary and the United 
Arab Emirates. 
Participants in the programme include only 
those countries with new nuclear power plants 
at some stage of assessment by the regulatory 
authorities. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 
functions as the secretariat for the programme. 
The MDEP’s work is organised in design-specific 
and issue-specific working groups. In addition, the 
MDEP has a management group and a steering 
group. Petteri Tiippana, the Director General of 
STUK, is the chair of the management group.
There are five Design-Specific Working Groups: 
the EPR Working Group, the AP1000 Working 
Group, the APR1400 Working Group, the VVER 
Working Group and the ABWR Working Group. Of 
these, STUK has participated in the EPR Working 
Group and the VVER Working Group, because an 
EPR plant is under construction at Olkiluoto (the 
Olkiluoto 3 project) and Fennovoima has submit-
ted a construction licence application on construc-
tion of a VVER plant in Pyhäjoki (the Hanhikivi 1 
project).
The MDEP Working Groups independent of 
plant design dealt with the following three sub-
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jects: plant and plant supplier inspections and 
reviews, pressure equipment standards and pro-
grammable I&C. STUK participated in the activi-
ties of all three Issue-Specific Working Groups.
Cooperation within the IAEA
The IAEA continued to revise its regulatory guides 
on nuclear safety. STUK had a representative on 
the Commission on Safety Standards (CSS) man-
aging the preparation of the regulatory guides as 
well as in the committees dealing with the con-
tent of the regulatory guides, i.e. the Nuclear 
Safety Standards Committee (NUSSC), the 
Waste Safety Standards Committee (WASSC), the 
Radiation Safety Standards Committee (RASSC), 
the Transport Safety Standards Committee 
(TRANSSC) and the Nuclear Security Guidance 
Committee (NSGC). STUK issued statements on 
the IAEA regulatory guides under preparation. An 
expert of STUK has been named in the Advisory 
Committee on Nuclear Security to the Director 
General of the IAEA (AdSec) for the term 2016–
2018.
Representatives of STUK were included in ex-
pert groups summoned by the IAEA; the groups 
reviewed the regulatory authorities’ operations in 
Lithuania, South Africa and Belorussia, and par-
ticipated in international peer reviews of security 
arrangements in Malesia and Sweden.
Cooperation within the OECD/NEA
The Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (NEA) 
coordinates international cooperation in the field of 
safety research in particular. The organisation also 
provides an opportunity for cooperation between 
regulatory authorities. STUK was represented in 
all main committees of the organisation dealing 
with radiation and nuclear safety issues. The main 
committees’ fields of activity are:
•	 Nuclear	 safety	 regulation	 (CNRA,	 Committee	
on Nuclear Regulatory Activities)
•	 Safety	research	(CSNI,	Committee	on	the	Safe-
ty of Nuclear Installations)
•	 Radiation	safety	(CRPPH,	Committee	on	Radia-
tion Protection and Public Health)
•	 Nuclear	waste	management	 (RWMC,	Radioac-
tive Waste Management Committee).
Cooperation within the EU
WENRA RHWG
STUK actively participated in the work of 
WENRA’s Reactor Harmonisation Working Group 
(RHWG) in 2016 even though it was able to attend 
only two of the working group’s three general meet-
ings. This year, the working group’s key tasks were 
a peer review of the updated reference levels for 
the operating nuclear power plants that were pub-
lished in 2014 and the preparation of a Technical 
Specification for the first Topical Peer Review in 
accordance with the EU Nuclear Safety Directive. 
The reference level peer review studied how the 
member states have included the requirements 
that were added or modified after the Fukushima 
accident in their own regulations. Results of the 
Finnish review state that eleven requirements 
need to be specified in the regulations – the results 
of the self-assessment stated that only two of the 
requirements needed further specifications. Taking 
into account these deficiencies will not change the 
Finnish procedures in practice, but their inclusion 
in the regulations will further specify the require-
ments. The first Topical Peer Review in accord-
ance with the Nuclear Safety Directive will start 
in 2017.
WENRA WGWD
STUK actively participated in the work of WENRA’s 
Working Group on Waste And Decommissioning 
(WGWD) in 2016. The working group convened 
twice. Self-assessments and peer reviews of refer-
ence levels connected to disposal were completed 
during the year, a reference level report on nu-
clear waste processing facilities was prepared and 
a draft on a summary of WGWD’s reference level 
reports was prepared.
ENSREG
STUK participated in the activities of the European 
Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) and 
in three of its subgroups (nuclear safety, nuclear 
waste management and communication). ENSREG 
decided that the theme of the first Topical Peer 
Review, which will be arranged every six years 
from now on according to the Nuclear Safety 
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Directive that was updated in 2014, is manage-
ment of the ageing of nuclear power plants. STUK 
actively participated in the preparation of the peer 
review guidelines in the ENSREG nuclear safe-
ty subgroup. A national peer review report will 
be prepared by the end of 2017 and Finland will 
participate in the peer review of the EU member 
states in spring 2018.
Bilateral cooperation 
STUK continued its regular meetings with the 
Swedish nuclear safety authority SSM, focusing 
on topical issues about nuclear power plants, such 
as the Swedish regulations, requirement manage-
ment, competence of the authorities, resource is-
sues and periodic safety review of the Loviisa nu-
clear power plant.
STUK started regular cooperation with the 
French nuclear safety authority Autorité de Sûreté 
Nucléaire (ASN) and its support organisation In-
stitut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire 
(IRSN) when the Olkiluoto 3 project was launched 
in the early 2000s. Regulatory practices and statu-
tory requirements of the countries have been com-
pared, and challenges and problems pertaining to 
the EPR plants under construction in both coun-
tries (Olkiluoto 3 and Flamanville 3) have been 
discussed.
Cooperation with the Russian nuclear safety au-
thority Rostechnadzor (RTN) was expanded to also 
cover issues pertaining to the safety assessments 
of AES2006-type VVER plants. Four AES-2006 
plants are currently under construction in Russia. 
Of them, the Leningrad 2 plant in Sosnovyi Bor 
is the reference plant for Fennovoima’s Hanhikivi 
1 project. In 2016, six cooperation meetings with 
RTN were arranged to review the construction 
status of the new plant units, for example. STUK 
visited the construction site of the Leningrad 2 
nuclear power plant three times with the nuclear 
safety authority and three times in issues pertain-
ing to plant cooperation. RTN has also studied the 
local inspection activities at Olkiluoto 3.
The Hungarian radiation and nuclear safety 
authority HAEA and the Turkish nuclear safety 
authority TAEK have also started preparation for 
a safety assessment of AES-2006 nuclear power 
plants (PAKS-2 and Akku-yu). In 2016, STUK vis-
ited both of these sister organisations to discuss 
the plant projects and the plants’ safety assess-
ments.
Also in 2016, STUK made together with the 
Canadian nuclear safety authority CNSC an initia-
tive on international cooperation in the regulation 
of the disposal of spent fuel. A regulatory work-
ing group was established for this cooperation. In 
addition to Finland and Canada, representatives 
of Sweden, Switzerland, France and the United 
States participate in the working group. The work-
ing group’s goal is to share experience and develop 
regulatory practices and requirements for disposal 
facilities constructed in the bedrock. The working 
group started its work in 2016 and will focus in 
the future in licensing of disposal facilities and re-
quirements of the different licensing stages, among 
other issues.
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Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Olkiluoto 1 2 Sep 1978 10 Oct 1979 910/880 Boiling water reactor (BWR),
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 2 18 Feb 1980 1 Jul 1982 910/880 Boiling water reactor (BWR),
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 3 Construction license granted Approx. 1,600 (net) Pressurized water reactor (PWR),
 17 Feb 2005   Areva NP
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj owns the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units located in Olkiluoto, Eurajoki, and  
the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit under construction.
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Loviisa 1 8 Feb1977 9 May 1977 526/502 Pressurized water reactor (PWR), 
    Atom ener goex port
Loviisa 2 4 Nov 1980 5 Jan 1 981 526/502 Pressurized water reactor (PWR), 
    Atom ener goex port
Fortum Power and Heat Oy owns the Loviisa 1 and 2 plant units located in Loviisa.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
APPENDIX 1 Objects of regulation
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Plant Supplemented  Nominal electric power, Type,
unit Decision-In-Principle approved net (MW) supplier
Hanhikivi 1 5 Dec 2014  Approx. 1200 Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR),
    ROSATOM
Hanhikivi nuclear power plant FH1 is a power plant project of Fennovoima.
Hanhikivi nuclear facility project 
Olkiluoto encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility
In November 2015, the 
Government granted Posiva 
a construction licence for 
the Olkiluoto encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility. 
The planned facility consists 
of a surface facility for the 
encapsulation of spent nuclear 
fuel, an underground disposal 
facility, and supporting build-
ings. Posiva has already built 
an access tunnel, three shafts 
and a technical facility and 
research area at a depth of 
420–437 metres as parts of 
the underground research facility Onkalo. For the 
actual disposal facility, the underground facility 
will be expanded by two additional shafts and the 
disposal tunnels that will be excavated in stages. 
The construction of an underground research 
facility was a prerequisite for granting a construc-
Diagram of the encapsulation and disposal facility in Olkiluoto (Posiva Oy).
tion licence. Onkalo will provide an opportunity 
for more detailed study of the rock volumes best 
suited for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel, and 
allow for the testing of disposal facility construc-
tion methods and installation of the disposal 
system components.
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FiR 1 research reactor
Other uses of nuclear energy
The regulation also applies to mining and any 
preparation of ore aiming at obtaining uranium or 
thorium. Such operations are practiced at the pro-
duction plants of Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy and 
Freepoint Cobalt Oy. A planned uranium prepara-
tion plant at Talvivaara is also part of this regula-
tory group. There are small amounts of regulated 
materials at some laboratories. The regulation also 
applies to nuclear equipment, systems and nuclear 
information as well as nuclear fuel cycle research 
and development activities and the transport of 
nuclear materials and nuclear waste.
Facility Thermal power In operation Fuel TRIGA-reaktorin
    polttoainetyyppi
TRIGA Mark II 250 kW March 1962– Reactor core consists Uranium–zirkonium-
research reactor  June 2015 of 80 fuel rods which hybrid combination:
   contain 15 kg of uranium 8% uranium
    91% zirkonium and 
    1% hydrogen
The FiR 1 research reactor, operated by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, was commissioned in  
March 1962. VTT stopped using the reactor in June 2015 and placed in permanent shutdown. VTT is prepar-
ing an application on revising the reactor operating licence.
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Summary of the safety performance 
indicators for nuclear power plants
Background and objectives 
of the indicator system
Safety is a primary prerequisite for the operation 
of nuclear power plants. Along with inspections 
and safety assessments, indicators are a method 
of acquiring information on the safety level of the 
nuclear power plants and on any changes therein.
The objective of the indicator system is to rec-
ognise changes in plant safety as early on as pos-
sible. If the indicators weaken, the factors behind 
the development are investigated and changes to 
plant operation and STUK’s oversight of the area 
are considered. The indicators can also be used to 
monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of correc-
tive measures.
In the indicator system, nuclear safety is di-
vided into three sectors: 1) operation and main-
tenance, 2) operational events and 3) structural 
integrity. STUK began the development of its own 
indicator system in 1995. Nominated STUK rep-
resentatives are responsible for the maintenance 
and analysis of the indicators. The indicators, their 
maintenance procedures and the interpretation of 
the results are presented at the end of this sum-
mary. A brief summary of the safety status of each 
plant in 2016 is given below, followed by detailed 
results by indicator.
STUK will develop its indicator system in 2016 
and 2017. The indicator system will be revised 
in 2017. The new system will be more closely in-
tegrated into STUK’s other inspection activities 
and total safety assessment. Therefore, this an-
nual report does not include the entire indicator 
system but only the indicators that best describe 
what plant safety was like in the different sectors 
in 2016.
Nuclear safety
A.I Operation and maintenance of 
a nuclear facility A.II Operational events A.III Structural integrity
1. Failures and their repairs 1. Number of events 1. Fuel integrity
2. Exemptions and deviations from 
the Operational Limits and 
Conditions
3. Risk-significance of events
2. Primary and secondary circuits 
integrity
3. Unavailability of safety systems 4. Accident risk of nuclear facilities
3. Containment integrity
4. Occupational radiation doses
5. Number of fire alarms5. Radioactive releases
6. Investments in facilities
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Results of the safety performance 
indicators for the nuclear 
power plants in 2016
Summary of indicator results for 
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Ageing management and component maintenance 
at the Loviisa nuclear power plant have been func-
tional and the development measures taken have 
been correct. Preventive maintenance has ensured 
sufficient operability. The number of operation re-
strictions on components subject to the OLC and 
the ratio of preventive maintenance to fault repairs 
remained at a stable, acceptable level. The number 
of fault repairs has increased in the past few years 
because more components were repaired while 
they were still operable – the number of immediate 
faults has remained at the same level or even de-
creased. In addition, the average component repair 
times have decreased in the long term. Detection 
and anticipation of faults have been improved in 
the maintenance operations of the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant and components have been replaced, 
which is why there have been no faults that have a 
major impact on the safe operation of the plant and 
the plant has been able to manage the operability 
of components well.
This development was also reflected in the 
good availability of safety systems. Availability of 
the high pressure safety injection system and the 
emergency feedwater system was excellent and 
availability of the emergency diesel generators was 
good in 2016.
No common-cause failures important to safety 
occurred. Some events that influenced production 
occurred, but they did not influence the safe opera-
tion of the plant. The Loviisa nuclear power plant 
was operated in compliance with the good safety 
culture and the OLC. No events important to 
safety (INES ≥1) took place. When granting exemp-
tions from the OLC, STUK has assessed that the 
safety level would remain good despite modifica-
tions, more extensive maintenance or fault repairs. 
More such jobs than normally were carried out in 
2016.
Radiation safety at the Loviisa nuclear power 
plant is good and being developed in a determined 
manner. The main part of the radiation doses is 
received during outages. Despite the long annual 
outages, the employees’ radiation doses remained 
Operation and maintenance are assessed on 
the basis of information concerning the radiation 
protection and the operation and maintenance of 
the plant. The operation and maintenance of the 
plant is monitored using the failure and mainte-
nance data for the components with an effect on 
the safe operation of the plant, as well as by moni-
toring compliance with the operational limits and 
conditions (OLC). The success of radiation protec-
tion is monitored on the basis of the employees’ 
radiation doses and radioactive releases into the 
environment. Attention is also paid to investments 
to improve the plant and to the up-to-dateness of 
the plant documentation.
The indicators concerning operational 
events are used to monitor special situations and 
significant disturbances at the plant. Special situ-
ations include events with an effect on the safety of 
the plant, the personnel or the environment. A spe-
cial report is required for any special situations. 
Correspondingly, a transient report must be pre-
pared for any significant disturbances occurring 
at a plant unit. Such transients include reactor 
and turbine trips, and other operational transients 
leading to a forced reduction of more than 5% in 
the reactor power or average gross power. Risk 
indicators are used to monitor the safety effect of 
component unavailability and development of the 
plant’s risk level. The results provide insight into 
the operational activities at the plant and the effi-
ciency of the operating experience feedback system.
Structural integrity is assessed on the basis 
of the leak-tightness of the multiple radioactivity 
confinement barriers – the fuel, primary and sec-
ondary circuits, and the containment. The integri-
ty must meet the set objectives while the indicators 
must show no significant deterioration. Fuel integ-
rity is monitored on the basis of the radioactivity 
of the primary coolant and the number of leaking 
fuel bundles. The water chemistry indicators are 
used to monitor and control the integrity of the 
reactor coolant system and the secondary circuit. 
The monitoring is done by indices depicting the 
maintenance of water chemistry and by following 
selected corrosive impurities and corrosion prod-
ucts. Integrity of the containment is monitored by 
testing the leak tightness of isolation valves, pen-
etrations and air locks.
44
STUK-B 214 STUK’S SafeTy performance indicaTorS for npp’S in 2016 APPENDIX 2
low also in 2016 due to improvements of radiation 
safety, remaining well below the individual dose 
limits and the collective occupational dose limit. 
In 2016, the average of the ten largest doses was 
close to the average for the previous years. In 2016, 
radioactive releases into the air from the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant were of the same magnitude 
as in previous years, remaining clearly below the 
set limits.
Operational events
The number of reported events remained the same 
or decreased slightly. The number of simultane-
ous safety significant events (INES 1 or higher) 
decreased in the short and long term, which indi-
cates a positive development trend. Events war-
ranting a special report in 2016 were single events 
of low safety significance where the plant was non-
compliant with the OLC. The safety significance 
of the events is also reflected in the events’ risk 
significance, which has remained low and contin-
ued to steadily decrease over the years. Accident 
risk of the Loviisa nuclear power plant, which de-
scribes technical safety and reliability of the plant, 
has continued to decrease over the last ten years 
at both plant units, and new risk factors, discov-
ered as the scope of the PRA has been extended, 
have been efficiently eliminated. Fire safety at the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant remained at the good 
level of the previous years – only one event clas-
sified as a fire occurred in 2016, and a repairman 
was able to extinguish the smouldering fire with a 
fire extinguisher. The number of fire detection sys-
tem faults has remained at the same level for the 
past ten years.
Structural integrity
The structural integrity of the fuel, the primary 
circuit and the containment has remained good at 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant. There have been 
no leaking fuel assemblies at Loviisa since 2013.
There was no leaking fuel in the reactors of the 
Loviisa units in 2016, which means that the maxi-
mum iodine (I-131) activity value of the primary 
coolant remained low.
Condition of the primary and secondary cir-
cuits is monitored with the chemistry indicators, 
in particular. The small number of leaks and all of 
the chemistry indicators demonstrate that the in-
tegrity of the primary circuits of the Loviisa plant 
units was good in 2016.
Integrity of the containment remained at a good 
level at both of the Loviisa plant units. Total leak-
age through containment penetrations and isolation 
valves remained low, clearly below the set limits, in 
2016 as in the previous years.
Summary of indicator results for 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Operation and maintenance
Component ageing management and maintenance 
at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant have been 
functional and the development measures taken 
in the past few years have been successful, which 
is clearly indicated by the fact that the number of 
faults has remained low since 2012. Furthermore, 
components subject to the OLC have been inoper-
able only for short periods of time and the number 
of faults causing inoperability of components has 
decreased at both units. Detection and anticipa-
tion of faults have been continuously improved in 
the maintenance operations of Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant and components have been replaced, 
which is why there have been no faults that have 
a major impact on the safe operation of the plant 
units. Preventive maintenance has ensured suf-
ficient operability. The number of preventive main-
tenance actions performed has increased, which 
has improved the ratio of preventive maintenance 
to fault repairs.  The average repair times of faults 
causing inoperability of components subject to the 
OLC have become shorter, i.e. the development has 
been positive. This positive development was also 
reflected as good availability of safety systems (the 
containment spray system, the auxiliary feedwater 
system and the emergency diesel generators).
No common-cause failures important to safety 
occurred. Investigations about the fuel leaks at 
Olkiluoto 1 are still ongoing, however (see the sec-
tion on structural integrity). Slightly more events 
that influenced production occurred, but they did 
not influence the safe operation of the plant be-
cause the most important events were planned 
repair outages of both plant units. No safety sig-
nificant events (INES ≥1) or situations where the 
plant was non-compliant with the OLC occurred 
in 2016. The most important events in 2016 are 
STUK-B 214
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described in Appendix 3. The main purpose of the 
OLC exemption procedure is to verify that the 
safety level specified in the OLC is achieved during 
modifications, more extensive maintenance or fault 
repairs. Plenty of modifications were implemented 
in 2016, but less exemptions from the OLC than in 
the previous years were requested.
Radiation safety at the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant is good and being developed. The main part 
of the radiation doses is received during outages. 
In 2016, the radiation doses of the employees were 
slightly higher than in the previous years due 
to the fuel leaks at Olkiluoto 1. The doses still 
remained clearly below the dose limits set in the 
Radiation Decree, however. In 2016, the average of 
the ten largest doses was close to the average for 
the previous years. In 2016, radioactive releases 
into the air from Olkiluoto 2 were of the same 
magnitude as in previous years, remaining clearly 
below the set limits. Releases at Olkiluoto 1 were 
clearly higher than in the previous years due to 
the fuel leaks, but still remained well below the set 
limits.
In June, a release from the turbine building oc-
curred at Olkiluoto (see Appendix 3 to this annual 
report). It caused a short-term noble gas and aero-
sol nuclide release past the delay systems directly 
into the vent stack. The event increased the aerosol 
nuclide release level, in particular, but the impact 
of the short-lived nuclides on radiation safety is 
minimal. Due to the fuel leaks, the noble gas and 
iodine releases from Olkiluoto were clearly higher 
than in the previous years as well.
Operational events
No events important to safety occurred at the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant in 2016.
The number of reported events remained the 
same or decreased slightly. The number of si-
multaneous safety significant events (INES 1 or 
higher) decreased in the short and long term, 
which indicates a positive development trend. This 
is also reflected in the risk significance of the 
events which has remained low and continued to 
steadily decrease over the years. Fire safety at the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant has remained at the 
same good level as in previous years – no events 
classified as fires occurred in 2016 and the number 
of fire detection system faults has remained at the 
same level for the past ten years.
Accident risk of the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant, which describes technical safety and reli-
ability of the plant, has continued to decrease over 
the last ten years at both plant units, and new risk 
factors, discovered as the scope of the PRA has 
been extended, have been efficiently eliminated.
Structural integrity
Structural integrity of the primary circuit and the 
containment has remained good at the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant, but a large number of fuel 
leaks have occurred – in 2016, six leaking fuel 
assemblies were detected in and removed from 
Olkiluoto 1. This is an exceptionally high number 
of leaking assemblies. TVO took corrective action 
to improve the situation and will study the as-
semblies closer to determine the root causes of the 
leaks.
In addition to the number of removed assem-
blies, parameters monitored by STUK include 
maximum activity concentration of the primary 
coolant (I-131), which clearly shows an increase 
due to the leaking bundles in 2016. The values still 
remained clearly below the limit set in the OLC, 
however.
Condition of the primary circuit is monitored 
with the chemistry indicators and by studying 
allowed leaks. A valve leak was detected at both 
units during the fuel cycle. This slightly increased 
the leak volume but the leak volume has remained 
low when compared to the limit set in the OLC. 
The small number of leaks and all of the chemistry 
indicators demonstrate that the primary circuits of 
the Olkiluoto plant units were relatively leaktight 
and their integrity was at a relatively good level in 
2016.
Integrity of the containment has remained good 
at both plant units. STUK monitors leak test 
results of the outer isolation valves, total leak-
age and as-found leakages from containment pen-
etrations and airlocks. The number of leaks has 
remained steady, clearly below the set limits at 
both plant units, and the as-found leakages from 
containment penetrations and airlocks have been 
low at both plant units.
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Safety performance indicators
A.I Operation and maintenance
A.I.1 Faults and repairing them
A.I.1a Faults in components subject to the OLC
Definition
The number of faults causing the unavailability of 
components during load operation defined in the 
operational limits and conditions (OLC) is moni-
tored as an indicator. The faults are divided by 
plant unit into two groups: faults causing an im-
mediate operation restriction and faults causing 
an operation restriction in connection with repair 
work.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the work order systems 
and the operational documents of NPPs.
Purpose
The indicator is used to assess nuclear power plant 
lifecycle management and development of the con-
dition of components.
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
The total number of faults causing an operation 
restriction of components subject to the OLC in 
2016 was 198. The average number of faults during 
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the four previous years was 173, which means that 
there was no significant increase in the number of 
faults in 2016 or in the fault trend.
The number of faults per year remained stable. 
Any variation therein has been caused by the ran-
dom occurrence of faults that occurs in any large 
number of components. Fault detection and antici-
pation have been continuously improved in plant 
maintenance operations at Loviisa, and compo-
nents have been replaced. Due to these measures, 
the management of component availability has 
been successful.
Based on the above, it can be stated that the in-
dicator or the underlying fault data does not show 
any significant negative effects associated with the 
ageing of the facilities, which is an indication of 
well-functioning component lifecycle management 
and component maintenance.
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47
APPENDIX 2 STUK’S SafeTy performance indicaTorS for npp’S in 2016
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The number of failures occurring during power 
operation and causing the unavailability of compo-
nents subject to the operational limits and condi-
tions has been decreasing since 2012.
In 2012, the number of faults was nearly double 
the number of faults in 2009. In 2012, the number 
of faults decreased back to the level of 2010, and 
the number of faults did not change in 2013 or 
2014. According to this indicator, the year 2016 was 
similar to the years 2014 and 2015. The number of 
faults indicates that maintenance has been suc-
cessful.
The indicator “immediate operation restriction 
on detection of fault” decreased considerably. The 
considerable decrease was caused by the fact that 
most of the faults in the systems subject to the 
OLC were in components whose failure did not 
cause an immediate operation restriction.
The unavailability times of OLC components 
in OL1 during all four quarters of 2016 were brief. 
The number of faults causing an immediate op-
eration restriction decreased at both plants. The 
decrease started already in 2014.
In OL2, most of the unavailability times of OLC 
components were brief in 2016. Furthermore, the 
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observed faults in OLC components did not occur 
in any specific system alone.
A.I.1b Maintenance of components 
subject to the OLC
Definition
The indicator is used to follow the number of fault 
repairs and preventive maintenance work orders 
for components subject to the operational limits 
and conditions (OLC) by plant unit.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the nuclear power plant 
work order systems, from which all preventive 
maintenance operations and fault repairs are re-
trieved.
Purpose
The indicator describes the volumes of fault re-
pairs and preventive maintenance, and illustrates 
the condition of the nuclear power plant and its 
maintenance strategy. The indicator is used to as-
sess the maintenance strategy implemented at the 
NPP.
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
When considering the annual variation in the vol-
ume of fault repairs and particularly in the num-
ber of preventive maintenance jobs, the scheduling 
of various annual outages (refuelling outage, short 
annual outage, four-year annual outage, eight-year 
annual outage) included in the maintenance strat-
egy of the Loviisa NPP during a four-year cycle 
should be considered, as it can have a significant 
impact on the annual figures. In 2016, a four-year 
annual outage was implemented at LO1 and a 
short annual outage (a refuelling outage) at LO2.
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According to the data on which the indicator is 
based, the year 2016 showed no major deviation 
from the average numbers of fault repairs and pre-
ventive maintenance volumes of the four previous 
years. A slight increase was observed in both.
In 2016, the number of maintenance tasks 
on components subject to the OLC was 20.4% 
higher than the average. The volume of preventive 
maintenance was 17.6% higher than the average 
and the number of fault repairs 37.7% higher. 
The number of fault repairs includes the repair 
of faults and repairs of components that are still 
operable. The indicator’s increase was due to the 
increased number of the latter. The number of im-
mediate faults has remained stable or somewhat 
decreased.
The ratio of preventive maintenance to fault 
repairs was 5.1. The ratio is 18.5% lower than the 
6.1% average of the four previous years, which 
means that the share of preventive maintenance of 
all maintenance work has remained at almost the 
same level as in the previous years.
The large share of preventive maintenance 
operations reflects the selected maintenance strat-
egy, the purpose of which is to keep the number of 
faults and the effects of faults at a tolerable level.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The number of maintenance works causing inop-
erability of components, included in the indicator, 
decreased in 2009–2012 due to the lower number 
of fault repairs. In 2010, the number of faults re-
paired increased while the number of preventive 
maintenance operations decreased.
In 2016, the number of fault repairs that caused 
inoperability of components decreased from the 
level of 2011–2015. The number of preventive 
maintenance operations slightly increased, im-
proving the ratio of preventive maintenance to 
fault repairs from 2015. The number of preventive 
maintenance operations increased at OL2. The 
number of faults repaired at OL2 remained at the 
same level as in 2015 and the relative number of 
preventive maintenance tasks also increased more 
than at OL1, which is why the maintenance ratio 
increased to 1.9 at OL1 and to 1.4 at OL2. These 
are close to the 2012 values.
Based on the development of the ratio of pre-
ventive maintenance work to fault repairs and an 
assessment of the work on which the figures are 
based, the maintenance strategy can be considered 
successful.
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A.I.1c Repair times of components 
subjectto the OLC
Definition
As an indicator, the average repair time of faults 
causing the unavailability of components defined 
in the operational limits and conditions (OLC) is 
monitored. For each repair, the time recorded is 
the time of inoperability. In the case of a fault that 
causes an immediate operation restriction, it is cal-
culated from the detection of the fault to the end of 
the repair work. If the component is operable until 
the beginning of repairs, only the time it takes to 
complete the repairs is taken into account.
Sourc♦e of data
The data is obtained from the nuclear power 
plants’ work order systems as well as maintenance 
and operation documentation.
Purpose
The indicator shows how quickly failed components 
subject to the OLC are repaired when compared to 
the repair time allowed in the OLC. The indicator 
is used to assess the strategy, resources and effec-
tiveness of NPP maintenance.
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
The OLC define the maximum allowed repair times 
for components based on the components’ safety 
significance. The times vary from four hours to 21 
days. Furthermore, faults in OLC components are 
to be repaired within the allotted time without 
undue delay.
Due to the small amount of work requiring op-
eration restrictions and the varying allowed repair 
times, an individual repair operation may have a 
significant effect on the indicator, even if it is com-
pleted within the allotted time. This aspect of the 
indicator is taken into account in the interpreta-
tion of the indicator by evaluating the significance 
of individual long-term fault repairs in terms of 
maintenance strategy, resources and efficiency of 
operations.
The average repair times of faults causing una-
vailability of components have remained stable at 
the Loviisa NPP for several years. In 2016, the av-
erage repair time for the plant units was 14 hours, 
while the average of the four previous years was 
19.6 hours, i.e. there was an improvement of 40%.
Based on the 2016 indicators and the underly-
ing data, the plant’s maintenance operations can 
be considered appropriate. Despite the positive de-
velopment in repair times, attention still needs to 
be paid to having the necessary resources available 
for fault repairs, and for carrying out the repairs 
without unnecessary delays.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The indicator is used to monitor the repair times 
of components subject to the operational limits and 
conditions (OLC). The repair time allowed in the 
OLC is usually 30 days for faults concerning one 
subsystem and three days for faults concerning 
two subsystems. Depending on the system and the 
component, other allowed repair times may also be 
defined in the OLC.
In the long term, the average repair time has 
varied between six to ten hours.
In 2015, the average repair time of faults caus-
ing inoperability of components subject to the OLC 
at OL1 and OL2 was around 7 h. In the case of 
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both plant units, the average repair time of faults 
causing inoperability of components subject to the 
OLC was lower than in the previous years in 2016, 
and at OL2 it was exceptionally low. This was due 
to the low number of faults and the fact that no 
long-term faults occurred.
On the basis of the 2016 indicators and the un-
derlying data, the NPP’s maintenance operations 
were appropriate.
A.I.2 Exemptions and deviations from the OLC
Definition
As indicators, the number of non-conformances 
with the operational limits and conditions (OLC), 
as well as the number of exemptions granted by 
STUK, are monitored.
Source of data
Data for the indicator is collected from applications 
for exemption by the power companies and from 
event reports.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the power compa-
nies’ activities in accordance with the operational 
limits and conditions: compliance with the OLC 
and identified situations during which it is neces-
sary to deviate from the OLC; conclusions regard-
ing the appropriateness of the OLC can also be 
made based on this data.
Interpretation of the indicator
The main purpose of the OLC exemption procedure 
is to enable modifications and maintenance that 
will improve safety and plant availability.
Non-conformance with the OLC refers to a situ-
ation where the NPP or a system or component of 
the NPP is not in a safe state as required by the 
operational limits and conditions. The objective is 
to have zero non-conformance events at the NPPs. 
The licensee must always prepare a special report 
on each non-conformance and any corrective meas-
ures, and submit it to STUK for approval.
Loviisa
Exemptions
Based on the last ten years (2006–2015), the Loviisa 
NPP applies for STUK’s approval for exemptions 
from the OLC six times per year on average. The 
number of applications in 2016 (eight applications 
in total) was slightly higher than the average. Six 
of the applications involved modifications, one in-
volved the testing of steam generator safety valves 
and one involved an error in a system alarm on the 
margin to boiling. As the planned deviations had no 
significant safety implications, STUK approved the 
applications.
Non-conformance with the OLC
In 2016, four events during which the plant did 
not comply with the OLC without an advance 
safety analysis and approval were detected at the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant. Such events have oc-
curred three times per year on average during 
the past ten years (2007–2015). All events that 
were non-compliant with the OLC in 2016 are de-
scribed in Chapter 4.1.2 of this annual report and 
in Appendix 3.
Loviisa NPP analyses all non-conformances 
with the OLC within a month of detection. The 
analysis includes finding out the underlying caus-
es, assessing the safety significance of the event 
and determining corrective measures to prevent 
reoccurrence of the non-conformances. The results 
of the analysis are documented in a special report 
(indicator A.II.1). One key issue is identifying the 
possibility of reoccurrence, i.e. studying whether a 
similar event has occurred in the past and whether 
the corrective measures implemented at the time 
were sufficient. One issue in common to several 
of the events in 2012–2016 was non-compliance 
with the OLC during the changing of a plant unit’s 
operating mode, i.e. either when switching the unit 
from load operation to shutdown or from shutdown 
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to load operation. The shutdown or startup of a 
plant unit is implemented in stages. Before mov-
ing on to the next stage, it must be verified that 
all the requirements for the next stage have been 
met. These inspections were not fully successful in 
the case of these events. One must make sure that 
there are no defects that could lead to an inadvert-
ent deviation in people’s knowledge of the OLC, 
procedures related to compliance with the OLC or 
the formatting of the OLC themselves. The events 
in 2016 involved repairs and maintenance.
Olkiluoto
Based on data from the last ten years (2007–2016), 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant applies for 
STUK’s approval for exemptions from the OLC 
seven times per year on average. The number of 
applications in 2016 (four applications in total) was 
slightly lower than the average. Two of the applica-
tions involved repairs and modifications during the 
annual outage. In one of the cases, a permission to 
deviate from a requirement on the maintenance of 
the control rod actuators was sought, and the other 
case was about provisions for a possible power 
outage when commissioning a new backup power 
supply battery bank. The other two applications for 
exemption involved the draining of an emergency 
diesel generator fuel tank to perform an internal 
inspection. STUK approved all four applications.
Non-conformance with the OLC
In 2016, Olkiluoto power plant did not report any 
events during which the plant was non-compliant 
with the OLC without an advance safety analysis 
and STUK’s permission. The average number of 
events for the past ten years is three events non-
compliant with the OLC per year. The last year 
when there were zero events non-compliant with 
the OLC was 2010.
A.I.3 Unavailability of safety systems
Definition
As the indicator, the unavailability of safety sys-
tems per plant unit is monitored. The systems fol-
lowed at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant are the 
containment spray system (322), the auxiliary 
feedwater system (327) and the emergency diesel 
generators (651–656). Those followed at Loviisa 
nuclear power plant are the high pressure safety 
injection system (TJ), the auxiliary feedwater sys-
tem (RL92/93, RL94/97) and the emergency diesel 
generators (EY).
Essentially, the ratio of a system’s unavailabili-
ty hours and its required availability hours are cal-
culated as the indicator. The unavailability hours 
are the combined unavailability of redundant sub-
systems divided by the number of subsystems.
Annual plant criticality hours are the availabil-
ity requirement for the systems 322, 327, TJ and 
RL. For diesel generators, the requirement is con-
tinuous, i.e. equal to the annual operating hours.
The unavailability hours of a subsystem include 
the time required for the planned maintenance of 
components and unavailability due to faults. The 
latter includes, in addition to the time spent on 
repairs, the estimated unavailability time prior 
to fault detection. If a fault is estimated to have 
occurred in a previous successful test but to have 
escaped detection, the time between inservice tests 
is added to the unavailability time. If a fault has 
occurred between tests but its date of occurrence is 
unknown, half of the time that has lapsed between 
tests will be added to the unavailability time. If the 
fault clearly occurred during an operational, main-
tenance, testing or other event, the time between 
the event and the defection of the fault is added to 
the unavailability time.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies. The licensee’s representatives submit 
the necessary data to the relevant responsible per-
son at STUK.
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Purpose
The indicator indicates the unavailability of safety 
systems. The indicator is used to track the condi-
tion of safety systems and any identifiable trends.
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
TJ system
Analysis of the unavailability figures of the high 
pressure safety injection systems of the plant units 
in 2016 and their background information shows 
that no faults occurred at Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2, 
i.e. their condition and availability were excellent.
RL system
The total unavailability time of the Loviisa 1 
backup emergency feedwater system RL94 was 91 
hours in 2016. There was no unavailability during 
load operation. The entire unavailability time was 
caused by periodic maintenance of the system dur-
ing the annual outage of Loviisa 1.
The total unavailability time of the Loviisa 2 
backup emergency feedwater system RL97 was 98 
hours in 2016. There was no unavailability during 
load operation. The entire unavailability time was 
caused by periodic maintenance of the system dur-
ing the annual outage of Loviisa 2.
The unavailability of the auxiliary feedwater 
systems was low in 2016, i.e. their condition and 
availability were excellent.
EY system
In 2016, the unavailability time of the eight emer-
gency diesel generators was a total of 233 hours. 75 
hours of the unavailability time was caused by re-
pairs of the seawater cooling pump 22EY03D05 of 
the diesel generator 22EY03 during load operation.
In 2016, there were a total of ten emergency 
diesel generator events causing unavailability. Of 
these faults, two caused an immediate operation 
restriction and eight an operation restriction start-
ing at the beginning of the repair work.
Most of the repairs were due to leaks in the mo-
tors’ cooling/shell water pipelines. Some of these 
pipelines will be replaced during future annual 
outages of the plant.
The unavailability rate of the emergency diesel 
generators in 2016, 0.29%, is still clearly lower 
than the value for the previous year (2015), which 
was 0.45%, i.e. the availability level was good.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
Unavailability of the containment spray system in 
2007, 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2013 was zero for both 
plant units, and almost zero in 2009 and 2012.
Unavailability of the auxiliary feedwater sys-
tem increased significantly from 2014, but was 
practically zero (0.13). The increased unavailabili-
ty of Olkiluoto 1 in 2006 was due to faults in the re-
circulation and safety valves in system 327. There 
were no significant faults in 2007, 2008 or 2009, 
and the unavailability of the auxiliary feedwater 
system decreased to zero in 2009 at both plant 
Unavailability of high pressure safety injection system (TJ), 
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units. In 2010, unavailability of OL1 was still zero 
but unavailability of OL2 slightly increased from 
the previous year, mainly as a result of several 
new faults discovered during the annual outage. In 
2011, the figure for OL1 was multiplied from the 
previous years as the result of a hidden fault in one 
auxiliary feedwater system valve that remained 
inoperable for 504  hours; cf. Chapter A.II.3. In 
2013, the unavailability of the auxiliary feedwater 
system returned to the level of prior to 2011. This 
level was retained in 2016 at OL1, and the unavail-
ability of OL2 was almost zero.
The unavailability of the emergency diesel gen-
erators decreased in 2006 and 2007, and was very 
low as a result. In 2008, the value increased by 
nearly 95% compared to the previous year. The in-
crease was due to hidden faults in the compressed 
air motors of the diesels at both plant units. In 
2009, the unavailability of the diesel generators 
decreased considerably from the 2008 figures. In 
2010, unavailability increased somewhat from the 
previous year as a result of faults occurring in con-
nection with inservice testing. At OL1, the stator 
winding of a diesel generator failed in connection 
with an inservice test in August 2010, and the 
generator was replaced with an overhauled unit. 
In 2011, the unavailability of the emergency diesel 
generators was more than four times higher than 
in 2010, the highest figure ever recorded during 
the time this parameter has been monitored. The 
reason for the increase was the above-mentioned 
diesel generator fault, which may have lasted as 
long as from August 2010 to May 2011. In addition, 
there were faults in exhaust manifolds and ex-
haust pipes in 2011. In 2012, the unavailability of 
the diesel generators was zero. The unavailability 
of the diesel generators slightly increased in 2014 
but still remained very low. The unavailability 
increased again to 0.96 in 2015. The unavailabil-
ity of the diesel generators in both units was zero 
in 2016 due to preventive maintenance and im-
provements that were successfully realised during 
planned maintenance outages.
A.I.4 Radiation exposure
Definition
As the indicators, collective radiation exposure of 
nuclear power plant employees by plant site and 
the annual average of the ten highest occupational 
doses are monitored.
Source of data
The data on collective radiation exposure is re-
ceived from the quarterly and annual reports of the 
nuclear power plants as well as the national dose 
registry. The data on individual radiation doses is 
obtained from the national dose registry.
Purpose
The indicators are used to control the radiation 
exposure of employees. The collective occupational 
doses describe the success of the nuclear power 
plant’s ALARA programme. The average of the ten 
highest doses indicates how close to the 20  mSv 
dose limit the individual occupational doses at the 
nuclear power plants are. It also indicates effec-
tiveness of the nuclear power plant’s radiation pro-
tection unit.
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Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
Most doses are incurred through work done during 
outages. Thus, the duration of the outage and the 
amount of work having significance on radiation 
protection affect the annual radiation doses. Both 
Loviisa plant units have more extensive annual 
outages every four and eight years (the four-year 
annual outage and the eight-year annual outage) 
so that both plant units never have a major an-
nual outage during the same year. The four-year 
and eight-year outages have been arranged in even 
years and normal annual outages in odd years. In 
2016, like in 2008, a four-year annual outage took 
place at Loviisa  1 and a short annual outage at 
Loviisa 2. The effect of annual outages on collec-
tive occupational doses can be seen in the graph 
Collective occupational dose, Loviisa. Due to im-
provements in radiation safety, the radiation doses 
of employees have decreased, and the collective oc-
cupational dose in 2016 was clearly lower than the 
reference year of 2008.
The radiation doses for employees of Loviisa 
nuclear power plant remained below the individual 
dose limits. In 2016, the average of the ten largest 
doses was clearly lower than during the reference 
year. The Radiation Decree (1512/1991) stipulates 
that the effective dose for a worker from radiation 
work may not exceed the 20 mSv/year average over 
any period of five years, or 50 mSv during any one 
year.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
Most doses are incurred through work done dur-
ing outages. Thus, the duration of the outage and 
the amount of work having significance on radia-
tion protection affect the annual radiation doses. 
The annual outages of the Olkiluoto plant units 
are divided into two groups: refuelling outages 
and maintenance outages. The refuelling outage is 
shorter in duration (approximately 7 days). Length 
of the maintenance outage depends on the amount 
of work to be done (2–3 weeks). Annual outages are 
scheduled so that in the same year, one plant unit 
undergoes a maintenance outage and the other a 
refuelling outage. In 2016, Olkiluoto 1 underwent 
a maintenance outage and Olkiluoto 2 a refuelling 
outage.
The radiation doses have clearly decreased af-
ter the installation of new moisture separators at 
the plant units in 2005–2007. The radiation level 
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in the turbine buildings has continued to decrease 
after the installation of the moisture separators, 
and this has also decreased the collective occupa-
tional dose. Furthermore, improvements aiming 
at reducing the employees’ radiation doses have 
been made in the radiation protection of the plant. 
In 2016, the doses of the employees were slightly 
higher than in the previous years due to fuel leaks 
in Olkiluoto 1. The dose limits set in the Radiation 
Decree (1512/1991) were not exceeded.
A.I.5 Releases
Definition
As the indicators, radioactive releases into water-
ways and the air from the nuclear power plants are 
monitored, together with the calculated dose due 
to releases to the most exposed individual in the 
vicinity of the nuclear power plant.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies’ quarterly and annual reports. From 
this data, the calculated radiation dose for the 
most exposed individual in the vicinity of the plant 
is determined.
Purpose
The indicator is used to monitor the amount and 
trend of radioactive releases and assess factors 
having a bearing on any changes in them.
A.I.5a Releases into the air
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
In 2016, radioactive releases into the air from the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant were of the same mag-
nitude as in the previous years.
Noble gas releases to the atmosphere (Bq 87Kreq), 
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No fuel leaks were detected at Loviisa in 2016. 
Aerosol nuclides (including activated corrosion 
products) are released during maintenance work.
56
STUK-B 214 STUK’S SafeTy performance indicaTorS for npp’S in 2016 APPENDIX 2
Olkiluoto
In 2016, radioactive releases into the air from the 
Olkiluoto 2 nuclear power plant unit were of the 
same magnitude as in the previous years. The 
releases remained clearly below the set limits. 
During the spring, six leaking fuel rods were de-
tected at Olkiluoto 1. The releases of fission prod-
ucts were clearly higher than in the previous years 
due to the leaking fuel rods. The releases remained 
clearly below the set limits also at Olkiluoto 1, 
however. In June, a release from the turbine build-
ing occurred at Olkiluoto. It caused a short-term 
noble gas and aerosol nuclide release past the de-
lay systems directly into the vent stack. The event 
increased the aerosol nuclide release level, in par-
ticular, but the impact of the short-lived nuclides 
on radiation safety is minimal as they will decay 
into stable elements in the immediate vicinity of 
the vent stack. The level of the released longer-
lived aerosol nuclides at Olkiluoto remained at the 
same level as in the previous years.
Gaseous fission products, noble gases and io-
dine isotopes originate from leaking fuel rods, from 
the minute amounts of uranium left on the outer 
surfaces of fuel cladding during fuel fabrication 
and from reactor surface contamination due to 
earlier fuel leaks. Due to the fuel leaks at Olkiluoto 
1, the noble gas and iodine releases from Olkiluoto 
were clearly higher than in the previous years.
A.I.5b Releases into the sea
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
Releases of radioactive substances emitting gamma 
radiation into the environment from the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant remained clearly below the 
set limits. In 2009 and 2013, the Loviisa nucle-
ar power plant released evaporator concentrate 
waste into the sea as planned. Consequently, the 
releases of substances with gamma activity were 
larger than the average in those years. Releases of 
substances with gamma activity into the sea from 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant have decreased in 
recent years.
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Releases in 2008, 2009, 2014 and 2015 were below the detection limit.
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Olkiluoto
Releases of radioactive substances emitting gamma 
radiation into the environment from the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant remained clearly below the 
set limits. The releases of substances with gamma 
activity into the sea from Olkiluoto have decreased 
in the long term.
A.I.5c Population exposure
Interpretation of the indicator
Assessment of the radiation dose of the most ex-
posed individual in the vicinity of a nuclear power 
plant is based on information about the plant’s re-
leases and meteorological measurements. The ex-
posure routes that are taken into account include 
external radiation and internal radiation, i.e. ra-
diation caused by radioactive materials ending up 
inside the body via air or food. The estimated doses 
given here are lower than the values reported by 
the plants due to, for instance, the different model-
ling system of the dose caused by the nuclide C-14.
Loviisa
The radiation dose of the most exposed individual 
in the vicinity of the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
assessed by means of calculations in 2016 was at 
the regular level and less than 0.1% of the 100 µSv 
limit set in the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988).
Olkiluoto
In 2016, the radiation dose in the vicinity of 
Olkiluoto was the highest since 1997 due to the 
fuel leaks, among other issues. The radiation doses 
from Olkiluoto were still very low or less than 1% 
of the 100 µSv limit set in the Nuclear Energy 
Decree (161/1988).
Gamma activity of the liquid effluents (Bq), 
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A.II Operational events
A.II.1 Number of events
Definition
As the indicator, the number of operational event 
reports is monitored in compliance with YVL 
Guide A.10. YVL Guide A.10 entered into force in 
late 2015, which is why the old term “events war-
ranting a special report” is still used in the indica-
tor. In addition to special reports and transient 
reports, the new operational event reports include 
other plant events submitted to STUK for informa-
tion. A special report corresponds to an operational 
event report submitted for approval in the new 
YVL Guide A.10.
Source of data
Data for the indicator is obtained from the STUK 
document management system (SAHA).
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the number of safe-
ty-significant events.
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
No reactor trips occurred at the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant in 2016.
Based on data from the previous ten years 
(2006–2015), the average number of annual events 
warranting a special report is five per year, while 
the average number of events warranting a tran-
sient report is four per year. The number of events 
warranting a special report was normal in 2016 
(five in total) and the number of events warrant-
ing a transient report (two in total) was below the 
average. Many of the events warranting a special 
report are deviations from the operational limits 
and conditions (OLC). The development of events 
non-compliant with the OLC is considered under 
indicator A.I.2.
Events warranting a special report in 2016 are 
described in Appendix 3.
When considering the indicators concerning 
special and transient reports, it must be noted that 
the number of reports does not give a correct idea 
of the division of events by plant unit since, for 
technical reasons, the reports that concern both 
plant units have been entered for Loviisa 1 alone. 
No events warranting a special report or events 
warranting a transient report that involved both 
plant units took place in 2016, however.
Olkiluoto
No reactor trips occurred at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant in 2016. Based on the data from the 
last ten years, an average of zero to one reactor 
trips per year occurs at the Olkiluoto nuclear pow-
er plant. During the previous decade (1993–2001), 
an average of almost three to four reactor trips 
per year occurred. The larger number of trips is 
explained by the fact that it also includes reac-
tor trips during annual outages that occurred, for 
example, in connection with testing of the reactor 
protection system.
Based on data from the previous ten years 
(2007–2016), the average number of annual events 
warranting a special report is four per year, while 
the average number of events warranting a tran-
sient report is five per year. In 2016, the number 
of events warranting a special report (two in total) 
was lower than the average and the number of 
events warranting a transient report (three in to-
tal) was also lower than the annual average. Many 
of the events warranting a special report are de-
viations from the operational limits and conditions 
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(OLC). The development of events non-compliant 
with the OLC is considered under indicator A.I.2.
Events warranting a special report in 2016 are 
described in Appendix 3.
When considering the indicators concerning 
special and transient reports, it must be noted that 
the number of reports does not give a correct idea 
of the division of events by plant unit since, for 
technical reasons, reports that concern both plant 
units or the interim storage facility for spent nu-
clear fuel have been entered for Olkiluoto 1 alone. 
No special report concerned the interim storage 
facility for spent nuclear fuel in 2016.
A.II.3 Risk-significance of events
Definition
As the indicator, the risk-significance of events 
caused by component unavailability is monitored. 
An increase in the conditional core damage prob-
ability (CCDP) associated with each event is used 
as the measure of a risk. CCDP takes the duration 
of each event into consideration. Events are di-
vided into three categories: 1) unavailability due to 
component failures, 2) planned unavailability and 
3) initiating events.
Unavailability caused by work for which STUK 
has granted an exemption is included in category 
2. Any non-conformances with the OLC that can be 
applied to this indicator are included in category 1. 
Non-compliances with the OLC are also dealt with 
in Chapter A.I.2.
Calculations concerning the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant have been made with FinPSA software 
and those concerning Loviisa nuclear power plant 
with RiskSpectrum software. For Loviisa, calcula-
tions of a simultaneous fault in several compo-
nents are based solely on the load operation model, 
which means that the results are not as exact as 
for single faults which have been calculated for 
all operating modes. The modelling of simultane-
ous faults across all operating modes (17 of them) 
would be possible, but the calculation time would 
be too long when compared to the benefits gained. 
This year, no simultaneous faults of several compo-
nents with the highest risk-significance occurred.
Source of data
Data for the calculation of the indicator is collected 
from the power companies’ reports and applica-
tions for exemptions.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the risk-significance 
of component unavailability and to assess risk-sig-
nificant initiating events and planned unavailabil-
ity. Special attention is paid to recurring events, 
common cause faults, simultaneously occurring 
faults and human errors. Another objective of the 
event analysis is to systematically search for any 
signs of a deteriorating organisational and safety 
culture.
Interpretation of the indicator
The combined total CCDP divided by the prob-
ability of a severe accident gives an overview of the 
risk-significance of operational events. To facilitate 
analysis, risk calculation is based on conservative 
assumptions and simplifications, which materially 
weakens the applicability of the results for trend 
monitoring. If the risk-significance remains at the 
same average level year after year, the annual fluc-
tuation does not warrant particular attention.
Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Loviisa NPP
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Loviisa
At Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2, the risk caused by op-
erational activities remained at around the same 
level as in the past years in 2016.
A brief description of the most significant events 
regarding risks is provided below.
Loviisa 1:
1. Maintenance of auxiliary emergency feedwater 
system of LO2 took 99 hours during the annual 
outage of LO2. This caused a risk for LO1 that 
was in power operation because the auxiliary 
emergency feedwater system of LO2 can also 
be used to cool LO1. The calculated CCDP was 
1.7E-7.
Loviisa 2:
1. Maintenance of auxiliary emergency feedwater 
system of LO1 took 92 hours during the annual 
outage of LO1. This caused a risk for LO2 that 
was in power operation because the auxiliary 
emergency feedwater system of LO1 can also 
be used to cool LO2. The calculated CCDP was 
2.0E-7.
Olkiluoto
At Olkiluoto 1, the risk caused by operational ac-
tivities remained at around the same level as in 
the past years in 2016. Two hidden faults in emer-
gency core cooling systems at Olkiluoto 2 increased 
the additional risk from operational activities to a 
fairly high level (15.3%).
A brief description of the significant events is 
given below.
Olkiluoto 1:
1. Preventive maintenance of a diesel generator in 
the subsystem A took 266 h. CCDP: 2.4E-07.
Olkiluoto 2:
1. During inservice testing of subsystem 327 C of 
the emergency feedwater system, it was noted 
that valve 327V307 in the recirculation line was 
defective. During inservice testing of subsystem 
323 C of the core spray system, it was noted 
that there was a fault in the flow measurement. 
Both of these faults were hidden, and the com-
ponents were simultaneously defective for 337 
hours. The fault in the 327 system persisted for 
555 hours. CCDP: 1.5E-06.
2. Preventive maintenance of a diesel generator in 
the subsystem A took 184 h. CCDP: 1.7E-07.
3. Preventive maintenance of a diesel generator in 
the subsystem C took 109 h. CCDP: 1.1E-07.
A.II.4 Accident risk at nuclear power plants
Definition
As the indicator, the annual probability of an acci-
dent leading to severe damage to nuclear fuel (core 
damage frequency) is monitored. The accident risk 
is presented per plant unit.
Source of data
The data is obtained as the result of probabilis-
tic risk assessments (PRA) of the nuclear power 
plants. The PRA is based on detailed calculation 
models, which are continuously developed and 
complemented. A total of 200 man-years have been 
used at Finnish NPPs to develop the models. The 
basic PRA data includes globally collected reliabil-
ity information of components and operator ac-
tivities, as well as operating experience from the 
Finnish NPPs.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the development of 
the nuclear power plant’s accident risk. The objec-
tive is to operate and maintain the plant in such 
a manner that the accident risk decreases or re-
mains stable. Probabilistic risk assessments can 
assist in detecting a need to make modifications to 
the plant or revise the operating methods.
Interpretation of the indicator
When assessing the indicator, one must keep in 
mind that it is affected by both the development 
of the nuclear power plant and the development 
of the calculation model. Plant modifications and 
changes in methods, carried out to remove risk 
factors, will decrease the indicator value. An in-
crease of the indicator value may be due to the 
model being extended to new event groups, or the 
identification of new risk factors. Furthermore, de-
veloping more detailed models or obtaining more 
detailed basic data may change the risk estimates 
in either direction. For example, an increase in the 
Loviisa indicator in 2003 was due to the PRA being 
extended to cover exceptionally harsh weather con-
ditions and oil accidents at sea during a refuelling 
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outage. In the following year, the indicator value 
decreased, partly as a result of a more detailed 
analysis of these factors.
Loviisa
Accident risk of the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
has continued to decrease over the last ten years, 
and new risk factors, discovered as the scope of 
the PRA has been extended, have been efficiently 
eliminated. The indicator decreased in 2007 due 
to a new service water line completed during the 
period. The new line allows for the alternative in-
take of seawater from the outlet channel to cool 
the plant when it is at a shutdown. The change 
decreased the risks in situations where algae, fra-
zil ice or an oil spill endangers the availability of 
seawater via the conventional route. A decrease of 
the indicator in 2008 and in the following years re-
sulted from more detailed assessments performed 
in conjunction with the renewal of the operating 
licence, as well as changes at the plant planned 
to be carried out earlier or in connection with the 
licence renewal. Such changes include decreasing 
the probability of a criticality accident using, for 
example, boron analysers, and decreasing the prob-
ability of an external leak.
At the end of 2016, the core damage frequency 
or annual probability of core damage calculated 
with the PRA model of Loviisa 1 was around 1.3 
× 10-5/year, which is around 25% lower than in 
2015 (1.7 × 10-5 /year). The core damage frequency 
of Loviisa 2 was 1.6 × 10-5/year, which is 20% less 
than in 2015 (2.0 × 10-5/year). The difference be-
tween the plant units’ risk assessments is due 
to differences in ventilation and air conditioning 
systems that contain safety systems, for example. 
The risk was lower than in the previous year due 
to the reduced fire risk significance in the demin-
eralization plant, the development of emergency 
operating procedures for leaks, a new procedure on 
using the backup emergency feedwater pumping 
plant without DC power supply and the fact that 
the control system of the turbine bypass valves was 
modified into an oil-free system.
Olkiluoto
The indicator for the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
decreased by approximately 30% in 2008 compared 
to previous years’ relatively stable values. The de-
crease was mainly due to the more detailed model-
ling of earthquake events and changes carried out 
at the plant to improve seismic qualification. The 
increase in 2009 was due to the fact that a heat 
exchanger in the screening system cannot be used 
for residual heat removal, contrary to earlier as-
sessments. The decrease of the risk in 2010 was 
due to changes in the modelling of DC systems 672 
and 679 (inclusion of battery diversity), while the 
increase in 2011 resulted from reassessment of 
fire frequencies. At Olkiluoto, the most important 
factors affecting the overall accident risk include 
internal events during power operation (compo-
nent failures and pipe ruptures leading to an op-
erational transient).
At the end of 2016, the calculated core dam-
age frequency for Olkiluoto 1 was 0.64 x 10-5/year, 
which is around 30% lower than in 2015 (0.90 x 
10-5/year). At the end of 2016, the calculated core 
damage frequency of Olkiluoto 2 was 1.13 x 10-5/
year, which is around 23% lower than in 2015 (1.46 
x 10-5/year). The changes in the core damage fre-
quency were caused by updates of the confidence 
data and updates of the ignition frequencies used 
in the PRA, among other issues. The difference be-
tween the plant units is mainly caused by the fact 
that Olkiluoto 1 underwent modifications in 2014 
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that ensured operability of the auxiliary feedwater 
system, which is used to cool the reactor, in case 
seawater cooling is lost because of a blockage at the 
seawater intake or component failures. Such modi-
fications have not been implemented at Olkiluoto 
2 yet.
A.II.5 Number of fire alarms
Definition
As indicators, the number of fire alarms and actual 
fires are monitored.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies. The licensees submit the data needed 
for the indicator to the person responsible for the 
indicator at STUK.
Purpose
The indicators are used to follow the effectiveness 
of fire protection at the nuclear power plants.
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
In 2016, there was one extinguishing task at 
Loviisa 2 (LO2) in the turbine hall’s exciter room. 
The turbine had been shut down for warranty test-
ing when the employees noticed smoke coming from 
an electrical cabinet. A repairman extinguished 
the smouldering fire with a fire extinguisher. The 
rescue personnel confirmed fire safety of the area. 
The number of fire detection system faults and the 
number of actual alarms made by fire detectors at 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant have remained 
stable for the past ten years. Alarms from the fire 
detection system have also remained at a relatively 
low level. Most of the alarms were caused by dust, 
smoke or humidity.
The fire detection system of the Loviisa nu-
clear power plant was renovated in 2000. After the 
renovation of the fire alarm system, the number of 
alarms increased at the plant due to the more sen-
sitive detectors. Advance alarms issued by the fire 
detection system are no longer included in these 
statistics.
The average fire safety of the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant has remained at around the same lev-
el. There have been four events classified as fires 
at the Loviisa plant site in the past ten years. The 
number of alarms from the fire detection system is 
affected by the amount of maintenance and repair 
work performed at the nuclear power plants. Fire 
detection systems are not always disconnected in a 
wide enough area during maintenance work.
Olkiluoto
No events classified as fires occurred at the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant (OL1/OL2) in 2016. 
One fire event took place outside the plant site: a 
solenoid valve in a cooling device of a freezer in the 
cafeteria caught fire. The employees of the cafete-
ria extinguished the fire with a fire blanket and 
the rescue personnel used a fire extinguisher to 
verify fire safety of the area. No fire detection sys-
tem faults were observed at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant (OL1/OL2) in 2016. No faults were ob-
served during the seven past years, either. Correct 
alarms of the fire detection system have remained 
at a fairly low level over the past ten years. This 
lower trend started after the year 2007.
The fire detection system of the Olkiluoto nu-
clear power plant was renovated in 2001. After the 
renovation of the fire alarm system, the number of 
alarms increased at the plant due to the more sen-
sitive detectors. Advance alarms issued by the fire 
detection system are no longer included in these 
statistics.
The average fire safety of the Olkiluoto nuclear 
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power plant has remained at around the same 
level. The trend for events classified as fires in 
Olkiluoto is decreasing: the last event classified as 
a fire occurred six years ago. The number of alarms 
from the fire detection system is affected by the 
amount of maintenance and repair work performed 
at the nuclear power plants. Fire detection systems 
are not always disconnected in a wide enough area 
during maintenance work.
A.III Structural integrity
A.III.1 Fuel integrity
Definition
As indicators, the plant unit-specific maximum 
level and the highest maximum activity value of 
the iodine-131 activity concentration (I-131 activ-
ity concentration) in the primary coolant in steady-
state operation (startup operation or load opera-
tion for Loviisa and load operation for Olkiluoto) 
are followed. The change in activity concentration 
of I-131 in primary coolant due to depressurisation 
in conjunction with shutdowns or reactor trips and 
the number of leaking fuel assemblies removed 
from the reactor are also followed as indicators.
Source of data
The licensees submit the indicator values directly 
to the person in charge of the indicator at STUK. 
The maximum activity levels are also available 
in the quarterly reports submitted by the power 
companies.
Purpose
The indicators describe fuel integrity and the fuel 
leakage volume during the fuel cycle. The indica-
tors for shutdown situations also describe the suc-
cess of the shutdown in terms of radiation protec-
tion.
A.III.1a Primary circuit activity
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
There were no leaking fuel assemblies in the reac-
tors of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 in 2016. The last 
time a leaking fuel assembly was removed from the 
Loviisa 1 reactor was in 2013 and the last time a 
leaking fuel assembly was removed from Loviisa 2 
was during the annual outage of 2013. As a result 
of these measures, the maximum activity (I-131) 
of the primary coolant has remained low. After 
removal of the leaking fuel assemblies, the maxi-
mum iodine-131 activity values associated with 
shutdowns also returned to the level before the 
leaks. The indicators describing fuel integrity have 
remained at a good and stable level in 2014–2016.
Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
A total of six fuel assemblies were removed from 
the Olkiluoto 1 reactor in 2016, and the primary 
coolant activity level caused by iodine-131 at Olki-
luoto 1 was elevated. A leaking fuel assembly was 
last detected at Olkiluoto 1 in 2010. On the basis 
of other inspections carried out during the annual 
outage, the fuel types at both plant units have 
mostly behaved normally. Several fuel leaks have 
occurred in the 2000s at Olkiluoto 2. In 2016, the 
primary coolant activity caused by iodine-131 was 
at the same level as in 2015. The last time the ac-
tivity level at Olkiluoto 2 was markedly elevated 
was in 2012.
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A.III.1b Number of leaking fuel assemblies
All leaking fuel assemblies are removed during an-
nual outages. Both licensees use an external party 
when identifying leaking assemblies. This means 
that a subcontractor handles the actual equipment 
and provides the operators, but the plant’s own 
radiochemistry laboratory analyses the water sam-
ples from the reactor. The leaking fuel assembly is 
identified based on the analysis results.
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
There were no leaking fuel assemblies in the re-
actors of Loviisa 1 or Loviisa 2 during the period 
under review.
Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
There were no leaking fuel assemblies in the 
reactor of Olkiluoto 2 in 2016. In the reactor of 
Olkiluoto 1, there were six leaking fuel assemblies. 
The number of leaking fuel assemblies was excep-
tionally high. TVO has already taken corrective 
action to remedy the situation. The leaking fuel 
assemblies will also be studied to identify the root 
cause of the faults. Most of the previous leaks have 
been caused by small loose objects entering the 
reactor during maintenance operations. The cool-
ant flow may cause the loose objects to vibrate and 
break the fuel cladding. To minimise the problem, 
new Triple Wave+ foreign object sieves have been 
adopted at Olkiluoto 2.
A.III.3 Containment integrity
Definition
As indicators, the following parameters are moni-
tored:
•	 Total	as-found	leakage	of	outer	isolation	valves	
following the first integrity tests compared with 
the maximum allowed total leakage from the 
outer isolation valves.
•	 Percentage	of	isolation	valves	tested	during	the	
year in question at each plant unit that passed 
the leak test at the first attempt (i.e. as-found 
leakage smaller than the acceptance criteria of 
the valve and no consecutive exceeding of the 
attention criteria of a valve without repair).
•	 Combined	as-found	leakage	rate	of	containment	
penetrations and airlocks in relation to their 
maximum allowed total leakage. The combined 
leakage rate at Olkiluoto includes leaks from 
personnel airlocks, the maintenance dome and 
the containment dome. At Loviisa, the combined 
leakage rate comprises the leak test results from 
personnel airlocks, the material airlock, cable 
penetrations of inspection equipment, contain-
ment maintenance ventilation systems (TL23), 
main steam piping (RA) and feedwater system 
(RL) penetrations; seals of blind-flanged penetra-
tions in ice-filling pipes are also included.
Source of data
Data is obtained from the power companies’ leak-
tightness test reports that are submitted by the 
licensees to STUK for information within three 
months from the completion of an annual outage. 
STUK calculates the total as-found leakages, as 
the reports give total leakages as they are at the 
end of the annual outage (i.e. after the completion 
of repairs and re-testing).
Purpose
The indicators are used to monitor the integrity 
of containment isolation valves, penetrations and 
airlocks.
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Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
Based on the indicators, containment integrity at 
the Loviisa units is good.
Total leakage of the outer isolation valves com-
pared to the maximum allowed total leakage has 
somewhat decreased at both plant units. The as-
found leakage of both units remains clearly below 
the set limit.
The number of isolation valves that passed the 
leak test at first attempt has clearly increased at 
both plant units in the past few years, reaching 
100% at both units in 2016.
Overall as-found leakage rate of containment 
penetrations and airlocks has remained low at 
both plant units.
Olkiluoto
Based on the indicators, containment integrity at 
the Olkiluoto units is good.
The total as-found leakages of outer isolation 
valves at the Olkiluoto 1 plant unit remained at a 
low level, clearly below the limit set in the opera-
tional limits and conditions (OLC).
The overall as-found leakage of the outer iso-
lation valves of Olkiluoto 2 increased when com-
pared to the previous year, but remained clearly 
below the limit set in the OLC.
The percentage of isolation valves that passed 
the leak test at first attempt remained high for 
both plant units. There was a slight decrease from 
2014 at Olkiluoto 2 in 2016.
The total as-found leakage rate of containment 
penetrations, in which TVO includes leakages in 
the upper and lower personnel airlocks, the main-
tenance dome and the containment dome, returned 
to the level of the previous years in 2016, i.e. was 
low at both plant units.
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APPENDIX 3 Significant events 
at nuclear power plants in 2016
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Annual outages at Loviisa, 
7 August – 7 October 2016
This year, Loviisa 1 underwent a four-year main-
tenance outage that lasted around 38 days. In ad-
dition to refuelling, the power company performed 
comprehensive inspections and large-scale modi-
fications. Due to this, all the fuel was removed 
from the reactor for the duration of the mainte-
nance work. The shorter annual outage at Loviisa 
2 started on 17 September 2016 and lasted around 
20 days.
In addition to the refuelling, the largest modifi-
cation was the installation of the first phase of the 
Loviisa I&C renewal in both plant units, including 
a preventive safety function control and indication 
system as well as modernisation of the I&C status 
monitoring system. The plan is to complete the rest 
of the I&C renewal installations in stages during 
the 2017 annual outage (phase 2B) and the 2018 
annual outage (phase 1 or the final phase). Fortum 
completed the installations according to plan dur-
ing the annual outage.
The annual outage inspections were carried out 
on schedule and in the planned scope. During the 
annual outage, Fortum inspected – according to a 
programme agreed with STUK – that there was 
no hydrogen flaking in the reactor pressure vessel 
of Loviisa 1. Hydrogen flaking was detected in the 
walls of the reactor pressure vessels in Belgian nu-
clear power plants Doel 3 and Tihange 2 during the 
2012 inservice inspections, and the plants were out 
of operation for a long time because of the hydro-
gen flaking. A similar inspection on the pressure 
vessel of Loviisa 2 was performed during the 2014 
annual outage; no hydrogen flaking was detected 
in Loviisa 2 either.
During the 2016 annual outage, Fortum in-
spected the reactor safety injection system nozzles 
of Loviisa 1 with an ultrasound method for the first 
time ever. The result obtained from one of the noz-
Figure A3.1. INES classified events at the Loviisa plant 
(INES Level 1 or higher).
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zles was abnormal. As the nozzles are components 
important to safety, STUK required that the power 
company prepare a detailed report of the inspec-
tion result. Based on the inspection, STUK deter-
mined that the reactor pressure vessel can be safe-
ly operated. STUK required, however, that the new 
inspection method must be qualified and the nozzle 
from which the abnormal result was obtained and 
any similar nozzles in the second unit must be 
inspected using the same method during the 2017 
annual outage. The inspections at Loviisa 2 are not 
scheduled until for the year 2018 in the inspection 
programme, which means that the inspections will 
be brought forward by one year. According to the 
information currently available, similar inspec-
tions have not been carried out in the other VVER 
plants because it is a very challenging inspection 
from the technical viewpoint.
During the annual outage of Loviisa 1, addi-
tional work for the employees was caused by a fuel 
element storage bottle that was accidentally taken 
into the reactor during refuelling and a cable break 
in the refuelling machine. STUK oversaw the re-
moval of the bottle and the subsequent removal of 
parts of the broken cable from the reactor. These 
events did not pose any danger, but the power com-
pany submitted more detailed reports about them 
to STUK before the startup of the plant unit.
The radiation doses of the employees who par-
ticipated in the annual outages remained well be-
low the dose limits set in the Radiation Decree and 
the target levels set by Fortum. The radiation dose 
rates measured from the reactor coolant circuit 
of Loviisa 1 were lower than in the previous year 
and the combined radiation dose of the plant unit’s 
employees, 492 mmanSv, was less than half of the 
dose during the last four-year maintenance outage, 
which was used as the reference point. The com-
bined radiation dose of the employees at Loviisa 2 
was 300 mmanSv, which complied with Fortum’s 
advance estimate.
Radioactive materials did not pose any danger 
outside the plant either. STUK oversaw radioac-
tivity in the surroundings of the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant by regularly taking samples from the 
air, soil and sea. Very small amounts of radioac-
tive materials originating from the power plant 
were detected in one of the air samples and one of 
the sludge samples taken from the power plant’s 
wastewater treatment plant. The activity concen-
trations were so low that they could be detected in 
very accurate laboratory measurements only. They 
did not pose any danger to people or the environ-
ment.
Four events non-compliant with 
the OLC took place in 2016
In 2016, four events that were non-compliant with 
the OLC took place at the Loviisa nuclear power 
plant. The short-term events were separate from 
each other, and they did not compromise nuclear 
or radiation safety. All of the events were rated as 
INES category 0 events. Fortum investigated all of 
the events and submitted reports on them to STUK 
in compliance with the requirements. Furthermore, 
Fortum specified corrective measures to prevent 
reoccurrence of the events. STUK approves the 
events as part of the operational event report and 
oversees during its regulatory duties that the cor-
rective measures are properly realised.
The most important of the events was an unin-
tentional activation of a signal from the plant pro-
tection system during the Loviisa 2 annual outage. 
In this event, a signal from the plant protection 
system that isolates the feedwater line and main 
steam line due to low steam line pressure was un-
intentionally activated on two days (22 September 
and 27 September 2016) a total of three times. 
According to the power company’s report, all of the 
activations were caused by the removal of a bypass 
during the annual outage. The removal of this by-
pass of around 30 bar was due to transients caused 
by the work done during the annual outage, which 
means that it does not compromise reliable opera-
tion of the signal while the plant is in operation. 
The protection signal is of safety significance only 
during load operation, at which time it will isolate 
an affected steam generator in case of a steam pipe 
leak. The protection signal is not necessary during 
an annual outage, which is why it is bypassed to 
avoid unnecessary protection functions.
STUK required from Fortum a report on the 
event before the startup of the plant. STUK also 
studied the events and their causes on site and 
determined based on the inspection results that 
the licensee’s view is correct. One activation of the 
signal was caused by several jobs being simultane-
ously carried out, but the cause of the other two 
events has not been determined with full certainty. 
Fortum considers it most likely that the system’s 
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ability to withstand the changes of the testing and 
connection status during an annual outage may 
have been deteriorated due to ageing of the compo-
nents. STUK has deemed the situation acceptable 
in terms of safety, but will continue to monitor the 
condition of the system as part of its ongoing over-
sight duties.
The other three events were short-term 
non-conformances with the OLC
•	 On	30	September	2016	during	the	annual	out-
age of Loviisa 2, a subsystem that cools impor-
tant systems and rooms, which was being used 
by the clean component cooling system, was lost 
for a period of 28 minutes due to an operating 
error of a manual valve when restoring another 
system.
•	 On	12	September	2016	as	Loviisa	1	was	being	
started up after the annual outage, the allowed 
repair time of a pressurizer, which is eight 
hours, was exceeded by around one hour. The 
fault would not have prevented operation of the 
plant protection system.
•	 Electricity	supply	 to	one	 isolation	valve	 inside	
the containment of Loviisa 1 was not restored 
during the 2016 annual outage. The non-con-
formance was detected two days after startup 
of the unit when the unit was in load operation 
on 16 September 2016. The power supply was 
immediately restored. Due to the non-conform-
ance, the plant protection signal would not have 
closed one of the valves. Containment isolation 
would still have been possible, as there was an 
exterior isolation valve paired with the said 
valve.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Fuel leaks during the fuel 
cycle at Olkiluoto 1
The first indication of a fuel leak was detected in 
Olkiluoto 1 during exhaust gas system measure-
ments on 27 February 2016. Soon after this, neptu-
nium was detected in the reactor water, which in-
dicated that the leak was larger than normal. Fuel 
leaks are not completely unusual, even though 
there have not been many leaks at the Finnish 
plants in the past few years. TVO monitored the 
activity in the exhaust gas system with measure-
ments and noted that the activity level continued 
to increase. By conducting tests where the control 
rods were moved, TVO was able in early April to 
specify that the leaks were in three of the adjust-
ment positions.
Due to increased coolant activity levels, TVO 
decided on 11 April 2016 to shut the plant unit 
down for an extra refuelling outage. TVO has not 
performed any similar extra refuelling outages due 
to leaking fuel rods in the past. Three damaged fuel 
assemblies were identified with the leakage detec-
tion system. The fuel assemblies were removed from 
the reactor and visually inspected while in the fuel 
pool. The type of damage does not suggest the pres-
ence of any foreign objects, nor were any foreign ob-
jects detected in the inspected fuel elements. The ob-
served longitudinal cracks are typical for secondary 
damage that is caused by water that has penetrated 
the rod due to primary damage. Hydrides weaken 
the fuel cladding, and it cracks because of power 
changes caused by the movements of the rod. The 
fuel rods had been moved around the time the leaks 
started, which strongly suggests that the damage 
was caused by PCI (Pellet Cladding Interaction). 
Nothing can be said about the cause of the primary 
damage with any level of certainty before more ac-
curate investigations have been conducted. TVO will 
continue to investigate the root cause together with 
the fuel supplier.
New leaks were detected soon after the plant 
had been started up again, in April 2016. They 
were yet again located to the adjustment positions 
by moving the control rods. During the annual out-
age in May, TVO removed three more leaking fuel 
assemblies from the reactor. STUK required from 
TVO before starting up the plant a separate report 
on what kind of plans would be used to ensure 
safety of the future fuel cycle in terms of the use of 
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Figure A3.4. INES classified events at the Olkiluoto 
plant (INES Level 1 or higher).
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fuel. In the report, TVO described the actions it will 
take to reduce the probability of fuel leaks. STUK 
assessed the proposed measures and deemed them 
adequate, even though the probability of a fuel fail-
ure could be eliminated with full certainty.
Releases from OL1 were higher than in the pre-
vious years due to the leaks, but the releases still 
remained well below the set limits. The increase of 
the radiation level inside the plant due to the leaks 
was also moderate, and the radiation doses of the 
employees did not experience a significant increase 
due to the leaks. The event was rated at level 0 on 
the international INES scale because it had no sig-
nificance to nuclear or radiation safety. The event 
did not have any impact on the safety of the plant, 
the employees or the environment.
Annual outages at Olkiluoto, 
8 May – 9 June 2016
The annual outages were performed safely and all 
the scheduled works were completed at both plant 
units. Olkiluoto 2 underwent a refuelling outage 
Figure A3.5. Daily average gross power of  
the Olkiluoto 1 plant unit 2016.
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Figure A3.6. Daily average gross power of  
the Olkiluoto 2 plant unit 2016.
that lasted around nine days (8–18 May 2016), 
during which time the power company replaced 
around one fifth of the fuel in the reactor. During 
the maintenance outage of Olkiluoto 1, TVO re-
placed fuel and performed major modifications, 
which is why the outage lasted for around 21 days 
(18 May – 9 June 2016).
Important work done in Olkiluoto 1 included 
replacement of one of the reactor coolant pumps 
with a new pump and replacement of the pump’s 
frequency converter, renovation of the neutron flux 
calibration system and replacement of low voltage 
switchgear in one subsystem. In addition, one of 
the feedwater line and reactor cooling line mix-
ing points were replaced in Olkiluoto 1. The other 
mixing point had already been replaced during the 
2015 annual outage, i.e. both of the mixing points 
have now been replaced. Furthermore, TVO per-
formed an approved containment leak test at the 
end of the annual outage.
TVO will replace the ageing reactor coolant 
pumps of both plant units during this annual out-
age and the annual outages of the two following 
years. TVO started with the replacement of one of 
the six pumps in Olkiluoto 1 during the 2016 an-
nual outage. All of the six reactor coolant pumps 
in Olkiluoto 2 will be replaced next year, and 
finally the five remaining reactor coolant pumps 
in Olkiluoto 1 will be replaced during the 2018 
annual outage. Installation and commissioning 
of the new reactor coolant pump and the related 
frequency converter were also one of the special 
themes of the annual outage inspection that is part 
of STUK’s periodic inspection programme. A sum-
mary of the inspection is presented in Appendix 4 
to this annual report.
The radiation doses of the employees who par-
ticipated in the annual outages remained well 
below both the dose limits set in the Radiation 
Decree and the dose limits set by the power compa-
ny. An extra challenge during the annual outage of 
OL1 was the fact that there had been leaks in the 
reactor fuel elements during the fuel cycle and the 
level of radioactivity in many of the plant’s systems 
was higher than normal. This had to be taken into 
account when planning and realising the mainte-
nance work. Employees had to use more protective 
equipment than normally and some work had to be 
started later than originally planned.
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STUK also monitored the surroundings of 
the plant during the annual outages. Very small 
amounts of radioactive iodine were observed at the 
sampling points close to the plant. This was ex-
pected, as some of the fuel rods that had been dam-
aged during the fuel cycle were replaced during the 
annual outage. The detected level of iodine was so 
low that the very accurate measuring instruments 
were barely able to detect it. It did not have any 
impact on the safety of the environment or people.
Oil leak in the turbine hall of Olkiluoto 2
The Olkiluoto 2 plant unit was being shut down for 
a maintenance outage on 24 June 2016 to replace 
the motor of a reactor coolant pump when a fire 
alarm was activated in the turbine hall. It was 
observed that oil was releasing at high pressure 
from a bearing of the turbine in the turbine hall 
and there was oil mist in the turbine hall. The TVO 
alarm centre issued an alarm to the Pori emer-
gency response centre due to the related fire risk.
The shutdown was continued normally while 
the leak in the turbine hall was being located. TVO 
was able to locate the leaking point: a jacking oil 
pipe to the turbine bearing. The leaking point was 
isolated by closing a valve in the jacking oil system, 
and the leaking of oil stopped. Oil had leaked into 
the turbine hall and the area below the turbine 
hall from the leaking jacking oil pipe. The oil was 
collected with absorption containers and mats. The 
cleaning work and the repair of the jacking oil pipe 
were completed by the end of the weekend.
The event did not compromise radiation or nu-
clear safety, nor did it cause any risk to the employ-
ees of the plant. The fire risk in the turbine hall 
increased due to the event, however. The plant unit 
was being shut down when the leak started and 
the temperature of the turbine components had 
already dropped to some extent, but had the leak 
occurred in the beginning of the year, the hot sur-
faces of the pipes could have ignited the oil mist. 
The turbine hall is large when compared to the 
volume of the leak, however, which is why ignition 
of the air-oil mixture that occurs at a temperature 
of 200°C would have been highly unlikely.
Noble gases released into 
the turbine building
After the annual outage of Olkiluoto 1 on 16 June 
2016, TVO noticed that radioactive noble gases and 
a small amount of iodine had been released into 
some of the rooms in the plant unit’s turbine build-
ing. TVO located the leak to the radiation measur-
ing system of the exhaust gas system. The leak was 
minor and the event did not compromise the safety 
of the plant’s employees.
There was a leak into a room from the flange 
of a valve in the radiation measuring system. 
The leak stopped when a new flange gasket was 
installed. The flange had been opened during the 
annual outage to perform maintenance work. TVO 
stated that the most likely cause for the event was 
that the gasket of the flange was not replaced but 
the old gasket was reinstalled. The procedures 
state that the gasket must always be replaced after 
having opened a flange. Due to the event, TVO will 
offer its maintenance personnel training on proce-
dures related to gaskets during the maintenance 
day in spring 2017.
Because of the event, STUK wanted to perform 
extra measurements to verify whether iodine could 
be detected in the surroundings of the plant, but 
no iodine was detected in the air samples. The 
measuring station closest to Olkiluoto 1 is around 
three kilometres from the plant unit. At the meas-
uring station, particles from the air are collected 
into a fibreglass and activated carbon filter with a 
pump to be analysed in a laboratory. This method 
is able to detect very small amounts of radioactive 
substances.
During the event some of the radioactive ma-
terials moved from the interior of the plant unit 
to the vent stack without entering the exhaust 
gas system delay tanks, which increased the no-
ble gas and aerosol releases of the plant unit, in 
particular. Most of the releases consisted of short-
lived noble gas and aerosol nuclides. The impact of 
such nuclides on environmental radiation safety 
is minimal as they will very quickly deteriorate 
into stable elements. The releases caused by the 
event remained well below the plant’s set limits. 
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The event was rated at level 0 on the international 
INES scale because it had no significance to nucle-
ar or radiation safety. The event did not have any 
impact on the safety of the plant, the employees or 
the environment.
Cracks in nozzles of feedwater and 
reactor core spray system at Olkiluoto 2
The crack in a feedwater nozzle at Olkiluoto 2 is 
located in a weld in between the reactor pressure 
vessel nozzle butt weld and its joint (safe-end) on 
the inside of the nozzle. The crack may be a manu-
facturing fault that was originally left undetected 
and whose actual depth could not be determined 
until before new inspection techniques were intro-
duced. On the other hand, the crack may also be 
a fault caused by stress corrosion that has grown 
over time and may continue to grow. The crack 
was detected in 2003 and has been monitored ever 
since. During the 2013 annual outage, TVO had 
the area of the crack inspected from the outside 
by means of phased array ultrasonic testing. The 
depth of the internal crack was determined as 23 
mm (wall thickness 33 mm). The inspection result 
was a surprise: the depth of the crack was given as 
23 mm compared to the 10–15 mm that had been 
determined with the inspection techniques used 
before. During the 2013 annual outage, STUK ap-
proved a strength analysis submitted by TVO and 
a procedure where the crack would be monitored 
for the next three years. Based on inspections done 
during the 2016 annual outage, the crack has not 
grown.
When the internals of the reactor pressure ves-
sel were being inspected during the 2015 annual 
outage of Olkiluoto 2, cracks were observed in a 
welded joint between a reactor core spray system 
nozzle and a safe-end. At that time, STUK ap-
proved a procedure proposed by TVO where the 
weld would be inspected more often for at least the 
next three years. Based on inspections done during 
the 2016 annual outage, the cracks had not grown.
STUK has also required that TVO continue 
to study the causes of the cracks in the reactor 
pressure vessel nozzles and continue its work on 
preventing new indications and preventing the 
old indications from spreading. TVO submitted to 
STUK for approval at the beginning of 2016 a plan 
on related further measures. TVO has decided that 
preventive repairs of all the reactor pressure ves-
sel safe-end nozzles in Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 
will be performed. There are a total of ten nozzles 
in each plant unit. The nozzles will be repaired by 
machining the buffer/joint weld a couple of mil-
limetres from the inside and welding new filler 
material into the joint using a welding wire that 
is less susceptible to stress corrosion. TVO will 
repair the identified cracks in the nozzles at the 
same time. The plan is to complete these repairs at 
Olkiluoto 2 during the 2017 annual outage and at 
Olkiluoto 1 during the 2018 annual outage.
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APPENDIX 4 Periodic inspection programme 
of nuclear power plants 2016
Inspections included in the periodic inspection programme focus on safety 
management, operational main processes and procedures, as well as the techni-
cal acceptability of systems. The compliance of safety assessments, operation, 
maintenance and protection activities with the requirements of nuclear safety 
regulations are verified with the inspections. No material deficiencies with an 
effect on the safety of the plant, the personnel or the environment were observed 
in the 2016 inspections.
Inspections of the periodic inspection 
programme at Loviisa nuclear power plant
Personnel resources and 
competence, 18–19 May 2016
The inspection covered the licensee’s HR planning, 
resource requirements and competence manage-
ment. The 2016 inspection focused on develop-
ment of the licensee’s competence management 
and resource management. There were three main 
themes: determination of competence requirements; 
resources and duties of the training team; and good 
practices implemented at the plant in 2016.
No requirements were imposed by STUK fol-
lowing the inspection, but one recommendation 
was given: based on the inspection observations, 
STUK recommends that the competence develop-
ment project should focus much more on the com-
mitment of supervisors and communication about 
the project’s goals and benefits.
Basic programme
Inspections in 2016
Loviisa 1 and 2 Olkiluoto 1 and 2
Personnel resources and competence x  
Management and safety culture  x
Management system x x
Disposal facilities  x
Chemistry x  
Operating experience feedback  x
Operation x  
Plant maintenance x x
Fire protection x  
Utilisation of the PRA  x
Structures and buildings  x
Radiation protection x x
Nuclear security x x
Safety planning
Safety functions x x
Emergency preparedness x x
Reactor waste x  
Annual outage x x
Nuclear safeguards x x
Additional inspections
Implementation of YVL Guides x
Management of projects and modifications x
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Management system, 30 November 
– 1 December 2016
The inspection covered functionality of the licen-
see’s integrated management system from the per-
spective of nuclear and radiation safety. The in-
spection focused on maintenance and development 
of the licensee’s management system; the related 
organisation; the review process of applications 
pertaining to modifications; and the implementa-
tion of changes. Furthermore, Fortum’s develop-
ment measures to ensure compliance with the new 
YVL Guides were studied.
It was noted that Fortum needs to reassess the 
cooperation procedure between the head of the HR 
unit and the head of the business unit (the man-
agement representative in issues pertaining to 
the development of the management system) and 
people in other positions important for the develop-
ment of the management system. STUK imposed 
a requirement on this matter. It was also noted 
that Fortum has made plans to develop the modi-
fication work process. STUK considered the plans 
necessary and wants to monitor the development 
work; STUK imposed a requirement on this matter. 
STUK did not have any remarks as to the main-
tenance of the management system (assessments, 
etc.) or development/continuous improvement.
Chemistry, 25–26 April 2016
In the chemistry inspection, the licensee’s proce-
dures regarding the maintenance and development 
of the water chemistry conditions of the primary 
and secondary circuit, as well as the radiochem-
istry conditions, laboratory operations and decon-
tamination were studied. Special focus areas in-
cluded ensuring that the systems and components 
used to manage the water chemistry and radio-
chemistry conditions are properly maintained, and 
that the results of their inservice testing and the 
experience gained from operating activities are 
taken into consideration. The inspection also in-
cluded a site walk-down.
The inspection verified that the employees in 
the chemistry laboratory are motivated and their 
work is of a high quality. Management of the labo-
ratory encourages the employees to expand their 
competence areas.
No requirements were imposed by STUK fol-
lowing the inspection. Seven observations were 
made during the inspection. Two of the observa-
tions were about good practices. The observations 
involved the organisation; the identification of 
competence development requirements and devel-
opment of the employees’ competence; the marking 
of faulty or broken components; and continued 
identification of the sources of silver in the primary 
circuit. In addition, STUK recommended that a 
plan on reducing the frequency of primary circuit 
boron acid content sampling during annual out-
ages be submitted to the nuclear safety unit for 
comments to generate an internal safety assess-
ment of the change.
Operational activities, 20 December 2016
The inspection covered operational activities of the 
nuclear power plant as well as closely related ac-
tions and practices. Operational processes and ac-
tivities of the organisation that the nuclear power 
plant uses to ensure and verify compliance with 
the set requirements on nuclear safety, radiation 
protection, reliability of the operational activities 
and quality management were assessed and veri-
fied in the inspection.
The 2016 operational activities inspection fo-
cused on a training simulator in the Loviisa nucle-
ar power plant’s operational unit and the simula-
tor team. STUK inspected how well the simulator 
corresponds to the currently operating plants and 
instructions on simulators, as well as how the sim-
ulator training has been realised when compared 
to the plans. In the field of HR planning, STUK 
inspected the effects of Fortum’s organisational 
change and training plans for the simulator in-
structors and the shift supervisors/operators.
No material deficiencies or development needs 
of the simulator or the training were observed, nor 
were any requirements imposed. No remarks re-
garding the HR planning were made and the proce-
dures were up to date. The inspection verified that 
the employees in the simulator team are motivated 
and their work is of a high quality.
Plant maintenance, 2–3 November 2016
The inspection covered the resources, functions 
and tasks Fortum uses to ensure long-term oper-
ability of the systems, structures and components 
in its plant units. The focus areas of this inspection 
were HR planning in maintenance, monitoring of 
the plant components’ profitability and coverage of 
their condition monitoring. Furthermore, Fortum’s 
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replies to requirements imposed in the previous 
inspections on plant maintenance and mechanical 
engineering were reviewed during the inspection.
A new subunit added to the maintenance or-
ganisation due to Fortum’s organisational change 
is service life management. The change did not in-
fluence the number of employees in maintenance. 
The impressions about the new maintenance ar-
rangements for the Loviisa plant units that were 
taken into use last summer are positive. STUK will 
monitor feedback on the maintenance operations 
as well as any plans to outsource maintenance of 
the site and related actions. One observation made 
during the inspection was that pipelines from 
control valves to injectors in the external contain-
ment spray system were not included in the scope 
of the inspections, which is why one section that is 
critical for the performance of the system has not 
been tested since its commissioning (in 1990). Even 
though blockages in these spray valve lines that 
are open at one end is unlikely, the possibility of a 
blockage cannot be completely overruled without 
testing. Therefore, Fortum was required to verify 
unobstructed flow in these pipelines by means of 
testing.
Fire protection, 21–22 April 2016
The fire protection inspection assessed effective-
ness of the plant units’ fire protection arrange-
ments and the power company’s operations and the 
fire protection unit organisation – changes therein, 
procedures of the organisation, and training and 
drills of the fire brigade personnel.
It was verified that the nuclear power plant’s 
fire alarm and fire prevention systems have been 
inspected in compliance with the maintenance pro-
gramme and the work order practices. Performance 
of the fire protection arrangements has been as-
sessed with regular internal audits and also by the 
Eastern Uusimaa Fire and Rescue Services, the 
Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (Tukes) and 
the Nordic Nuclear Insurers insurance pool. STUK 
studied the improvement proposals from these 
inspections. Furthermore, the organisation, its re-
sponsibilities and implemented/planned changes 
were studied, and the status of procedure updates 
was verified.
No requirements were imposed on the licensee 
due to the inspection. No remarks regarding the 
HR planning were made and the procedures were 
up to date. Positive inspection observations in-
cluded properly arranged training and competence 
development programme of the fire protection unit. 
Furthermore, work to reduce the fire risk – modify-
ing the hydraulic turbine bypass stations RC into 
water-powered ones – will start during the 2016 
annual outages. Other observations included pro-
longed fire pump inspection intervals, a need to 
test the fire pumps with a higher flow than their 
operating point in the future as well as a need to 
specify more clearly the ignition used in reporting 
and the safety index. STUK will monitor these is-
sues in its future inspections. The actions required 
based on previous inspections had been properly 
performed.
Radiation protection, 27–28 October 2016
A radiation protection inspection covers the nu-
clear power plant’s radiation protection, radiation 
measurements, emission monitoring and environ-
mental monitoring. The focus areas this year were 
administrative radiation protection, the organi-
sation, ALARA operations and the processing of 
events.
It was noted that Fortum has successfully 
reached its ALARA goal. The radiation dose rate in 
the steam generator room, for example, has contin-
ued to reduce at both plant units. The key reason 
for the lowered dose rate is a project in which anti-
mony was successfully removed from the primary 
coolant.
Four requirements were imposed in the inspec-
tion. The requirements involved job descriptions, 
training programmes and radiation protection pro-
cedures. Furthermore, STUK required that Fortum 
continue its survey on radiation exposure to the eyes. 
The survey is necessary in order to determine wheth-
er separate eye dosimeters are needed for some of the 
jobs performed at the nuclear power plant.
Nuclear security, 11–15 April 2016
An extensive inspection of the security arrange-
ments was performed in accordance with the in-
spection plan. The inspection covered the monitor-
ing and management of keys; the protection of key 
targets and access control procedures; and prac-
tices involving unauthorised drones being flown at 
the plant site, to mention a few issues.
Five requirements were imposed in the inspec-
tion. Measures resulting from requirements made 
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in the course of earlier inspections had been appro-
priately implemented.
Safety functions, 25 November 
and 30 November 2016
The inspection covered the licensee’s procedures 
used to verify correctness of the status and design 
bases for the systems implementing safety func-
tions. Focus areas of this year’s inspection included 
scope of inservice tests on the reactor trip function 
and monitoring of the reactor core; testing, inspec-
tion and maintenance procedures of the fuel han-
dling equipment; and the qualification of refuelling 
machine operators. HR planning in the design and 
maintenance organisation was also covered.
Furthermore, STUK will perform an opera-
tional oversight inspection of transfer and hoisting 
operations in early 2017 to monitor Fortum’s ongo-
ing refuelling and hoisting operations development 
measures and the qualification of refuelling and 
hoisting machinery operators.
Emergency preparedness arrangements, 
12 October and 18 October 2016
Issues that are regularly inspected in emergency 
preparedness arrangement inspections include 
emergency preparedness guidelines, emergency 
preparedness facilities, emergency preparedness 
equipment, the emergency preparedness organisa-
tion and training for the emergency preparedness 
organisation. The focus areas in 2016 included HR 
planning and training plans as well as feedback on 
emergency preparedness drills and development 
areas identified based on the drills. The inspection 
of the emergency preparedness facilities focused 
especially on the management of contamination.
HR plans and training programmes for the 
employees handling the emergency preparedness 
arrangements are in order. As comes to the emer-
gency preparedness organisation, Fortum has been 
able to add more employees in radiation protection 
positions, in particular, and name mechanics in 
charge of repairs in the emergency preparedness 
organisation. Fortum is about to launch an emer-
gency preparedness training review project. The 
project will cover training as a whole, including ba-
sic training, refresher training and guidelines. The 
Fortum emergency preparedness centre practiced 
contamination management in 2015, and prin-
ciples of the operation were carefully considered 
before this drill. However, contamination manage-
ment in the emergency preparedness facilities 
is not a fully planned entity with comprehensive 
procedures. The inspection included a site walk-
down during which the backup power supply of the 
emergency preparedness centre and a flood protec-
tion project were studied.
STUK imposed one requirement in the inspec-
tion: Fortum must plan the contamination man-
agement arrangements in the emergency prepar-
edness facilities, prepare procedures that cover 
these operations and place the necessary equip-
ment at the planned locations.
Operational waste, 1–2 June 2016
STUK regulates and inspects the processing and 
disposal of radioactive operational waste at the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant. Low- and interme-
diate-level operational waste is generated during 
maintenance and repairs as well as during the 
treatment of circulating water. The inspection of 
operational waste focused on remarks made dur-
ing the last inspection; development since the last 
inspection and any important issues that have oc-
curred; HR planning; and radiation doses of the 
employees. The condition of facilities in which 
waste is processed and stored, radiation levels in 
these facilities, their classification and their mark-
ings were inspected during a site walk-down.
No material deficiencies or development needs 
were observed, nor were any requirements im-
posed based on the inspection. A positive observa-
tion made during the inspection was that based on 
the indicators on the waste packing room, opera-
tions at the packing room have been developed by 
introducing a pre-classification system for waste 
and packing the waste more tightly, for example.
Annual outage, 7 August – 10 October 2016
The inspection covered and verified the pow-
er plant’s annual outage actions used to main-
tain safety as well as the actions used to manage 
and control operations during an annual outage. 
Inspectors from several fields of technology from 
STUK’s nuclear reactor regulation department 
participated in the inspection. They had prede-
termined inspection areas. STUK also performed 
general oversight of the plant site by means of, for 
instance, regular site walk-downs and overseeing 
the progress of planned work. Furthermore, STUK 
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studied how well safety is prioritised in the licen-
see’s decision-making process.
A focus area in this year’s inspection was re-
placement of the high-pressure safety injection 
system’s motors and heat exchangers; STUK over-
saw mechanical engineering, electrical and I&C 
engineering, radiation protection and operational 
safety of the replacement, among other issues. 
Other focus areas of the oversight during the an-
nual outage included employee orientation to tasks 
important for the annual outage, management of 
personnel resources, HR planning, Fortum’s op-
erating experience feedback process linked to the 
annual outages, heavy lifting in the turbine hall 
and reactor building during annual outages, civil 
engineering and fire protection.
Based on the inspection results, one can state 
that Fortum’s annual outage operations comply 
with the requirements and have been successful. 
A total of 26 observations were made and two re-
quirements were imposed during the annual out-
age inspection. The requirements involved report-
ing and processing of operational events.
Nuclear safeguards, 19–21 April 2016
The inspection focus areas were the nuclear safe-
guards system of Fortum’s Loviisa nuclear power 
plant and the manner in which the plant takes 
care of its nuclear safeguards obligations. The in-
spection covered the procedures Fortum uses to 
meet the requirements posed by legislation, the 
YVL Guides (Guide YVL D.1 in particular) and 
EU Regulations. Separate nuclear safeguards in-
spections had been performed before, but this was 
the first time nuclear safeguards were included in 
the periodic inspection programme. The inspection 
covered the role of management in the arrange-
ment of nuclear safeguards; the plant’s actions and 
responsibilities involving the maintenance and de-
velopment of the nuclear use item accountancy 
and reporting system; actions linked to compliance 
with the nuclear safeguards obligations and relat-
ed responsibilities; and actions and responsibilities 
that enable regulatory oversight (by the IAEA and 
the European Commission, for example).
The inspection verified that the management 
of the Loviisa nuclear power plant is strongly in-
volved in HR planning and securing the resources 
needed to ensure compliance with the nuclear safe-
guards requirements, as new people who will do 
their part in ensuring compliance with the nuclear 
safeguards obligations are currently being quali-
fied for both procurement and storage operations. 
Furthermore, the recent organisational renewal 
strengthens the resources and authorisation of the 
person in charge of nuclear safeguards and their 
deputies.
One of the development areas observed during 
the inspection was that a security guide for inspec-
tors (of the IAEA and the European Commission) 
to be read prior to working close to the open reactor 
pool would be beneficial.
Deficiencies in compliance with the agreed is-
sues and the rules (the Commission’s plant-specific 
particular safeguard provisions) when updating 
the plant’s technical basic data and during inter-
nal inspections of the nuclear safeguards manual 
approved by STUK were observed during the in-
spection. Requirements pertaining to these given 
during the inspection included an update of the 
technical basic data in due time before the next 
inspections of the IAEA and the Commission and 
performing the annual internal inspection in com-
pliance with the handbook in such a manner that 
an inspection of the plant’s nuclear-use items 
or other nuclear material inventory will also be 
completed by an independent party who is not the 
person in charge of nuclear safeguards.
Inspections of the periodic inspection 
programme at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Management and safety 
culture, 9–10 March 2016
The inspection covered how the management has 
ensured with its actions and communication that 
safety is the priority in the organisation culture 
despite the organisational renewal and personnel 
cuts. In addition, the inspection studied what kind 
of safety indicators and operation process indica-
tors the management of TVO uses to monitor qual-
ity and safety of the organisation’s actions. At the 
inspection, TVO presented a safety culture pro-
gramme that was created to be used as the frame-
work for the development of safety culture. Other 
issues covered in the inspection included security 
arrangements as part of safety, management and 
safety culture.
The management of TVO was of the opinion 
that the organisational renewal has not influenced 
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the priority of safety or safety at the Olkiluoto nu-
clear power plant. Analyses of the organisational 
renewal have been performed and the organisation 
has initiated a variety of actions to discuss and 
clarify the goals and impact of the organisational 
renewal. It was not verified during the inspection 
whether the management has a sufficiently clear 
idea of the practical challenges faced by the organi-
sation after the organisational renewal, however. 
Such challenges include clarity of responsibilities 
and the adequacy of competence and resources, 
among other issues.
Following the inspection, STUK imposed two 
requirements. TVO must assess the connection 
between the weaker personnel survey results and 
the criticality of the personnel and the quality 
and safety of the operations. Furthermore, STUK 
required that TVO supplement its safety culture 
programme to make it more comprehensive.
Management system, 23–24 November 2016
The inspection covered tasks of TVO’s quality 
management organisation; resources and develop-
ment of competence; and supplier audits as well 
as the qualifications and competence of auditors. 
Furthermore, the inspection verified actions per-
taining to procurement and project management 
that are requirements in the implementation deci-
sions of YVL Guide A.3, Management system for a 
nuclear facility and YVL Guide A.5, Construction 
and commissioning of a nuclear facility. The in-
spection was carried out by verifying information 
from documents, such as supplier audit reports, 
and interviewing personnel of the licensee at the 
plant site.
No requirements were imposed by STUK fol-
lowing the inspection. STUK did make some obser-
vations on further development of the operations, 
however. All documents pertaining to supplier au-
dits, such as audit plans and reports, should be 
saved in such a manner that they could be found 
from the same location when needed. Furthermore, 
TVO should consider using more specific auditing 
criteria and developing the audit report template 
and the description of the most important issues to 
be included in the reports.
Disposal facilities, 5–6 October 2016
The inspection covered the concrete and rock struc-
tures of the operational waste disposal facility (the 
VLJ repository) at Olkiluoto. Inspected issues in-
cluded the related TVO organisation, processes and 
functions; operating procedures; TVO’s own inspec-
tions; status of ongoing research; and maintenance 
procedures. In the personnel section of the 2016 
inspection, STUK focused on HR planning.
The person in charge of monitoring the VLJ 
repository, research and coordination of related 
reporting resigned from TVO in August 2016. 
At the time the inspection was held, in early 
October 2016, the situation with responsibilities 
was unclear. The unclear situation will also influ-
ence the preparation of the next VLJ repository 
monitoring programme. Following the inspection, 
STUK imposed three requirements involving the 
use, maintenance and research of the VLJ reposi-
tory in Olkiluoto; the VLJ repository monitoring 
programme for 2018–2022; and development of 
reporting on the VLJ repository and submission of 
reports to the regulatory authority.
STUK also made positive observations during 
the inspection. TVO had ordered an assessment 
of the representativeness of the VLJ reposito-
ry’s hydrogeochemistry samples and observations 
from highly qualified suppliers. The results of 
the assessment can also be used as an aid in the 
preparation of the next VLJ repository monitoring 
programme. TVO is searching for alternative rock 
displacement measuring methods for monitoring 
sites in the top part of the intermediate-level waste 
silo where these measurements cannot be conduct-
ed due to the radiation status. The displacement 
measurements are necessary to survey the normal 
state of the bedrock before starting expansion of 
the VLJ repository.
Operating experience feedback, 
2–3 March 2016
In the inspection, STUK verified adequacy of TVO’s 
operating experience feedback personnel resources, 
the development of competence as well as docu-
mentation and functionality of TVO’s operating 
experience feedback procedures. The inspection 
also covered TVO’s operating experience feedback 
goals and the procedures used to reach these goals. 
STUK conducted the inspection by studying TVO’s 
manuals and procedures, interviewing TVO’s per-
sonnel, verifying the documentation required in 
TVO’s procedures and monitoring the operations. 
The inspection was fairly extensive because a new 
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YVL Guide on operating experience feedback, YVL 
A.10, entered into force in late 2015 and STUK 
wished to verify that its requirements had been 
met.
The inspection indicated that TVO has properly 
taken care of its operating experience feedback 
personnel resources and procedures. TVO monitors 
and assesses the success of its operating experi-
ence feedback operations and specifies measures 
to develop and improve the operations. STUK 
observed some development needs that need to 
be met to achieve full compliance with the re-
quirements of YVL Guide A.10. On the basis of 
the inspection observations, STUK imposed some 
requirements regarding the goals of the operating 
experience feedback operations, improvement of 
competence in specific sectors, documentation and 
use of interpretation methods, prioritisation of ac-
tions determined based on TVO’s own operating 
experience feedback and assessment of effective-
ness. Furthermore, STUK offered some inspec-
tion observations regarding operating experience 
feedback responsibilities and documentation of the 
procedures for TVO to assess and take into account 
when developing the operations.
Plant maintenance, 30–31 March 2016
The inspection covered the resources, functions 
and tasks TVO uses to ensure long-term operabil-
ity of the systems, structures and components in 
its plant units. Special inspection focus areas in-
cluded maintenance HR planning; fuel handling 
equipment and pipelines to a limited extent; ongo-
ing modifications; and requirements on mainte-
nance of electrical and I&C equipment in the YVL 
Guides. The new YVL Guides entered into force in 
late 2015.
Following the inspection, STUK imposed six 
requirements. Some of the requirements involved 
actions to be completed to ensure compliance with 
the new YVL Guides. TVO must prepare a plan on 
determination of operability of the emergency die-
sel generators’ fuel transfer pipelines. In addition, 
TVO must assess by means of visual inspections 
during the 2016 annual outages whether there are 
any small-diameter pipelines important to safety 
in any areas that are not accessible during load 
operation whose defective supports could lead to 
a fatigue failure. Furthermore, TVO was required 
to create and present at the next inspection pro-
cedures that it will use to reduce the possibility of 
the use of forged products at the plant units.
Utilisation of the PRA, 5 December 2016
The inspection on the utilisation of the PRA cov-
ered the PRA update status and key results, PRA 
applications, adequacy of personnel resources and 
maintenance of guidelines on the PRA. A spe-
cial theme covered was the corrective measures 
planned due to a leak in a rotameter during the 
annual outage and their significance in terms of 
the PRA.
The inspection indicated that TVO has main-
tained a sufficient resource base despite the per-
sonnel changes and the PRA update has proceeded 
as planned. Plenty of PRA applications have been 
prepared to support plant modifications, suitabil-
ity analyses and annual outage planning, as well 
as to be used in the quarterly operational event 
risk monitoring reviews. The PRA guidelines are 
up to date and the PRA is used as planned and in 
a versatile manner to support the management 
of safety. No deficiencies were observed in the in-
spected issues.
Structures and buildings, 2–3 November 2016
Special focus area of the inspection of the mainte-
nance procedures of structures, buildings, seawater 
channels and tunnels was civil engineering and 
structural engineering maintenance personnel re-
sources and procedures. In addition, the results of 
inspections carried out by the power company and 
modifications made were discussed.
The inspection indicated that TVO’s procedures 
are up to date and civil engineering works have 
been completed on time despite the organisational 
renewal and the changes in personnel resources. 
Notes regarding the workload of the personnel and 
the planning of training were made during the 
inspection.
Radiation protection, 8–9 March 2016
Special focus areas of the radiation protection in-
spection included procedures used in radiation pro-
tection planning, adequacy of personnel resources 
and radiation protection guidelines. The inspection 
indicated that TVO has properly handled radia-
tion protection of the plant. The employees’ low ra-
diation doses prove this. As a good practice, STUK 
noted extensive processing of plant modifications 
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that influence radiation safety within the organi-
sation. The radiation protection guidelines are up 
to date and have been supplemented with new 
procedures.
STUK observed some development needs that 
need to be met to achieve full compliance with 
the requirements of Guide YVL A.4. Based on 
the inspection observations, STUK imposed re-
quirements relating to the documentation of the 
deputies of radiation protection personnel and the 
preparation of training programmes important to 
safety.
Nuclear security, 25–29 April 2016
Practical implementation of the new Guides YVL 
A.11 and A.12 and the key design basis threat re-
quirements was studied during the inspection. The 
inspection covered both physical protection and 
information security. The inspection focus areas 
included demonstration of the effectiveness of the 
security arrangements, the determination of vital 
areas and practical implementation of the security 
arrangements.
TVO is currently developing its security ar-
rangement self-assessment with the help of a 
supervision plan. In addition to its internal audit 
procedure and independent third-party assess-
ments, TVO will improve the reporting of security 
arrangements to its management. Monitoring and 
reporting of the security organisation training 
programme have been developed in the past few 
years, and the plan is to use training more in the 
demonstration of the effectiveness of the security 
arrangements.
Based on the inspection, STUK issued require-
ments on development of the practical implemen-
tation of security arrangements and the documen-
tation on the planning, assessment and implemen-
tation of security arrangements.
Safety functions, 8–9 November 2016
The inspection covered the licensee’s procedures 
used to verify that the systems managing reactive-
ness comply with the design bases. The manage-
ment of reactivity includes stopping the reactor 
and retaining it subcritical. Issues covered in the 
inspection included the chain of systems that im-
plement the trip function and maintenance of their 
performance and reliability. Procedures for peri-
odic testing of the protection function were verified 
during the inspection. The performance of tests 
was verified with random tests. The inspection also 
included a walk-down of the warehouse and an in-
spection of spare part management.
Based on the inspection, STUK can state that 
TVO’s reactivity management procedures are prop-
er and the guidelines are up to date. The organisa-
tion’s resources, competence and introduction are 
also sufficient. Following the inspection, STUK 
imposed two requirements. TVO must assess how 
systematic development of the inservice testing 
programme can be achieved. The responsibilities 
and procedures must be described in the guide-
lines. Another requirement involved the clarifica-
tion of reporting on different systems and plant 
functions, and the determination of responsibili-
ties. Following the inspection, STUK issued four 
recommendations. It recommended, for example, 
that TVO assess the need to clarify the descrip-
tions and structure of the descriptions of periodic 
test instructions.
One of the inspection focus areas were fuel 
handling equipment. The inspection covered inser-
vice inspections of refuelling machines, guidelines, 
qualification of operators and ageing management. 
Based on the inspection, STUK can state that the 
guidelines are comprehensive and regularly up-
dated. Inservice inspections of refuelling machines 
are also properly realised. TVO has different al-
ternatives for the modernisation of the refuelling 
machines and ageing management of the refuelling 
machines is appropriate.
Emergency preparedness 
arrangements, 8–9 September 2016
The emergency preparedness arrangements in-
spection comprehensively covered the nuclear 
power plant’s emergency preparedness arrange-
ments. Issues that are regularly inspected include 
emergency preparedness guidelines, emergency 
preparedness facilities, emergency preparedness 
equipment, the emergency preparedness organisa-
tion and training for the emergency preparedness 
organisation. The focus areas in 2016 included HR 
planning and training plans as well as feedback on 
emergency preparedness drills and development 
areas identified based on the drills. In the case of 
emergency preparedness equipment, the automatic 
radiation protection network and pressurized air 
respirators were covered. How TVO uses global 
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operating experience feedback in the development 
of its emergency preparedness arrangements was 
studied. The pressurized air respirators were used 
as an example of the operating experience feedback 
operations. The inspection also covered the current 
status of rescue arrangements at the Olkiluoto 3 
construction site.
HR plans and training programmes for the 
employees handling the emergency preparedness 
arrangements are in order. TVO has continued 
the systematic development of the training of 
its emergency preparedness organisation. More 
emergency preparedness arrangement personnel 
resources had been added during the period un-
der review. TVO is about to launch a development 
project on the normal use of respirators and their 
use in emergency situations. There have been long-
term data transfer interruptions at some of TVO’s 
external radiation network stations. The affected 
stations are not located next to each other, how-
ever, which means there are no dead spaces that 
would compromise the emergency preparedness 
arrangements.
STUK imposed three requirements in the in-
spection. TVO must study how the emergency pre-
paredness training of people who have completed 
the introduction training has been arranged at 
other nuclear power plants. TVO must include a 
better description of the evacuation arrangements 
at the OL3 construction site in its emergency re-
sponse plan. The emergency preparedness guides 
in the emergency preparedness facilities must be 
updated (the latest versions must be used).
Annual outage, 8 May – 8 June 2016
The inspection covered and verified the pow-
er plant’s annual outage actions used to main-
tain safety as well as the actions used to manage 
and control operations during an annual outage. 
Inspectors from several fields of technology partici-
pated in the inspection. They had predetermined 
inspection areas. A focus area in this year’s inspec-
tion was installation of a new reactor coolant pump 
and the installation and commissioning of the re-
lated frequency transformer in Olkiluoto 1. STUK 
oversaw mechanical engineering, electrical and 
I&C engineering, radiation protection and opera-
tional safety of the replacement, among other is-
sues. According to the observations made by STUK, 
the replacement of the reactor coolant pump was 
successful, even though such a challenging modi-
fication was now implemented for the first time. A 
positive observation was the fact that the reactor 
coolant pump commissioning tests were realised 
in a calm and systematic manner. TVO’s expertise 
was deemed to be of a high level. STUK issued a 
recommendation on developing the commissioning 
test procedures of pumps.
Based on the inspection, TVO’s operations dur-
ing annual outages are proper. STUK recorded a 
total of 54 observations during the inspection. Most 
of them were neutral observations which verified 
that the procedures comply with the regulatory 
requirements and the plant’s own guidelines. No 
safety deficiencies that require STUK’s immediate 
action were observed during the inspection. Three 
requirements were imposed based on the observa-
tions made. Two of them involved procedures for 
the orientation of new employees and one involved 
radiation protection of the plant. STUK also gave a 
remark on the importance of completing on sched-
ule all corrective measures determined based on 
operational events. According to the observations 
made, some corrective measures had not been im-
plemented as planned.
Nuclear safeguards, 13–15 September 2016
The inspection focus areas were the nuclear safe-
guards system of TVO’s Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant and the manner in which TVO takes care 
of its nuclear safeguards obligations. The inspec-
tion covered the procedures TVO uses to meet the 
requirements posed by legislation, the YVL Guides 
(Guide YVL D.1 in particular) and EU Regulations.
The inspection covered the role of management 
in the arrangement of nuclear safeguards; the 
plant’s actions and responsibilities involving the 
maintenance and development of the nuclear use 
item accountancy and reporting system; actions 
linked to compliance with the nuclear safeguards 
obligations and related responsibilities; and ac-
tions and responsibilities that enable regulatory 
oversight (by the IAEA and the European Commis-
sion, for example).
Following the inspection, STUK imposed two 
requirements. The inspection verified that the 
management of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
is involved in HR planning and securing the re-
sources needed to ensure compliance with the 
nuclear safeguards requirements, but there is no 
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plan on supporting the persons in charge of nu-
clear safeguards activities and ensure that the 
necessary resources are available. Procedures on 
granting visitor permits to inspectors of the IAEA 
and Euratom have not been prepared; instead, the 
operations have been based on oral instructions. 
To ensure that the inspectors will always have 
access to the plant and the areas to be inspected, 
written visitor procedures that include all of the 
necessary issues must be prepared and a reference 
to these procedures must be added to the nuclear 
safeguards manual.
Additional inspections conducted in 
connection with the periodic inspection 
programme at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Implementation of YVL Guides, 
28 September 2016
In 2015, STUK evaluated how well the Olkiluoto 
1 and 2 plant units comply with the requirements 
of the new nuclear safety guidelines (YVL Guides). 
The improvement measures specified in connection 
with the implementation decision are currently be-
ing implemented. The inspection covered how the 
licensee monitors the implementation of the meas-
ures needed to comply with the requirements that 
were left as open in the YVL Guide implementa-
tion decisions and how the licensee ensures that 
the new procedures will be included in the prac-
tices of the different organisational units.
Based on the inspection, STUK can state that 
the tools needed to systematically monitor the 
open measures are available. No major deficien-
cies were observed in the list of issues to be moni-
tored. Responsibilities for the performance of the 
measures had also been clearly defined and the 
management monitors achievement of the goals on 
schedule. There are instructions on the procedures 
to be used when postponing the deadline of a meas-
ure and communication about the postponement to 
STUK. Completion of measures was verified with 
random tests during the inspection. All of the in-
spected measures had been completed on schedule 
and included in TVO’s management system.
TVO has arranged its employees training on the 
new YVL Guides. When preparing training materi-
als, the fact that new people have been added to 
the organisation has been taken into account and 
the training covers key content of the new YVL 
Guides in addition to the new and changed regula-
tory requirements. TVO will repeat the training in 
spring 2017.
Based on the inspection, STUK required that 
TVO reassess and update (if necessary) its guide-
lines on testing organisations. Furthermore, STUK 
required that TVO review the measures given in 
connection with the implementation decision of 
Guide YVL B.1 and add any deficiencies in the 
monitoring list.
Management of projects and 
modifications, 14–15 December 2016
In this additional inspection, STUK assessed pro-
cedures pertaining to investments and modifica-
tions important to safety and TVO’s project exper-
tise. The inspection focused on quality and risk 
management procedures of projects for which pro-
ject managers carry the main responsibility (such 
as the management of non-conformances and the 
utilisation of experience).
STUK is of the opinion that TVO’s project man-
agement procedures are systematic. The invest-
ment process has been properly described, there 
are guidelines about it and the responsibilities 
have been specified. The procedures and templates 
for projects take into account the requirements of 
the YVL Guides and there is a licensing manager 
within the organisation who verifies compliance of 
the process.
The project managers are well aware of their 
key duties as the project managers. They have 
plenty of responsibilities (on budget, schedule and 
quality), which is why having sufficient compe-
tence and the support of the rest of the organisa-
tion is important. TVO has arranged training for 
the project managers and the project managers are 
supported in their work by the licensing manager 
and the chief engineers, among others. There is no 
risk management support person, however. STUK’s 
impression after the inspection is that TVO has 
encountered some challenges in providing the per-
sonnel resources projects need and there are some 
gaps due to internal transfers caused by the or-
ganisational renewal.
The persons in charge of projects do not re-
cord many non-conformances in TVO’s operations. 
Based on the interviews, TVO does not have any 
shared view of who is responsible for assessing the 
need for the authorities to process project non-con-
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formances. Based on the inspection, STUK is of the 
opinion that lessons learned from TVO’s event in-
vestigations are not being reviewed to a sufficient 
extent in the case of projects, which is why STUK 
imposed a requirement on development of the 
operations. STUK is of the opinion that operating 
experience and lessons learned from other plants 
are covered to a sufficient extent.
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APPENDIX 5 Construction inspection 
programme of Olkiluoto 3 in 2016
The objective of the Olkiluoto 3 construction in-
spection programme is to verify that the operations 
required by the construction of the unit ensure a 
high quality implementation according to the ap-
proved plans and in compliance with official regu-
lations, without compromising the operating units 
within the site. The inspection programme assess-
es and oversees the licensee’s operations in con-
structing the unit, implementation of procedures in 
various technical areas, the licensee’s competence 
and use of expertise, the processing of safety is-
sues, as well as quality assurance and control. The 
inspection programme of Olkiluoto 3 was launched 
in 2005 when construction of the unit started. The 
number of annual inspections has varied between 
nine and fifteen.
In 2016, 11 inspections included in the con-
struction inspection programme were implement-
ed, one of which was an unannounced inspection. 
Special focus areas of the construction inspection 
programme included commissioning procedures 
and provisions made for operation. Below is a brief 
description of the inspection findings for which 
STUK required improvements from TVO. On the 
whole, the inspections have led to the conclusion 
that the procedures and resources of TVO’s organi-
sation are adequate.
An inspection on the testing of the I&C systems 
focused on TVO’s role during the testing, the status 
of the I&C system testing, coverage of the I&C 
tests and commissioning inspections of the I&C 
systems. One requirement on ensuring sufficient 
coverage of the I&C testing was given during the 
inspection.
Goal of the maintenance and ageing manage-
ment inspection was to study TVO’s readiness for 
maintenance and ageing management of mechani-
cal components. The inspection covered the status 
of the maintenance procedures as well as procure-
ment and storage of spare parts. Status of the 
training given to the maintenance personnel and 
training plans was also assessed. TVO’s mainte-
nance strategy and maintenance monitoring meth-
ods were assessed with selected components. The 
inspection also covered maintenance of the com-
ponents and structures during the commission-
ing stage and TVO’s views on and provisions for 
the elimination of negative effects caused by the 
plant’s long installation stage. No requirements 
were imposed in the inspection. 
The emergency preparedness arrangement in-
spection covered the emergency preparedness ar-
rangements, guidelines, facilities and training as 
well as security arrangement issues. STUK im-
Subject of inspection Inspection date
I&C system testing 27–28 January 2016
Maintenance and ageing management 9–10 February 2016
Emergency preparedness arrangements 22–23 March 2016
Commissioning 12–13 April 2016
Quality management – safety culture during commissioning 10–12 May 2016
Verification and validation of operator procedures 13–14 June 2016
Commissioning inspection of nuclear island components and systems 31 May – 1 June 2016
Management of modifications and configuration 21–22 September 2016
Electrical engineering 6–7 October 2016
Training and licensing of operators 11–12 October 2016
I&C 29–30 November 2016
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posed three requirements based on the inspection: 
a list of emergency preparedness procedures must 
be submitted to STUK; the emergency response 
plan must be supplemented with key tasks related 
to the management of threats; and announcements 
between the plant units during an emergency situ-
ation must be fluent. 
The commissioning inspection covered TVO’s 
operation during commissioning, maintenance of 
the situation assessment and employee orientation 
during commissioning. The inspection also covered 
the utilisation of operating experience feedback 
from the OL3 unit and other nuclear power plants 
during commissioning. One requirement on clarify-
ing the roles and responsibilities of the different 
organisations was given.
The quality management inspection covered the 
safety culture at the commissioning stage. The in-
spection also covered security arrangement issues 
as part of the safety culture. One requirement was 
imposed based on the inspection: the personnel 
must be provided instructions on how to prepare 
for a variety of external threats to the security ar-
rangements, such as phishing.
The operator procedures inspection covered 
background materials used when preparing the 
procedures, methods used to verify emergency op-
erating procedures and the validation plan. The in-
spection verified that the operations and documen-
tation comply with the procedures.  The current 
status of simulator tests and the validation plan 
were also reviewed. Based on the inspection, STUK 
required that the methodicalness and traceabil-
ity of testing be improved and that the testing be 
made more comprehensive in that it would cover 
all of the issues covered by the procedures, transi-
tions between procedures and a variety of faults. 
Furthermore, STUK required that a party inde-
pendent of the planning of the procedures must be 
used in the planning and approval of testing. 
In the unannounced inspection, STUK inspect-
ed TVO’s preparation for the commissioning in-
spections of the nuclear island (the components 
and systems will undergo a commissioning inspec-
tion before testing is started to verify that the pre-
requisites for starting testing have been met). No 
non-conformances from the agreed practices were 
observed and STUK noted that TVO and the plant 
supplier have actively developed their operations 
over the course of the last year. Some development 
areas were observed, such as the need to eliminate 
some overlapping work tasks, but no requirements 
were imposed based on the inspection.
The inspection on the management of modifica-
tions and configuration assessed TVO’s procedures 
in the processing of design and construction site 
modifications and the manner in which TVO re-
ceives information about modifications and over-
sees the plant supplier’s modification and configu-
ration management process. It was observed that 
TVO’s operations comply with the guidelines and 
TVO receives plenty of information about planned 
modifications. TVO has clearly developed its pro-
cedures during the project period. The processing 
of modifications is well documented and traceable. 
One requirement on instructions on the statutory 
approval of construction site modifications and re-
lated documentation was made.
The 2016 electrical engineering inspection cov-
ered the licensee’s observations about the com-
missioning of the electricity systems of OL3 and 
provisions for the operation of OL3, regarding har-
monisation of TVO’s electrical engineering opera-
tion/maintenance procedures for OL1/2 and OL3. 
One requirement on distribution of the design 
basis current in SBO’s parallel generator cables 
was given. 
The operator training and licensing inspection 
covered training plans for the operating personnel 
to be licensed, the related background materials 
and the planned operating personnel licensing 
routines. Four representatives of the operating 
personnel were interviewed prior to the inspection 
to study the views of the people being trained. Two 
requirements were imposed in the inspection: the 
training provided to the OL3 operators must in-
clude a section where the manner in which opera-
tors and shift supervisors can act as each other’s 
deputies and the deputy practices for the OL3 divi-
sion manager must be properly planned.
The I&C inspection covered the current status 
of operating procedures, the progress of the resolu-
tion of technical problems observed during testing 
and the management of modifications and configu-
ration. In connection with the latter, a walk-down 
of the plant supplier’s office and the construction 
site was arranged to verify appropriateness of doc-
ument modification markings. One requirement on 
recording daily observations on the commissioning 
of the I&C systems was given.
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APPENDIX 6 Inspections pertaining 
to the processing of Fennovoima’s 
construction licence application
When processing reports linked to the construc-
tion licence application of the Hanhikivi 1 plant 
project, STUK assesses both technical compliance 
of the plant and ability of the organisations of the 
licensee, the plant supplier and the main service 
providers to construct and ultimately operate a 
nuclear power plant.
In addition to studying the management sys-
tems of these actors, STUK conducts inspections 
to verify that the operations of the organisations 
comply with the requirements in practice. STUK 
launched the inspections included in the regula-
tory inspection programme (RKT) in September 
2015. Inspections are planned six months in ad-
vance. In 2016, STUK carried out a total of 15 
inspections. The inspection results will be used 
when preparing STUK’s safety assessment and 
statement on the construction licence.
Operations relating to the initiation of 
the manufacturing of long lead items 
(LLI) at Fennovoima (Helsinki)
Based on the inspection, Fennovoima must develop 
its plans related to LLI procurement. Aspects to 
be taken into account in the development include 
actions needed for procurement, responsibilities, 
the utilisation of resources and interfaces. “Critical 
components” must be distinguished from other 
“LLI components”, treated as a separate item, and 
presented as examples of STUK’s early inspection 
components. Furthermore, a general description of 
critical components must be prepared to facilitate 
the starting of STUK’s early inspection. Critical 
components include the reactor pressure vessel 
and pressurizers, for example. The details of the 
procedures must be agreed on with STUK as these 
processes become current.
Subject of inspection Date
Operations relating to the initiation of the manufacturing of long lead items (LLI) 
at Fennovoima (Helsinki)
8–10 March 2016
Management at Fennovoima and the processing of safety issues (Helsinki) 29 February – 2 March 2016
Review procedures and safety assessment of the plant supplier, RAOS Project 
Oy (Helsinki/St. Petersburg)
22–24 March 2016
Fennovoima’s civil engineering and facility/layout design – provisions for 
internal and external hazards (Helsinki)
26–28 April 2016
Review procedures and safety assessment of the principal designer of the 
plant’s primary circuit, OKB Gidropress (Podolsk)
27–29 April 2016
Fennovoima’s management system and key processes (Helsinki) 25–27 May 2016
JSC Atomproekt (St. Petersburg) 31 October – 2 November 2016
Fennovoima Oy, nuclear safeguards (Helsinki) 25–27 October 2016
Fennovoima Oy, safety culture (Helsinki) 12–14 October 2016
Fennovoima Oy, personnel resources (Helsinki) 21–23 November 2016
JSC Group TITAN-2 (St. Petersburg) 9–11 November 2016
Fennovoima Oy, security arrangements (Helsinki) 7–11 November 2016
Kurchatov Institute (Moscow) 16–18 November 2016
Fennovoima Oy, electricity (Helsinki) 25–27 October 2016
RAOS Project Oy (St. Petersburg) 19–21 December 2016
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Management at Fennovoima and the 
processing of safety issues (Helsinki)
Based on the inspection, Fennovoima must develop 
its operations by, among other things, harmonizing 
procedures with the plant supplier’s configuration 
management to ensure the compatibility of the 
entire process, by clarifying the structure of the 
configuration management guidelines and by in-
troducing a configuration management tool, and by 
ensuring communication processes between con-
figuration management, design management and 
licensing. Configuration management or the man-
agement of the technical configuration is a systems 
engineering process. It maintains the integrity of 
design and implementation with the help of identi-
fication, control, accounting and monitoring of the 
configuration.
Fennovoima must also assess the structure of 
the current organisation, the allocation of compe-
tences and resources as well as the organisation’s 
authority and responsibility relationships with 
respect to reaching the safety and quality objec-
tives. Fennovoima is planning to allocate its review 
resources to the processing of construction licence 
materials based on the plant supplier’s engineer-
ing schedule. Fennovoima must ensure through 
its project design that it has plans and sufficient 
resources for ensuring the integrity and conformity 
of design in the document review of the construc-
tion licence phase.
Review procedures and safety 
assessment of the plant supplier, 
RAOS Project Oy (St. Petersburg)
Based on the inspection, STUK noted that RAOS 
Project Oy’s management system does not current-
ly comply with the Finnish requirements. Fenno-
voima must ensure that the management system 
of RAOS is developed.
Inspection observations indicate that insuffi-
cient personnel resources prevent RAOS Project 
Oy from fulfilling the requirements placed on the 
plant supplier. Furthermore, RAOS Project Oy 
must specify the organisations responsible for en-
gineering at the construction licence stage.
It was observed in the inspection that the plant 
engineering configuration baseline has not been 
frozen. All construction licence materials to be sub-
mitted to STUK for review must be based on one 
and the same frozen configuration baseline. It was 
noted during the inspection that the configuration 
management process and the related instructions 
are still being developed. In order to meet the YVL 
Guide requirements, RAOS Project Oy must com-
plete the preparation of, and implement, the config-
uration management procedures and instructions.
Fennovoima’s civil engineering and 
facility/layout design – provisions for 
internal and external hazards (Helsinki)
Based on the inspection, Fennovoima must provide 
instructions for such facility/layout design guide 
procedures as are required to ensure the implemen-
tation of design requirements relating to layout, 
provisions for internal and external hazards, radia-
tion protection as well as security and emergency 
preparedness arrangements at the various design 
stages. Fennovoima must identify at least the fol-
lowing facility/layout design requirements and en-
sure that they are taken into account in the design 
(the National Building Code and the YVL Guides).
Fennovoima must take into account the poten-
tial facility/layout design problem areas identified 
by STUK in its preliminary safety assessment of 
2014 in the control of the design also in other re-
spects than an airplane crash.
Furthermore, Fennovoima must arrange con-
struction-related quality assurance and inspec-
tions, and personnel resources must be designated.
STUK noted that the experience gained and les-
sons learnt from the construction of the reference 
facility and other AES-2006 plants, and, where 
applicable, VVER-1000 plants, must be utilized in 
the FH1 plant unit facility/layout design process. 
In addition, systematic gathering and utilisation of 
observations and experiences relating to the FH1 
construction site must be started.
Review procedures and safety assessment 
of the main designer of the plant’s primary 
circuit, OKB Gidropress (Podolsk)
Based on the inspection, a documented process for 
the managing of safety issues must be added into 
the OGB Gidropress management system and the 
project-specific guidelines must be finalised.
Based on the inspection observations, OKB 
Gidropress must develop its Human Factors 
Engineering (HFE) strategy to also cover the de-
sign of systems, structures and components, and 
HFE must be made part of the design process.
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It was noted during the inspection that only fro-
zen and approved calculation codes may be used in 
the deterministic safety analyses of the construc-
tion licence application and that the data must be 
based on the same frozen configuration.
The plant engineering configuration baseline 
has not been frozen. Fennovoima must ensure 
that the project uses standardised configuration 
management definitions. Change management 
procedures between the frozen baselines must be 
described in the guidelines.
Fennovoima’s management 
system and key processes
STUK continued its regulatory inspection pro-
gramme (RKT) on the construction licence applica-
tion with an inspection of Fennovoima’s manage-
ment system and key processes. During the inspec-
tion, STUK noted that Fennovoima had clearly 
developed its management system due to STUK’s 
previous requirements.
Requirements given during the inspection in-
cluded, for instance, securing the interfaces be-
tween the processes of Fennovoima and the plant 
supplier, taking into account nuclear safety issues 
in project management, i.e. in the operations of the 
Project Execution Committee, as well as clarifying 
the responsibilities of Fennovoima’s different de-
partments in the processing of safety issues at the 
plant, architecture and system level.
JSC Atomproekt (St. Petersburg)
In the follow-up inspection of the principal designer 
(the first inspection took place on 16–18 December 
2015), STUK assessed the engineering and quality 
management procedures of Atomproekt. STUK’s 
follow-up inspection verified development of the 
principal designer’s management system and 
whether the design operations of AP comply with 
the Finnish requirements. The inspection focused 
especially on Atomproekt’s engineering manage-
ment procedures and guidelines. First, the inspec-
tion verified compliance with the requirements giv-
en in the first inspection. After the procedures had 
been reviewed and the verification was complete, 
half (5/10) of the requirements imposed in the first 
inspection could be closed.
STUK inspected the setting of plant and system 
level design bases for external hazards and their 
approval status, as well as changes in the position 
of the principal designer and links between new 
design organisations and the principal designer. 
The inspection also covered the approval of design 
subcontractors and delivery control, the manage-
ment of design changes and the preparation of 
deterministic safety analyses.
Based on the follow-up inspection, STUK is-
sued new requirements pertaining to, for instance, 
resource planning of the principal designer and 
allocation of resources, guidelines on the prelimi-
nary safety analysis report (PSAR), quality plan-
ning, continuity of the principal designer function, 
management of design changes and provisions for 
deterministic analyses. Based on the inspection, 
STUK noted clear development in the operations 
of Atomproekt, but also noticed continuous defi-
ciencies in the design resources of the Hanhikivi 1 
project.
Fennovoima Oy, nuclear 
safeguards (Helsinki)
The inspection covered Fennovoima’s nuclear safe-
guards system and Fennovoima’s plans for arrang-
ing the safeguards necessary to ensure the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons. The inspection 
focused on the plans and procedures Fennovoima 
uses to meet the requirements posed by legislation, 
the YVL Guides (Guide YVL D.1 in particular) and 
EU Regulations.
The inspection focus areas were: the manage-
ment system, processing of nuclear safeguards 
issues by management teams, cooperation and 
communication with persons in charge of nu-
clear safeguards activities, development of nuclear 
safeguards and training, risk management and 
risk assessments in nuclear safeguards, nuclear 
safeguards resource allocation, nuclear safeguards 
manual and its approval, Fennovoima’s nuclear 
safeguards system and enabling the oversight of 
authorities and international organisations.
Based on the inspection, STUK issued recom-
mendations regarding annual reporting, informa-
tion security criteria and codes of conduct in an 
appendix to the nuclear safeguards manual. Based 
on the inspection, STUK imposed requirements on 
planning and scheduling the nuclear safeguards 
system, the processing of documents and the man-
agement of non-conformances.
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Fennovoima Oy, safety culture (Helsinki)
Fennovoima’s procedures in assessing and develop-
ing its safety culture were assessed in the safety 
culture follow-up inspection. Special attention was 
paid to Fennovoima’s procedures to ensure a good 
safety culture throughout its supply chain. The 
inspection also studied Fennovoima’s measures 
regarding the requirements imposed in the 2015 
safety culture inspection.
In the inspection, STUK assessed that the 
management of Fennovoima aims to develop its 
safety culture competence and an overall idea of 
the development of Fennovoima’s safety culture 
by, for instance, reporting safety culture develop-
ment measures in FMT. It was also observed that 
the development of Fennovoima’s safety culture 
is active and its importance has been recognised 
by the Fennovoima organisation. STUK verified 
that Fennovoima did not perform a systematic 
safety culture self-assessment or a third-party 
assessment in 2016, which means that the view 
of Fennovoima’s management on the situation 
having improved is based particularly on a survey 
that measures functionality of the work commu-
nity which includes some safety culture ques-
tions and the fact that no reports on significant 
safety concerns have been submitted, which – in 
STUK’s opinion – does not provide a sufficiently 
reliable idea of the actual situation. The view of 
Fennovoima’s management on the status of safety 
culture in the supply chain was scattered.
Based on the inspection, STUK stated that 
Fennovoima needs to develop the entire process it 
uses to verify the safety culture of its organisation 
and supply chain and to effectively react to any dis-
advantages. Thus, STUK imposed a requirement 
that the Fennovoima management system must 
include procedures that the management can use 
to achieve a comprehensive and reliable idea of the 
safety culture status in Fennovoima and in its sup-
ply chain, as well as compliance of the safety cul-
ture. Fennovoima must describe these procedures 
and use them. Scope and correct timing of the 
actions included in the safety culture action plan 
must be verified taking into account issues such 
as the progress of plant design and manufacture. 
Fennovoima must ensure that there are sufficient 
resources to complete these actions. STUK will 
verify the development in a separate meeting to be 
arranged in March 2017.
Fennovoima Oy, personnel 
resources (Helsinki)
The personnel resources follow-up inspection fo-
cused on resource and competence management 
at Fennovoima with regard to further developing 
nuclear safety and meeting the needs of the plant 
project. Status of the requirements from the previ-
ous inspection and competence development plans 
and procedures for the responsible persons as laid 
down in YVL Guide A.4 were reviewed.
Based on the inspection, STUK stated that 
Fennovoima must develop its competence and re-
source management procedures and ensure that 
all duties important to safety in the different 
organisations included in the supply chain have 
been determined and competence of the people 
in these positions is sufficient. For this reason, 
STUK imposed a requirement that Fennovoima 
must systematically verify sufficient competence 
and resources in its organisation. Procedures must 
be described and related guidelines must be up-
dated. Any tasks important to safety or related to 
safety must be taken into account in the develop-
ment work. The procedures must guarantee the 
organisation’s sufficient professional competence, 
technical know-how and safety competence, as well 
as identification of competence deficiencies and 
resource gaps. Furthermore, Fennovoima must de-
velop its procedures for the identification of tasks 
important to safety in the different organisations 
included in the supply chain, the setting of related 
requirements, and the monitoring and securing of 
competencies.
JSC Group TITAN-2 (Sosnovyi Bor)
Purpose of the TITAN-2 inspection was to verify 
the supplier’s ability to act as the main contrac-
tor of a nuclear power plant construction site. The 
inspection verified through selected samples that 
the project and design management processes 
are implemented according to the instructions at 
TITAN-2. STUK verified procedures and plans on 
Hanhikivi 1 as well as related documents and da-
tabases.
Based on the inspection, STUK imposed re-
quirements on assessment and certification of 
the TITAN-2 management system, requirement 
management, risk management, presentation of 
Finnish requirements in the project, and system-
atic utilisation of construction experience from 
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other VVER plants and nuclear power plant pro-
jects. No training on Finnish safety requirements, 
the Hanhikivi 1 design basis, the management 
system of the Hanhikivi 1 project or construction 
experience was found in the TITAN-2 training 
programme.
Fennovoima Oy, security 
arrangements (Helsinki)
The inspection covered the security arrangements 
of Fennovoima, which are considered to include 
structural, technical, operative, and organisational 
arrangements in order to detect, delay and prevent 
illegal or unauthorised activity.
Based on the inspection, STUK imposed re-
quirements on, for instance, Fennovoima having 
to more clearly take into account the Finnish se-
curity arrangement requirements in engineering 
and construction realised by the plant supplier 
and the description of buildings classified as EYT 
in the preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) 
from the viewpoint of the realisation of security 
arrangements.
Kurchatov Institute (Moscow)
The inspection covered the UNPP department 
of the Kurchatov Institute. The focus areas were 
the organisation, configuration and quality man-
agement, deterministic safety analyses and the 
Institute’s material testing operations. During the 
inspection, STUK was informed that the organisa-
tion will be merged with other organisations that 
do not participate in the Hanhikivi 1 project. Due 
to the merger, the VVER subunit is now called 
UNPP. The change will influence the management 
system documentation; it must be updated.
It was observed during the inspection that 
the Kurchatov Institute’s configuration manage-
ment plan is still being prepared. STUK imposed 
a requirement that Fennovoima must ensure that 
the plan is completed and that it is in line with 
Fennovoima’s configuration management. All con-
struction licence documents to be assessed and 
reviewed by STUK must be based on one and the 
same frozen configuration baseline.
According to the inspection observations, the 
preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) materi-
als have already been prepared by the Institute. 
STUK imposed a requirement that Fennovoima 
must ensure that the PSAR chapters delivered 
in connection with the construction licence docu-
mentation comply with the Finnish requirements 
and any differences from the Hanhikivi 1 plant 
are determined and presented in the PSAR. It was 
also noted that Fennovoima has not yet approved 
the Kurchatov Institute’s quality plan. According 
to the inspection observations, work has been done 
without an approved quality plan. Fennovoima 
must ensure that the quality plan is completed and 
taken into use. The Kurchatov Institute must im-
prove its document management guidelines.
Fennovoima Oy, electricity (Helsinki)
The inspection covered Fennovoima’s electrical 
engineering and emergency power supply units. 
Issued covered in the inspection included Fenno-
voima’s electricity and emergency power supply 
unit personnel resources as well as actions and 
procedures when identifying, monitoring and pro-
cessing safety issues. The inspection focused on 
the following safety-critical key functions: design 
of personnel resources, engineering control and 
monitoring, reviewing technical plans, supplier ap-
proval and oversight of suppliers and procurement. 
The above-mentioned functions were verified by 
means of examples in the inspection.
Based on the inspection, STUK imposed re-
quirements on, for instance, verifying the lev-
el of expertise in power distribution to manage 
Fennovoima’s own design and that of its subcon-
tractors, as well as to assess the design of the plant 
supplier and its subcontractors. Fennovoima must 
develop its introductory training on knowledge of 
the plant to electrical engineering consultants, in-
troductory training on Fennovoima’s management 
system and introductory training on the Finnish 
nuclear safety requirements to electrical engineer-
ing employees. Fennovoima must determine the 
status of electrical engineering concepts in the de-
sign efforts and the construction licence documents 
and demonstrate that the quality plans are used to 
guide the design processes of electrical engineer-
ing concepts, architectures and systems. After the 
inspection, STUK required that Fennovoima add 
electrical engineering design guidelines to its man-
agement system.
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RAOS Project Oy (St. Petersburg)
The follow-up inspection of the plant supplier cov-
ered actions by RAOS Project Oy (“RAOS”) and its 
procedures in the identification, monitoring and 
processing of safety issues and in quality manage-
ment. The inspection focused on central safety-
critical management system processes, such as the 
processing of safety issues, quality management 
(QA/QC), project management and design man-
agement (including licensing planning and the 
management of open issues in the supply chain), 
configuration management (including change man-
agement) and management of requirements.
The inspection verified through selected sam-
ples that the above-mentioned project and design 
management processes are implemented accord-
ing to the instructions at RAOS. STUK verified 
instructions, procedures and plans on Hanhikivi 
1 as well as related documents and databases. 
When compliance with the requirements given 
in the first inspection was being verified, it was 
noted that RAOS has determinedly developed its 
management system. After the procedures had 
been reviewed and the verification was complete, 
most (13/15) of the requirements imposed in the 
first inspection could be closed. The requirements 
that were still left open involve assessment scope 
for the RAOS management system and freezing of 
the configuration baseline CB 0. It was observed 
during the inspection that the plant supplier’s 
organisation does not include all the necessary per-
sonnel resources yet. RAOS must submit reports 
on its personnel resource plans to Fennovoima and 
STUK. A requirement on supplier audits and their 
approval in the supply chain was also imposed. 
In addition, requirements on design management 
terminology and the management of document re-
visions were imposed.
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APPENDIX 7 Construction inspection programme 
for the encapsulation plant and disposal facility
In 2016, the oversight project continued the in-
spections included in the construction inspection 
programme (RTO). Inspections included in the pro-
gramme assess the performance of Posiva’s man-
agement system, the sufficiency of procedures and 
their ability to guide design, manufacture, con-
struction and installation operations, as well as 
the taking into account of safety requirements at 
different stages of the project. The programme also 
aims at assessing Posiva’s procedures to ensure 
that a safe nuclear facility of a high quality will 
be constructed. Inspections included in the pro-
gramme may also be targeted to Posiva’s suppliers 
important to safety. The 2016 inspections only fo-
cused on operations of the licensee, however.
The 2016 programme consisted of nine inspec-
tions. Below are brief descriptions of the inspec-
tions, as well as the key observations made based 
on which STUK had required improvements and 
development actions from Posiva. A total of around 
thirty requirements on correcting observed defi-
ciencies or further developing the operations were 
submitted to Posiva in the inspection decisions.
Quality management
One goal of the inspection was to assess the impact 
of Posiva’s 2015 organisational renewal on qual-
ity assurance and quality control operations and 
personnel resources. The inspection also covered 
personnel resources in the organisational units in 
charge of quality assurance and quality control. 
A topical special theme was quality control of the 
clay-based engineered barriers used during dispos-
al, the buffer block and the tunnel filling material.
Posiva is in the process of merging some of its 
procedures to comply with TVO’s operations. To 
ensure that the merger is completed in a controlled 
manner, Posiva was required to prepare a plan that 
includes the scope of the development work, devel-
opment areas, personnel resources and schedule. 
Posiva’s procedures when processing suspicious 
products or forgeries in the non-conformance man-
agement system were assessed in the inspection. 
In addition to the regular processing of prod-
uct non-conformances, such products may require 
other actions, such as communication of informa-
tion, notifications to the authorities or disposal of 
products. The inspection demonstrated that Posiva 
must assess the need to update its non-conform-
ance management process to ensure that any 
suspicious products or forgeries will be sufficiently 
comprehensively processed.
Design operations
The design operations inspection covered Posiva’s 
design operations, the control and guidance of de-
Subject of inspection Date
Quality management 25–26 January 2016
Design operations 30–31 March 2016
Personnel resources and training 23–25 May 2016
Rock classification and detailed model descriptions 2–3 June 2016
Nuclear safeguards 6–8 June 2016
Rock construction procedures 19–20 September 2016
Project management and quality management of the disposal and encapsula-
tion facility
15–19 September 2016
Safety culture 8–9 November 2016
Long-term safety 23–24 November 2016
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sign, design guidelines and the sufficiency of per-
sonnel resources. Two examples were used to verify 
that the control and guidance of design are realised 
in compliance with Posiva’s procedures.
Posiva has updated its design processes and 
guidelines to comply with its changed operations 
model and organisation. The inspection determined 
that the tasks, responsibilities and obligations of 
the plant technology function that carries the re-
sponsibility for the detailed design of the nuclear 
waste facility have been specified in detail.
Posiva has taken into account the impact of 
the organisational renewal in its configuration 
management plan, for example. A stage where the 
basic design and the requirement specification are 
verified was added in connection with the update 
to ensure that Posiva’s design is sound and bal-
anced. The new stage also aims at verification of 
the readiness of the design to move forward to the 
implementation planning stage.
As a summary for the inspection, STUK stated 
that Posiva has continued the systematic develop-
ment of its design operations in compliance with 
the principle of continuous improvement laid down 
in Posiva’s management system. STUK is of the 
opinion that if the procedures are followed, Posiva 
will be able to verify that the nuclear waste facil-
ity and its systems, components and structures are 
designed, manufactured, constructed, installed and 
commissioned in compliance with the approved 
plans and procedures.
Personnel resources and training
In 2016, STUK implemented a comprehensive and 
detailed inspection of the planning of Posiva’s per-
sonnel resources and personnel training. The in-
spection covered Posiva’s personnel resource plans 
and the current status of the organisation for pro-
jects involving the disposal facility and its con-
struction, the encapsulation facility, manufacture 
and long-term safety. The inspection verified how 
well the resource plans have identified all of the 
key competence areas from the project plans, how 
well the correct number of experts for all the goals 
listed in the project plans have been allocated and 
whether the personnel resources have been cor-
rectly scheduled. Furthermore, the inspection veri-
fied adequacy of Posiva’s personnel resources and 
the competence of the employees on safe construc-
tion of a nuclear waste facility.
Twelve employees from the Posiva organisation 
were interviewed on the first day of the inspection. 
The interviews aimed at determining experiences 
of the employees on the current status of the or-
ganisation, on personnel resource planning, on 
the development of competence and on the safety 
significance of their work duties.
Posiva has in place orientation procedures for 
people recruited from outside the organisation and 
people who are transferred from the TVO organi-
sation to the Posiva organisation. Posiva does not 
have a clear orientation procedure for people who 
are employed by TVO and work less than 50% of 
their working hours in the Posiva organisation, 
however. To eliminate this deficiency, Posiva was 
required to create a procedure to ensure that the 
non-Posiva employees working in the Posiva organ-
isation will receive systematic orientation training.
It was also determined that Posiva should use 
a more systematic procedure to prepare for per-
sonnel turnover, and Posiva was required to take 
action to ensure better preparation for personnel 
turnover and long recruitment times. Based on the 
inspection, STUK noted, however, that the recruit-
ment operations as a whole have been systematic.
One of STUK’s requirements based on the 
inspection results was that Posiva must use de-
velopment programmes to ensure that sufficient 
competence will be achieved and maintained in all 
positions important to safety. Furthermore, Posiva 
must make sure that the development programmes 
include project management training to verify that 
there is sufficient project management expertise 
for all of Posiva’s projects important to safety.
Rock classification and detailed 
model descriptions
The inspection covered Posiva’s rock classification 
system and detailed rock model descriptions. The 
inspection covered processes that Posiva uses to 
verify compliance with the regulations in the ap-
plicability classification of the disposal site and the 
rock in the disposal facility that is part of the de-
sign and construction of the disposal facility. Posiva 
must demonstrate that the procedures used in the 
applicability classification of the bedrock and the 
provisions for the detailed model descriptions are 
documented and that the procedures, classification 
and descriptions are not too dependent on the per-
sonal views of the experts.
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The inspection demonstrated that Posiva has 
documented document review procedures at a gen-
eral level in its procedures, but compliance with 
the principle of independence in the preparation, 
review and approval of documents has been some-
what subject to interpretation. Therefore, Posiva 
was required to document the document review 
and approval procedures used in the rock classifi-
cation to ensure that sufficient independence will 
be achieved.
Another issue observed in the inspection was 
that the rock classification procedures, which are 
extensive enough, are not up to date. Posiva must 
make several additions and modifications to the 
procedure. The plan is to separate some parts of 
the procedure into supplementary classification 
procedures. At least some of them are still at the 
planning stage. As the update process is still ongo-
ing, STUK required that Posiva submits to STUK 
a plan on the updating of the procedures required 
for the rock classification and a schedule for the 
updates. Posiva was also required to implement 
the document management procedures required 
for the rock classification in its document manage-
ment system in such a manner that it will be able 
to verify that the latest classification data is avail-
able for both design and decision-making.
Nuclear safeguards
The inspection focus areas were the nuclear 
safeguards system of Posiva and the manner in 
which Posiva takes care of its nuclear safeguards 
obligations. The inspection focused on the pro-
cedures Posiva uses to meet the requirements 
posed by legislation, STUK’s YVL Guides and EU 
Regulations.
A nuclear safeguards handbook, which is part of 
Posiva’s management system, includes actual op-
erations and issues regarding nuclear safeguards 
and references to other documents that describe 
more general administrative instructions for the 
management system. In the inspection, Posiva 
was required to verify in connection with the next 
update of the handbook that all the requirements 
in STUK’s Guide YVL D.1, Regulatory control of 
nuclear safeguards, that apply to the construction 
of Posiva’s nuclear facility are identified and taken 
into account. Furthermore, when updating the 
nuclear safeguards handbook or the related guide-
lines, more specific approval practices for interna-
tional inspectors and the enabling of inspections by 
technical experts must be added.
Rock construction procedures
The inspection covered processes that Posiva uses 
to verify compliance with the regulations and qual-
ity management in the rock engineering and rock 
construction of the disposal facility. The inspection 
covered Posiva’s rock engineering and implementa-
tion processes and functions as well as their in-
terfaces with other processes, such as initial data, 
rock classification and long-term safety. The in-
spection verified that procedures on construction 
of the disposal facility, the management of changes, 
quality management and quality assurance are 
properly planned and documented, and the opera-
tions comply with the guidelines.
The goal with the construction of Posiva’s dis-
posal facility is to construct a facility that complies 
with the requirements. According to STUK’s view, 
issues that Posiva needs to further develop in its 
construction activities include the recording, ad-
ministration and processing of instances when the 
construction action limits are exceeded, the moni-
toring of the implementation of actions and the 
closing of the actions so that the procedure includes 
a schedule and determines the persons responsible 
for the processing of the actions. Advanced proce-
dures will ensure that all events that could lead 
to situations that compromise compliance of the 
operations are properly processed. Another im-
portant requirement to Posiva by STUK was the 
delivery to STUK of a plan on the development of 
the rock construction methods to be used to ensure 
construction of the disposal facility in compliance 
with the requirements.
Project management and quality 
management of the disposal 
and encapsulation facility
The inspection covered Posiva’s project planning 
and the procedures Posiva uses to ensure good 
quality of projects. The inspection studied the pro-
cedures Posiva uses when reconciling and manag-
ing personnel resources in the line organisation 
and projects, as well as verified how issues impor-
tant to nuclear and radiation safety are processed 
by the management of the project organisation. 
Other inspection focus areas included management 
of internal and external communication of projects, 
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management of stakeholders and project reporting. 
The comprehensive inspection included a section 
in which Posiva’s experts who participate in the 
encapsulation and disposal facility project were 
interviewed.
The inspection demonstrated that there are 
some areas that need updating in the plans for 
both the disposal facility project and the encap-
sulation facility project based on both the YVL 
Guides and Posiva’s own guidelines. Furthermore, 
the quality management descriptions in the project 
plans need to be supplemented and further devel-
oped. Due to the observations made, Posiva was 
required to ensure that STUK’s requirements on 
project management and Posiva’s own guidelines 
will be taken into account to a sufficient extent 
when the project plans are updated the next time. 
In the case of project management, Posiva was re-
quired to take care in general that people working 
in all projects are provided a systematic orienta-
tion to the project plans.
It was noted during the inspection that Posiva 
recently completed the reporting of experiences 
from the research facility (the Onkalo project). 
Posiva was required to take the report into account 
in the construction of the disposal facility and the 
development of its operations.
Posiva submitted a risk management plan for 
the construction project in connection with its con-
struction licence application. However, it was noted 
during the inspection that the project is currently 
using a new risk management guideline, which 
means that the risk management plan submitted 
in connection with the construction licence applica-
tion is no longer valid. Posiva was required to sub-
mit to STUK for information the project’s updated 
risk management plan.
Safety culture
The inspection covered Posiva’s safety culture as-
sessment and development procedures, Posiva’s 
2016 safety culture action plan and implementa-
tion of TVO Group’s safety culture programme at 
Posiva in 2016. The inspection also covered Posiva’s 
safety culture development resources and the re-
lated organisation as well as verified how Posiva 
has communicated information about the safety 
culture and promoted its safety culture principles. 
Other inspection areas included Posiva’s safety cul-
ture follow-up and assessment methods and their 
results.
It was noted after the inspection that Posiva 
is currently developing its safety culture develop-
ment and assessment operations to reach the level 
specified by STUK’s requirements. No require-
ments for Posiva were made during the inspection.
Long-term safety
The inspection covered the preparation of Posiva’s 
safety case, which is required to demonstrate long-
term safety. The plan is to include the safety case in 
Posiva’s operating licence application that should 
be submitted by the end of 2020.
The inspection covered the operations and pro-
cedures that Posiva uses to verify compliance with 
the regulations and requirements when preparing 
its TURVA-2020 safety case and the safety case 
documentation. Other areas covered by the inspec-
tion included communication about changes in the 
research and development operations to STUK and 
the role of the Swedish company SKB in the prepa-
ration of TURVA-2020.
The descriptions of some of the responsible 
roles in the documents reviewed during the inspec-
tion were unclear and the terminology used was 
not harmonised. Posiva was required to assess 
these documents to verify that the content of the 
documents is unambiguous. A need to update the 
TURVA-2020 project and quality plan was also 
detected. Reconciliation of the quality plan sched-
ule with the schedule of the disposal project must 
be taken into account in the quality plan and the 
schedules of the work packages therein must be 
updated.
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APPENDIX 8 Licences and approvals in accordance 
with the Nuclear Energy Act in 2016
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
•	 3/C42214/2016,	22	March	2016:	OL1/OL2	–	im-
port of SIRM protective sleeves from Germany. 
Last date of validity 31 January 2016.
•	 5/G42214/2016,	19	May	2016:	OL3	–	 import	of	
dummy fuel assembly and control rod from Ger-
many. Last date of validity 31 January 2016.
•	 7/C42214/2016,	 9	 September	 2016:	 OL1/OL2	
– import of reactor coolant pump components 
from Germany. Last date of validity 31 Decem-
ber 2017.
•	 8/C42214/2016,	17	October	2016:	Import	of	nu-
clear fuel with Euratom obligation code “S” from 
Germany (OL1 e 39). Last date of validity 31 
December 2017.
•	 9/C42214/2016,	17	October	2016:	Import	of	nu-
clear fuel with Euratom obligation code “P” 
from Sweden (OL2 e 37). Last date of validity 
31 December 2017.
•	 12/G42214/2016,	12	December	2016:	Replacing	
import licence 4/G42214/2011 for dual-use prod-
ucts required in the construction and operation 
of the OL3 nuclear power plant unit and its 
extension decision 5/G42214/2013 with a new 
import licence (import from France or Germany). 
Last date of validity 31 January 2018.
•	 13/G42214/2016,	 12	 December	 2016:	 Import	
of nuclear fuel with Euratom obligation codes 
“N”, “P” and “S” from Germany (OL3 initial core 
loading and backup assemblies). Last date of 
validity 31 December 2020.
Fortum Power and Heat Oy
•	 12/A42214/2015,	 21	 January	 2016:	 Import	 of	
neutron flux sensors from Russia. Last date of 
validity 31 January 2016.
•	 1/A42214/2016,	27	April	2016:	Import	of	in-core	
neutron flux sensors from Canada. Last date of 
validity 31 January 2016.
Others
•	 1/Y42214/2016,	 26	 January	 2016,	 VTT	 Tech-
nical Research Centre of Finland; import of 
design documents of the Fukushima Daiichi nu-
clear reactors and fuel assemblies from Japan 
and their possession. Last date of validity 31 
January 2025.
•	 14/Y42214/2016,	24	November	2016:	Operating	
licence for VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety. Last 
date of validity 31 January 2026.
•	 5/Y42214/2016,	16	May	2016:	Operating	licence	
for nuclear-use items for the Department of Ap-
plied Physics of the Aalto University. Last date 
of validity 31 May 2026.
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